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SUMMARY
This thesis is concerned with what it is to be a person, and 
with what is involved in being the same person over time. I begin by 
making a survey of the major theories of personal identity, and 
mark some important divisions and distinctions between them, 
primarily between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and, within 
this former category, between the Physical and Psychological 
Criteria, and argue that none of these ha5 proved to be satisfactory. 
I stress the importance of the work of Derek Parfit, and in 
particular his shifting of the agenda away from the relation of 
identity to that of ’Relation R ’, and his claim that it is the 
holding of this latter relation - namely psychological continuity 
by any means - that contains 'all that matters’ to us regarding 
the future, and not necessarily whether 1^ survive. I show how this 
theory avoids the pitfalls that defeated the other theories, and 
propose various developments of it.
A critical eye is then cast over the methodology of thought- 
experimentation, so long the cornerstone of philosophical studies 
of personal identity, whereby conclusions are derived from consider­
ations regarding what we would say if certain hypothetical states 
of affairs were to occur. The concept of 'theoretical possibility' 
is employed in order to determine the limits of applicability of 
such thought-experiments. Many of the most influential arguments 
and theories regarding issues of personal identity are found to be 
flawed due to misuse of this methodology, and their conclusions are 
judged to be unwarranted.
The remainder of the thesis is concerned with identifying and 
discussing issues regarding personal identity that remain, once a 
more modest methodological framework is imposed. These concern the 
nature and the limits of psychological unity and continuity, and 
focus on real-life conditions, both typical and pathological, and 
are rooted within scientific research (particularly the neuro- 
sciences) rather than imaginative speculation.
My conclusions are for the most part negative, arguing that not 
only the answers, but the very questions that have been traditionally 
posed regarding personal identity cease to be relevant, once the 
flaws in the framework that supported them have been exposed.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PRELUDE
I was initially drawn into investigations of personal identity through 
my fascination with the work of Derek Parfit, and his iconoclastic 
claim that personal identity itself was not essentially 'what mattered'. 
I saw my task as in developing a Parfitian theory, and, in doing so, I 
wholeheartedly adopted the method of / experiment, as employed
by my mentor and so many of his illustrious peers and predecessors. 
However, in time I began to have serious misgivings over the use of 
this methodology. It seemed to me that some of the most notable
experiments were firstly too outlandish and secondly too 
vague and unspecified (and that these two factors were integrally 
connected) to admit trustworthy conclusions.
Wittgenstein famously described the situation of someone who has 
been bewitched by a misleading philosophical perspective as being akin 
to a fly trapped in a bottle, forever buzzing around in circles in 
the illusion of progress, but who only needed to stop and look up, and
then the way out would come into view, and be seen to have been there
all along. While identifying with this picture, a more accurate 
metaphor for my own predicament is that of a fly who has been enticed 
by a drop of jam, and who, finding himself stuck to it, is left with 
the only option of eating himself free. This is the project of the 
first half of this thesis - that of working from within the tradition 
of thought'- experimentation, devouring its choice delicacies, even
making a few of my own, and concluding that while the feast is very
tasty and enjoyable, it is excessive and indulgent, and in need of the 
application of a few principles of sound nutrition. Within this 
context, my title of 'Beyond Personal Identity' makes reference to 
Parfit's dropping of the concept of identity in favour of an analysis 
in terms of psychological continuity, and also to my advocacy of the 
primacy of the concept of 'human being' over that of 'person*.
However, rather than urging an outright rejection of the practice of 
thought - experimentation, I am advocating the practice of extreme 
caution in its employment. Whilst some notable examples are whole - 
heartedly rejected, I keep an .uptP,- minded agnosticism regarding 
others, and cul*vd- the situations described therein might
be actualised. In the second half of the thesis I identify and 
investigate the central issues regarding personal identity once the
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unrestricted use of • ‘ tKoio.ntr-experiments is rejected. As we will see; 1 
c*ryui many of the traditional issues dominating the subject are dropped, as 
they gained credence from this discredited approach, and so the whole 
basis of inquiry., into personal identity will need to be reassessed.
In this introductory chapter I will give a brief overview of the
dominant theories and analyses of personal identity, and describe some
important distinctions and classifications that are employed in the 
construction of these theories. This will enable me to set the scene 
for the more detailed investigations of the following chapters.
1.2 Varieties of Identity
In any discussion of identity there are several different 
concepts which must be clearly distinguished, since confusion 
regarding them can lead to profound error. It is best to make these 
distinctions clearly at the beginning. Logicians regard identity as an 
equivalence relation, that is, it comprises the following relations : 
reflexivity : a = a. 
symmetry : if a = b, then b = a. 
transitivity : if a = b, and b = c, then a = c.
However, the crucial property that distinguishes identity statements 
from all others is that they must obey Leibnlk’Law, otherwise known as 
the law of the Indiscerftability of Identicals : that is, if a = b, 
then whatever is true of a is true of b and vice versa. Put formally, 
this reads as (x) (y) [(x = y) o (0x s 0y)].
The type of identity referred to in the above specifications is 
numerical identity, which must be distinguished from qualitative 
identity, otherwise known as ’exact similarity’. (When the term 
’idgfltity’ appears on its own, I take it to refer to numerical identity). 
If a and b are numerically identical, then they are one and the same 
thing, whereas if a and b are qualitatively identical, then they are 
exactly alike in their intrinsic qualities and properties and in the 
relationships thereof - but it does not follow that they are numerically 
identical. Rather, this relationship between a and b might be expressed 
by saying that they are two tokens of the same type.
Many of the philosophical quandaries regarding personal identity arise 
from the running together of numerical and qualitative identity. The 
difficulties are compounded by yet another distinction, namely that 
between synchronic and diachronic identity. If a and b are synchronic-
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ally identical, then they are one and the same thing (i.e. numerically 
identical) at a given time t; whereas if a and b are diachronically 
identical, then the relation of numerical identity holds between them 
over time. That is, they are both stages or 'time - slices’ of the 
same t e m p o r a l l y - * object.
In cases concerning the alleged holding of synchronic identity, the 
content of the question ’is a = b ?’ often unpacks to reveal a question 
regarding sense and reference - that is, whether ’a ’ and ’b ’ are terms 
which refer to one and the same object, but (in Russellian terms) under 
different descriptions, or (in terms of Kripke & Putnam’s causal 
theory) having two distinct causal chains of usage, both grounded in 
the same object. Recently, another set of problems relating to 
synchronic identity of persons has come to the fore, concerning such 
phenomena as split - surgery and Multiple Personality Disorder,
concerning the issue of ’unity of mind’ and the ’copersonality relation’ 
amongst mental states i.e. under what conditions are mental states 
attributable to the same person at any given time ? I discuss these 
issues in detail in later chapters.
However, it is undoubtedly the case that the majority of the perennial
questions regarding identity, and particularly regarding personal 
beg* Hfipird
identity have . to matters concerning the conditions of the
holding of identity through time. The basic fact that everything in 
the Universe is in motion and constantly undergoing changes raises the 
fundamental question of how, and under what conditions, can identity 
through time be maintained in the absence or breaching of qualitative 
identity, in the face of such unremitting change. Clearly, no-one 
would suggest that such identity is preserved throughout all possible 
changes, so we must closely examine the issues regarding the criteria 
for identity through time for specific classes of entities.
It is wise to clear up some potential confusion regarding the ways in 
which Leibniz’ Law relates to diachronic identity. To take an example : 
the newspaper, a copy of which was purchased by my father, that 
published the announcement of my birth to a jubilant world was, on 
that day (tl), clean and white. That newspaper is now (t2) dirty, 
yellow and crumpled, in a cupboard in my mother’s house. Let us call 
the hot-off-the-press paper ’a ’, and the old rag ’b ’. I want to say 
that a = b. But does not Leibniz’ Law demand that if a = b, then any 
property that can be ascribed to a must equally be ascribable to b ?
And surely a is white and b is not ?
Such an argument misapplies Leibniz' Law. I accept that if a paper is 
white at tl and it is not white at t2, then there is something that is 
a true predication of it at tl which is a false predication of it at 
t2. However, this does not constitute a contravention of Leibniz' Law, 
as the law does not require that if a = b, then 
if a is F (white) at tl then b is F at t2, but that
if a is F at tl, then b is F at tj_.
1.3 REDUCTIONISM AND NON-REDUCTIONISM
In stating this important distinction among theories of personal 
identity, I will draw on the treatment by Parfit [1984], who amongst 
recent writers has discussed the distinction in the most depth.
A reductionist theory of personal identity is one that holds the 
following principles to be true :
1. The fact of the holding of personal identity through time consists 
purely in the holding of other facts, namely facts concerning physical 
and / or psychological continuity.
2. A person s existence j* ■ consists^in the existence of a brain and
body, and the occurrence of a causally interrelated set of mental and
physical states.
3. A reductionist can accept that persons exist, and have experiences, 
but they deny that persons are 'separately existing entities' beyond 
those existents specified above in 2.
4. These facts i,.. personal identity consists can be described 
'impersonally', that is, without attributing them to any person; so 
that, while persons exist in the sense described in 3., we could give 
a complete description of reality that did not mention persons.
5. There can be cases in which the issue of a person's identity through 
time is 'unpuzzlingly indeterminate'. Of course, numerical identity is 
an 'all-or-nothing' relation that does not admit of degrees - as 
Shoemaker [1985] says,
"No ordered pair of entities in the world can be such that it is 
indeterminate whether its first member is identical to its second"
(p450).
Rather, what Parfit is saying is that since persons are not separately 
existing entities, personal identity should be analysed in terms of 
physical and psychological continuity, and since these relations do 
admit of degrees, there will conceivably be cases where a clear-cut 
answer to the question of identity cannot in principle be given.
Although this factor of the indeterminacy of identity is often presented 
as a metaphysical matter, relating to some indeterminacy in the world
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regarding the relationship between'a at tl and b at t2, it should, on 
the contrary, be regarded as a semantic matter, where an indeterminacy 
in the reference of a given sortal concept leads to the formulation of 
identity statements without determinate truth-values.
6. In such situations, and when all the facts regarding what is 
constitutive of a particular are known, then any question that remains 
regarding its identity is empty, that is, it is not a real question 
regarding different possibilities, but is a case where any apparently 
conflicting answers are merely different descriptions of the same 
state of affairs.
7. What matters as regards the future is not the continued holding of 
my identity per se, but the maint'e/icunce of the continuities given in 
2.. For instance, Parfit argues that the relation that contains ’all 
that matters’ is Relation R - psychological continuity by any means. 
Relating this to 6., Andrew Brennan [1988] sees the reductionism / 
non-reductionism dispute as concerning
"how much information is necessary for telling us all that matters in 
an identity problem” (p255)
To a reductionist, when all the facts are in regarding physical and 
psychological continuity, we know enough to determine all that matters 
even if the question of identity remains unresolved, whereas in such a 
situation, a non-reductionist would regard the big issue as remaining 
open until the matter of identity is settled.
A non-reductionist theory of personal identity can be defined in terms 
of its opposition to this reductionist creed. In particular, non- 
reductionism holds that persons are separately-existing basic entities 
apart from a continuing body and brain and sets of mental and physical 
states; personal identity is a ’further fact’ that is irreducible to 
these other facts; the holding of identity is always a determinate 
matter, and is itself essentially ’what matters’ as regards future 
survival. Parfit argues that once these conditions are combined, non- 
reductionism appears to be committed to the existence of something 
like a Cartesian Ego. In saying that questions of personal identity 
always have a determinate answer, a non-reductionist is not committed 
to the claim that we must be able in practice to determine the answer, 
but merely that this ’further fact’ is out there, even if it transcends 
our practical limitations on verifiability. So, for example, a Kantian 
belief in a Transcendental Ego located within an unknowable Noumenal 
world would still count as a non-reductionist view.
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1.4 REDUCTIONIST CRITERIA OF IDENTITY
Reductionism is by far the dominant perspective regarding personal 
identity, and most of the interesting debates have taken place within 
its confines, concerning which set of facts personal identity is best 
analysed in terms of. In this, the basic dispute is between forms of 
the Physical and Psychological Criteria. Both these theories have a 
long philosophical pedigree, but in their modern variants they are not 
committed to much of the metaphysical baggage carried by their older 
formulations. For instance, the issue of dualism versus materialism 
has been set aside, as contemporary reductionists are all committed to 
some form of materialism. Rather, the two criteria differ by focussing 
on different levels of description of events constitutive of identity, 
or, in particular cases, in opting for the priority of some such events 
over others in dealing with questions of identity.
The Physical criterion states that x at tl is the same person as y 
at t2 if enough of x’s brain continues to support a full human 
consciousness, and is now y ’s brain, and if no other person z exists 
at t2 who also has enough of x’s brain to support such a consciousness.
For the moment, let us note that this is a sophisticated version 
of the criterion, with its emphasis on the brain as the essential 
bearer of conscious experience, in contrast with the Psychological 
criterion, which focusses on relationships between the experiences 
themselves. Note also that the Physical criterion is committed to the 
spatio-temporal continuity of the brain as a necessary condition of 
identity through time. In ch.4 I will attempt to refute this.
The Psychological criterion states that x at tl is the same person 
as y at t2 if the relation of psychological continuity holds between 
them, and there is no other person z at t2 who is likewise psycho­
logically continuous with x.
The most detailed formulation of this criterion has come from 
Parfit [1984], and my exposition will utilise some of his technical 
distinctions. Firstly, psychological connectedness consists in the 
holding of particular direct psychological connections between mental 
oxfents. The paradigm examples offered by Parfit are between an 
experience and the subsequent memory of it, or the forming of an 
intention and the subsequent action. Connectedness is a relation that 
comes by degrees, depending on the number of direct connections that 
hold. Strong connectedness is defined as holding in cases where at
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least half the number of direct connections made are preserved until 
at least the following day.
Psychological continuity consists of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness. This preserves personal identity through time in cases 
where there is an absence of a suitable degree of psychological 
connectedness holding over longer periods of time than a day, and thus 
avoids the paradox threatened by Reid’s [1785] example of the officer 
who remembers stealing apples as a child, but who, as a general in 
later life, remembers having led a cavalry charge as an officer, but 
not having stolen the apples. (I discuss this in ch.6) So, although 
most experiences occurring around tl will be forgotten at tlOO, they 
will mostly be remembered at t2 (the next day), and most experiences 
at t2 will be remembered at t3,and so on, so we have overlapping chains 
of memories preserving our psychological continuity, and, thereby, our 
identity.
Different versions of the Psychological criterion disagree over 
the issue of which causal processes must be responsible for the 
maintainance of psychological continuity. The narrow Psychological 
criterion admits only the normal cause - one continuously functioning 
brain - as suitable. Thus it will give the same answers to identity 
questions as the Physical criterion. By contrast, the wide Psychological 
criterion allows any causal process that permits psychological 
continuity to hold. So, for example, in the teletransportation fantasies 
so loved by philosophers, (see ch.4), the wide Psychological criterion 
would permit my replica and I to be identified, but neither the Physical 
nor the narrow Psychological criteria would agree.
1.5 THE MENU
In chapter 2 I will continue to investigate the dispute between the 
Physical and Psychological criteria by offering a critical discussion 
of the major contemporary contributions to the debate.
In chapter 3 I discuss aspects of non-reductionism.
In chapter 4 I pick up the thread of ch.2 again, with particular
reference to the issue of -SQrtctl- covered identity statements, and the 
question 'What kind of thing am I ?'.
In chapter 5 I call into question the methodology of thought-
experimentation that has figured heavily in the preceeding chapters. .
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In chapter 6, I discuss the concept of psychological continuity with 
reference to the central concept of memory.
In chapter 7 I discuss the implications of split-brain surgery for the 
concept of mental unity.
In chapter 8 I continue this discussion by investigating issues 
deriving from Multiple Personality Disorder.
I finish by drawing together my conclusions.
CHAPTER 2 IDENTITY AND SURVIVAL
As an entry into the contemporary debate between adherents of the 
Physical and Psychological Criteria, I will describe a puzzle set by 
Williams [1970] which goes directly to the heart of the matter. I will 
follow this with one influential response by Nozick [1981], and then 
with another, more fruitful reply, by Parfit [1984].
2.1 WILLIAMS' DILEMMA
Bernard Williams had previously advocated a Physical Criterion of 
personal identity, but in "The Self And The Future", the plot thickens.
In this article, he describes a thought-experiment in which we seem 
bound to say that a person has ’swopped’ a body and brain for another,
and survives as the same person in this new body, and that therefore a
Psychological Criterion looks justified. However, he then contrasts 
another thought-experiment which points firmly to a Physical Criterion. 
The problem is that this latter case appears to be very similar to the 
previous one, to the extent of being merely an alternative description 
of the same state of affairs, yet which leads to a contrary conclusion.
The examples involve that old and trusted friend of philosophers, 
the mad neuroscientist. In CASE 1, this highly disagreeable fellow has 
captured two persons A and B, and performs what might be called a
mutual total brain-state transfer upon them. In other words, through
some advanced technology, he manages to ’record’ in some form their 
entire respective sets of memories, dispositions, etc., which he then 
erases from their respective brains, and then ’switches’ them, so that 
the mental states that had been realised within A ’s brain are now 
realised within B ’s brain, and vice versa. A aind B are the names of the 
persons prior to this operation, and the resulting persons are called 
the ’A-body-person' and the ’B-body-person’, i.e. the A-body-person is 
the person whose present body was once A's body, and the B-body-person 
is likewise related to B.
Clearly, the big question concerns diachronic identity - i.e. are 
A and the A-body-person stages of the same temporally-enduring person, 
or are A and the B-body-person ? (As shorthand, I will use the more 
manageable expression 'is identical with’, or ’= ’ in tackling this 
issue - so the question is whether A = the A-body-person or whether 
A = the B-body-person.) Prior to the operation, A and B are told that
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one of the resulting persons is to be given $100,000, whilst the other 
is to be tortured. They are asked to choose who will get what, by 
basing their decisions purely on the grounds of self-interest. If A 
and B both thought that the operation constituted a ’body-swop’, then 
A would choose that the B-body-person receives the reward and that the 
A-body-person is tortured, with B choosing the converse. Williams 
plausibly argues that if the scientist withholds his decision from 
them until it is made manifest by the operation, whereupon he tortures 
the B-body-person and rewards the A-body-person, then the B-body person, 
having A ’s memories, will complain that that wasn’t the outcome he had 
chosen, whilst the A-body-person will be relieved that the choice that 
he, as B, made was carried out.
The claim that A = the B-body-person, and that B = the A-body- 
person looks to be justified even in a case where both victims don’t 
see the operation as being a ’body-swop'. For example, if A supports a 
Physical Criterion, he may choose that the B-body-person is tortured - 
but, says Williams, he as the B-body-person, will soon realise that he 
has made an unwise choice once the torture begins - and, specifically, 
he will recognise this unfortunate choice as being his.
In CASE 2 , I_ have been captured by this same mad scientist, who 
plans to use me as the subject of his dastardly experiments. I am
informed that I am to be subjected to agonising torture, but that
before this ordeal, all my mental states - all my memories, traits of 
character, likes and dislikes, ect., will be erased from my mind by 
means of some electronic device, so that I will forget the fact that I
am to be tortured. In addition, my lost ’mental set’ will be replaced,
via some form of programming, with another set of memories, attitudes, 
values, etc., qualitatively identical to those of some other living 
person. Now, Williams argues, it seems plausible to say that, from my 
point of view, anticipating these forthcoming events, the knowledge 
that I will undergo these psychological alterations does not remove my 
fear of this imminent torture, nor my conviction that despite all these 
changes, it is still me;,vi;ho is about to suffer. In fact, if anything, 
these changes will be perceived by me as adding to my ordeal, as now 
not only do I have physical agony to cope with, but also mental 
derangement.
However, by the Psychological Criterion, given that this case 
involves a complete break in psychological continuity, I should not be
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egoistically concerned with the fate of the person who will occupy my 
body, since he and I are not the same person. But, as Williams says, 
our intuitions are clear that it is I_ who is to be tortured, so my 
fears are well-justified, and the Psychological Criterion, it appears, 
is not. Yet surely Case 2 is merely an alternative description of Case 
1, stated in first-person-singular terms, so that, if I call myself ’A ’, 
the conclusion is that A = the A-body-person, in contrast to the 
previous conclusion.
The other difference between the two cases is that in Case 2, the 
second person, the 'mind-donor', is depicted as playing a fairly minor 
part, and the suggestion is that anything happening to him cannot 
affect the purported A:A-body-person identification. This argument is 
supported by two principles suggested by Williams in a previous essay 
[1957]. The first principle states that the question of whether x at tl 
is identical with y at t2 can only depend on facts concerning x and y, 
and any facts about some other z are irrelevant to the issue. The second 
principle is that if x at ti is identical with y at t2 by virtue of some 
relation holding between them, then there cannot be any other z who is 
similarly related to x at t2. If any such z does exist, or even could 
have existed, then x and y are not to be identified.
However, in Case 1, what happened to the second person is crucial, 
because we seemed forced to conclude that I am identical to the person 
surviving in his body after the operation. Yet from the perspective of 
Case 2, even if we bring the two cases more into line and make the
additional move in Case 2 of allowing my original 'mental set' to be
realised within the body whose previous mind-set had been donated to me, 
this does not make any intrinsic difference to what is going to happen 
to me - I am still going to be tortured, no matter what happens to 
anyone else. So Williams has presented us with an antinomy, as we have
been led to two mutually exclusive conclusions on the basis of the
same premises. Williams admits himself to be puzzled, and offers no 
resolution.
2.2 NOZICK'S RESPONSE
Robert Nozick suggests a way of compatibilising our divergent 
responses to the two cases, by denying the applicability of Williams' 
two above-mentioned principles, which he regards as inapplicable not 
just to 'problem case' counterfactuals like the above, but to all
possible cases, so that, on the contrary, the issue of whether x at tl 
and y at t2 are identical will always depend on who or what else is 
present at t2. Nozick offers the CLOSEST CONTINUER theory of identity 
(including personal identity), which states that :
x at tl is identical with y at t2 if y's properties grow out of, are 
causally dependent on x’s, and if there is no other z at t2 that stands 
in a closer (or as close) relation to x. Corollary to this ’closest 
continuer’ relation is the ’closest predecessor' relation, whereby for 
such an x and y to be identified, x must be y's closest predecesser - 
y cannot more closely continue some other z existing at tl than it does 
x. If xlSiy’s closest predecesser and y is x’s closest continuer, then 
x and y are said to be ’mono-related’, and the identity relation holds 
between them.
Now Nozick thinks that as a matter of fact we always do make 
judgements regarding matters of identity in accordance with this theory 
(presumably subconsciously), as it provides answers to all hypothetical 
problem cases that are in accordance with what our intuitions advise us. 
However he backtracks significantly to say that the theory cannot by 
itself solve identity problems, since it does not specify "what 
dimension or weighed sum of dimensions measures closeness" (p33). Take 
the famous example of the ship of Theseus. In the course of time, a 
ship gradually has all its component parts replaced, so that eventually 
not one original part remains. Yet throughout this time, and all these 
repairs and replacements, it remained afloat and functioning as a ship, 
and still bore the same name. However, in the intervening period, the 
original ship-parts were collected and stored, and once the entire set 
had been gathered, a ship-builder restored them to their former roles, 
and relaunched the reassembled ship. So we now have two ships, each 
with a claim to be the same ship as the original one. So, in Nozick's 
terms, the two 'dimensions' are firstly spatio-temporal continuity as a 
functioning ship, and secondly numerical identity of parts, and Nozick's 
theory cannot tell us which of these considerations should take priority.
Also, the Closest Continuer theory can at most offer a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition of identity, as y can be x's closest 
continuer, yet not be close enough to x for the identity relation to 
hold. This ’minimum closeness requirement’, amd the dimensions along 
which it is measured will, says Nozick, vary according to the kind of 
object under consideration.
Nozick lists a number of classic puzzle cases regarding personal
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identity to show that his theory gives solutions to them that accord 
with our intuitions. For example, if A at tl has his brain-states copied 
and programmed into a clone body, then this clone, B, is not identical 
to A, as A's closest continuer at this time t2 is A himself. However, 
if such a brain-state transfer took place and A were to die at this 
point, then B would be A's closest continuer on account of psychological 
continuity, and thus would be judged identical to A.
Nozick never spells out what his solution to Williams' dilemma is, 
but it seems to be that in Case 2, A's concern for the A-body-person is 
due to the fact that this person is, in the absence of anyone else, A's 
closest continuer, whereas in Case 1, psychological continuity over­
rules this physical continuity, so that the B-body-person is A ’s closest 
continuer. This, of course, gets us nowhefe, as it merely restates the 
problem, namely, given that the two cases are virtually alternative 
descriptions of the same state of affairs, how do they lead us to such 
opposite conclusions ? Why do different 'dimensions’ take precedence 
in the two cases ? I will have more to say on Williams’ poser later in 
this chapter, and also in chapter 5, where I argue that the real 
significance of the dilemma is very different from that which Williams 
intends* ' 'w But firstly I must continue with my criticism of the 
Closest Continuer theory.
Not only do I deny that it is compatible with our intuitions in all 
possible cases, but also, I argue, that it gets itself into such a 
muddle in attempting to do so that it loses allcitiuiibfittvj . One situation 
that exposes its weaknesses is that of a ’tie’, that is, where both y 
and z at t2 are equally close continuers of x at tl, along the same 
dimensions. Nozick stresses that his theory is strictly a Closest 
Continuer theory, which does not allow identity to hold with a mere 
’continuer none is closer than' (if such was permitted, x would 
survive in case of a tie) and that in such cases, neither y nor z is X ’s 
closest continuer, and therefore x ceases to exist.
So, for example in Parfit's story entitled 'My Division', in which 
A ’s cerebral hemispheres are removed, separated, and transplanted into 
the skulls of his fellow triplet siblings B & C, A ceases to exist.
This is surely counterintuitive, given the physical continuity and the 
subsequent psychological continuity supported by each hemisphere. Nozick 
claims to be driven to his conclusion by the fact that all the other
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alternatives seem to him to be even more inadequate. For example, it 
cannot be that both B & C are identical with A, as it would follow, as 
identity is a transitive relation, that B & C are identical with each 
other, and they are not. Neither can it be that oneof B and C is 
identical with A, as, since B & C are qualitatively identical to each 
other, any reason for identifying A with one of them must equally be a 
reason for identifying A with the other, especially given that both are 
causally related to A in exactly similar ways. Obviously one is not 
justified in just stipulating that A is identical with one of the two, 
but for no reason. He also rejects the solution proposed by Lewis 
[1983] (see ch2.9)which says that while B & C at t2 are different people 
A at tl also consisted of two different people.
But surely Nozick’s own solution is equally hopeless. If A is not 
identical-through-time with either B or C, then surely he should not be 
self-interestedly concerned with whatever happens to either of them. In 
other words, if he is informed that B will be subjected to torture at 
t2, he shouldn’t be concerned for B in any way over and above the 
humanitarian concern for another person, or even the added concern for 
the well-being of loved ones. However, we are strongly inclined to say 
that A would, and should be egoistically concerned for B. Nozick tries 
to deal with this difficulty by saying that the degree of care that any 
x at tl feels for any y at t2 will be proportional to the closeness 
between them along the appropriate dimensions, with the exception of 
cases where y is x ’s closest continuer, as x cares about his closest 
continuer in a special way, not proportional to closeness (as long as 
it satisfies the minimum closeness requirement). So Nozick seems to be 
saying that A will not be concerned with ceasing to exist, as what 
matters in the situation is that someone exists who continues A closely 
enough to have been identical with A if he had been x ’s closest 
continuer. So, in such a tie situation, A will be concerned about B and 
C equally, and in proportion to their closeness to him, but, had B been 
his closest continuer, yet intrinsically no closer to A than he is in 
the tie situation, then the degree of concern accorded to him would 
increase.
But how can it be that A ceases to exist in a tie situation ? If I 
were A, and my brain were split and transplanted, wouldn’t I be able to 
affirm, from this new body, or bodies, ”1 do not exist’’? This obviously 
can't be right. Nozick cannot mean just that A does not exist, but that 
he does not exist qua A . This leads to the possibility that if C were 
removed and vanished without trace so that I didn’t know whether the
other transplant took place, then I, as B, wouldn’t know whether I 
survived the transplant and whether I was identical with A.
Another problem that Nozick has to face involves cases of ’overlap’, 
where, for example, one of my cerebral hemispheres is transplanted into 
a clone body, and I retain the other one, and I die at a later date, so 
that there is a partial overlap in our lifetimes. Now if I had died 
immediately after the hemispherectomy, the clone would be my closest 
continuer, and therefore identical with me. Yet, Nozick says, if I had 
survived for several more years, then I (the J.B.-body-person) would be 
my closest continuer within that time, and after my death, the clone 
would not be identical with me. But clearly the idea of a sharp dividing 
line specifying the overlap of lifetimes that cannot be crossed if the 
cloneAare to be identified is absurd.
Surely this example just exposes the Closet Continuer theory to 
the same problems as defeated the theories that Nozick rejects? He 
tries to get out of the trap by saying that the difficulty here is 
due to a tension between, on the one hand, our inclinations towards 
the Closest Continuer theory in its ’Local’ form (wfrch is the theory 
already described) and what he calls its ’global* form, which states 
that x at tl is identical with y at t2 if y is x ’s closest continuer
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and if there is no longer extended thing z i . more closely continuous 
wtt'k x than any other equallyQliWjui thing of which x is a part. So in an 
overlap situation, which can be depicted as below,
A » B 1 
, I
1 I
| |
1 C * D
 ^
Time
Where A represents myself before the hemispherectomy, B is 
myself after this operation, C is the clone while I am alive, and D 
is the clone after I am dead, we have a situation where
(i) B is A's closest continuer, and
(ii) D is the closest continuer of A+B, yet
(iii) C is D ’s closest predecessor, and
(iv) A is the closest predecessor of C+D,
so neither A+B+D nor A+C+D are mono-related, and cannot be stages of 
the same continuous entity. However, A and D are mono-related, and 
the global theory says that where B and C are relatively small
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compared to the time-span of A and D, then A+D constitutes a single 
entity, albeit a temporally discontinuous one.
The first point that should be made about this attempted escape 
route is that Nozick can no longer claim to have the support of our 
intuitions regarding questions of identity through time. Our 
intuitions are rather simple fellows, and Nozick’s theory grows more 
convoluted by the minute. More seriously, his ad hoc introduction of 
the global varipjit still does nothing to deal with the absurdities 
of the ’sharp dividing line' that scuppered the local theory. All it 
does, at best, is to provide a diagnosis of the Closest Continuer 
theory’s inadequacies.
2.3 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECTRUM
My own view is that if you accept that the thought-experimental 
’problem cases’ have a real bearing on the issues of personal 
identity, then any attempt to deal with these cases in terms of the 
concept of identity will fail, and that a more fruitful approach is 
to follow Parfit's line and analyse the cases in terms of Relation R 
or, as Andrew Brennan [1988] puts it, ’survival’. The Closest 
Continuer theory can retain its insights when it is interpreted as a 
theory of the conditions of survival rather than of identity - where, 
briefly, x ’s closest continuer is whoever survives x to the greatest 
degree, and where, in cases of a tie, there is, in Parfit's words, a 
'double success' rather than both contenders 'cancelling each other 
out', as when the case is described in terms of identity. I will 
focus on Brennan and his concept of survival in detail in ch.4, but 
for the moment I will concentrate on Pat-fit.
Let us now return to Williams' Case 2, which pointed to a 
Physical Criterion, and consider Parfit's response. Parfit develops 
Williams’ story to devise a whole range of cases (which he calls the 
’Psychological Spectrum’), each involving the disruption of psycho­
logical continuity to some degree. Williams' case is at the far end 
of this spectrum, as it involves a total break with any psychological 
continuity. A near-end case would involve only a minimal loss of 
memories, character traits, etc., and correspondingly minimal addition 
of new ones. In between these extremes would be a vast number of 
cases, each involving a tiny degree more psychological change than 
its predecessor.
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By application of the Sorites paradox, we can start with a near­
end case, involving negligible change. If we agree, as seems to be 
extremely plausible, that (calling the pre-operative person A and the 
post-operative person B),that A and B are the same person, then, 
given that the spectrum can contain any number of possible cases 
according to how close we make the contiguous cases, then if the next 
case (calling the first one ’n ’ and the next case ’n+1’) involves an 
infinitesimal increase in psychological change to what was involved 
in case n, then surely A = B in case n+1, as there is virtually no 
difference between the cases. Someone taking this line could draw on 
Williams’ [1957] rule that something so fundamentally important as a 
change in, or loss of identity could not rest on such an insignificant 
matter as the minute difference between cases n and n+1. However, the 
paradox arises when we apply this proc endure to each consecutive pair 
of cases right through the spectrum, fof we seem to be forced into 
making the conclusion that A = B even in Williams’ extreme far-end cf in­
case where there is n_o psychological continuity between A and B. 
(Obviously these Sorites problems are not unique to matters of 
personal identity). At this point it looks as if Parfit is in agree­
ment with Williams regarding the weakness of the Psychological 
Criterion. However this appearence is deceptive, and his argument so 
far is merely a prelude to his main arguments and their much more 
radical conclusion.
Parfit leaves the Psychological Spectrum for the moment. Yet it 
is instructive to note that he could have pushed the argument harder 
to allow the paradoxes to pile up. If we apply the Sorites rule again 
starting this time with Williams'^treme far-end case 2 (let us call 
it case nlOO), then, if a defender of the Psychological Criterion 
says that in such a case that A f B, then he would seem to be obliged 
to make the same judgement in the second-last case n99, and likewise 
all the wayj^own the spectrum to case n. So here we have obtained the 
opposite conclusion to Parfit, by another application of the same 
technique.
2.4 THE PHYSICAL SPECTRUM
As a pre-taste of his own line, Parfit comments that the paradox 
he has exposed is not fundamentally due. to any flaw unique to the 
Psychological Criterion, but is due to the underlying assumption that rV 
a determinate answer to questions of identity through time in all
possible cases. This is the assumption that Parfit attacks, arguing 
that at least in the middle cases in the Psychological Spectrum, any 
such questions are empty. He then turns the tables on supporters of 
the Physical Criterion by showing that a similar argument to that 
applied to the Psychological Criterion can be constructed to derive 
paradoxes from the Physical Criterion, if we accept this assumption 
that identity is always a determinate matter. A 'Physical Spectrum' 
is devised, wherein a scale of minute gradations of change are applied 
to A's body, where his brain and body cells are replaced by exact 
duplicates. So in the near-end case n we have someone, B, who is 
virtually both physically and psychologically with A, and
so we would appear to have overwhelming reason to say that they were 
the same person. In the far-end case, the resulting person will be 
psychologically continuous with the original, but in no way is he 
physically continuous, as 100% of his cells have been simultaneously 
destroyed and replaced (as in Parfit's Teletransporter story - see ch 
4) thus breaking a necessary condition of the Physical Criterion, so 
by this Criterion, we seem forced to say that A is not the same person 
as his 'duplicate', B.
If one adhered to a Physical Criterion, and also held that 
identity was always a determinate matter, then one would be committed 
to the claim that identity is preserved only if a critical percentage 
of cells remains unreplaced in cases such as the above. Even if the 
story was recast to ”0/ofu replacement of neurons, by claiming
that the brain is the only part of the body that is relevant to the 
matter of identity, then the problem is unsolved, and merely shifts 
back a step to the claim that the holding of identity through time 
depends on the retention of this critical percentage of neurons (or 
back a step further, if we restrict the issue to some privileged set 
of neurons, such as those of the cerebral cortex).
But how are we to establish what this critical percentage of 
cells is, in a way that is not arbitrary and stipulative? No indepen­
dent test could ever confirm or falsify the credentials of such a 
choice. The only possible independent test would have to be 'from the 
inside', that is, from B's own testimony. But, since in all cases in 
the Physical Spectrum,A is completely psychologically continuous with 
B, in all cases he will claim to be the same person as before. So 
following through the logic of Parfit's argument pushes us into
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accepting a wide Psychological Criterion as appropriate for personal 
identity.
2.5 THE COMBINED SPECTRUM
Parfit employs another argument against the Physical Criterion, 
this time against unpublished arguments by Thomas Nagel (described in 
Parfit [1984]), which I will consider shortly. But first, mention 
should be made of Parfit's 'Combined Spectrum', which, as its name 
suggests, combines the essential features of both the Psychological 
and Physical Spectra, whereby, to varying degrees, Parfit's brain 
and body cells are replaced by exact duplicates of those of Greta 
Garbo, so that his psychological properties will also be accordingly 
replaced by hers. So the Combined Spectrum involves cases with various 
degrees of physical and psychological continuity holding. As expected, 
when Sorites techniques are applied as before, the paradoxes start to 
pile up, urging Parfit to recommend the utility of the view that since 
there is no 'further fact' that personal identity consists in over 
and above those of physical and psychological continuity, then in 
the above-mentioned cases there is no real content to the question of 
whether the pre- and post-operative persons are to be identified.
Geoffrey Madell [1985] has contested Parfit's claim that if 
some of Parfit's cells were replaced by cells identical to those of 
Garbo, then there is no fact of the matter as to whether the resulting 
person is Parfit or Garbo. Madell says that this impersonal inter- 
petation of the thought-experiment is not "the most natural and 
obvious way” of understanding it, which is that it should be seen as 
a case of "two minds in one skin, a pretty startling case of Multiple 
Personality, perhaps” (pl07), so, given that the two sets of mental 
states, those of Parfit and of Garbo, will remain distinct and non­
integrated, there is no one person who is identical with neither, 
and thus, he reckons, Parfit's claim that personal identity is a 
matter of degree loses its justification.
Now it seems to me that this argument from Madell misses the 
point, as he is not so much criticising Parfit's conclusions as 1
describing a different story, one in which the token-Garbo neurons 
are added in such a way that the mental states embodied therein come 
to constitute an autonomous personality, distinct from Parfit's own,
i.e. as the Garbo neurons are added, they somehow fail to become 
functionally integrated with Parfit's own, so that they establish a
nexus of memories, attitudes, etc., to the extent that they themselves 
constitute a ’mind*. Note that Multiple Personality Syndrome involves 
"two or more personalities, each of which is so well-developed and 
integrated as to have a relatively coordinated * rich, unified and 
stable life of its own" [Taylor & Martin 1944 (p282)]. But rather 
than offering the more natural and obvious way of describing the 
outcome of Parfit's story, he has altered it, introducing a different 
outcome, and offered the most obvious interpretation of it.
Madell himself is a non-reductionist, arguing that personal 
identity rests on a further fact irreducible to either physical or 
psychological continuity. However, I fail to see how his suggested 
outcome, as stated above, provides any support for such a view. Also, 
his non-reductionism would commit him to saying that . a middle case 
in the Physical Spectrum, where the resulting ’mind’ is formed using
duplicate neurons, would lead again to a case of two non-integrated
minds, and therefore another case of Multiple Personality, albeit a 
peculiar form, as such a divided ’mind' would be qualitatively 
indistinguishable from that of the pre-operative person.
2.6 THE PHYSICAL SPECTRUM AGAIN
Returning to the Physical Spectrum, it does seem implausible to 
say that the replacement of a few more neurons can have the tumultaimjs 
consequence of a change of identity. However, John Robinson [1988] 
disputes this claim, saying that such a process need not involve just 
’one more small psychological change’, since some of our psychological 
properties are essential to our identities, and others are inessential. 
If the neurons underlying these essential properties were replaced,
then a change in identity would be effected.
However Robinson gives us no indication of which psychological 
properties he is referring to, nor any argument to support his claim 
that there are such properties. He merely admits that a satisfactory 
analysis of the issue is long overdue, and that this "cannot be done 
independently of a theory about the nature, unity and continuity of 
consciousness” (p328). Agreed but, I stress, the onus is on him to 
identify these properties, or at least to offer some argument to the 
effect that some.sud\ properties must exist. In the absence of such 
submissions, his claims can be safely ignored as having no real
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content.
Parfit considers another variant on the Physical Criterion, this 
time from Thomas Nagel, who,(as a Reductionist who thinks that I am 
essentially my brain^ also holds that personal identity is the 
relation that contains ’all that matters', as Parfit puts it. Parfit 
tries to show the inconsistency of this position by another thought- 
experiment : I have been diagnosed as having an incurable and fatal 
brain disease, and an operation is necessary. I can have a choice of 
two operations,’ . ", : . . • '____, ’ - - i .
The first operation, 01, is really a sequence of one hundred mini­
operations, each involving the removal of one percent of my brain, 
and the replacement by the appropriate/.,neurons. The second operation 
02 involves the removal of the whole brain in a single operation, and 
the transplantation of a whole newKbrain.
In 01, each new percentage of replacement neurons is added to 
the original brain, and becomes structurally and functionally 
integrated with it, and so can be legitimately regarded as part of 
this brain, and this brain be legitimately regarded as preserving my 
identity throughout the part-replacement. (Incidentally, one can 
easily construct an analogue to the puzzle of the ship of Theseus by 
imagining that some scientist had kept the diseased cells, kept them 
alive in some way, and reassembled the original brain, perhaps in a 
clone body). However, the situation is different in 02, as the old 
brain has been destroyed. Parfit claims that Nagel must say that I 
survive in 01 but not in 02. But since in both cases there is full 
psychological continuity, with only the means of achieving this being 
different, surely this difference is a trivial matter, and how could 
it make such an impact as to mean the difference between life and 
death? Thus Parfit is led to reject Nagel’s position.
Andrew Brennan [1988], while defending a Parfitian position, 
argues that we needn’t describe 02 as involving the destruction of my 
brain, claiming that by his ’conditions for survival’ (see ch.4), my 
brain survives to a high degree in its replica. The production of 
this replica is a copying process using my original brain as the 
prototype, so the two brains are causally related. We can make the 
additional point that my brain and its replica in 02 are two tokens
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of the same type ’my brain’.
John Robinson offers a telling counterexample to Parfit’s argument 
on the Physical Spectrum, and to his claim that a replica contains 
’all that matters’ to me regarding my future. He considers a case 
where my neurons are replaced not by artificially constructed 
duplicates, but by those from the brain of my twin, who is completely 
identical to me right down to the cellular level, so that, since our 
brains are identical, then we will likewise be identical on the 
psychological level also, so any such transplant will not effect my 
psychological continuity. (Even if we dispute his reasoning here, we 
can simply recast the example, and say 'and _if we were psychologically 
identical’). Robinson says that while it is plausible to say that I 
survive in a near-end case, this would not be so in a far-end case 
when all my neurons are replaced, as this constitutes a brain 
transplant, with my twin's brain being relocated in my body, so 
surely the surviving person is him and not me. And since this takes 
place with the retention of full psychological continuity, then this 
cannot be constitutive of personal identity.
Note that in this case, as with Parfit's duplication cases, each 
neuron and its replacement are tokens of the same type - but the 
crucial difference in Robinson’s example is that the two are not 
causally related. The twin's neurons are not copied from the prototype 
of my neurons. Robinson's case seems closer to those depicted in the 
Combined Spectrum. I will have more to say on these examples in ch.5, 
where I discuss the use of thought-experiments as a methodological 
tool.
2.7 MY DIVISION
Parfit offers another set of powerful arguments to back up his 
advocacy of Relation R. These are again based on thought-experiments 
depicting situations that are presently beyond our practical 
capabilities, but, he argues, could become a reality in the future.
In the chapter entitled 'My Division’, he starts by considering a case 
involving identical twins, A and B, who are seriously injured in such 
a way that A ’s body is damaged beyond repair but his brain is still 
functioning normally, whereas B has a seriously damaged brain but is 
otherwise uninjured. Now, by both the Physical and Psychological 
Criteria, if A ’s brain were transplanted into B's body, the resulting
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person would be A, as the receiving of a new body can be seen more 
accurately as a limiting case of organ transplant. This highlights 
what is reckoned to be unique about the brain in matters of identity, 
(and shows the immediate plausibility of Nagel’s position),that if B 
receives A ’s heart, lungs, liver and kidneys, the resulting person is 
B, but if A ’s brain is transplanted, the resulting person is A, and in 
fact it is more accurate to say that it is A_ who is the recipient here 
and not the donor.
Parfit now asks us to consider the fact that substantially less 
than a complete brain can support a full human consciousness - for 
instance a stroke victim can suffer the loss of function of an entire 
cerebral hemisphere, yet relearn the associated abilities to some 
extent by the remaining functioning hemisphere restructuring its 
’division of labour' and taking them over. Likewise, people have 
survived hemispherectomy. Next, Parfit notes that a small percentage 
of people do not have a pronounced functional division whereby 
language-related functions are dominantly carried out by one hemisphere 
only. His examples in 'My Division' concentrates on some such person, 
whose linguistic functions are performed with equal input by both 
cerebral hemispheres.
Now imagine a case involving identical infant triplets A,B and C. 
In an accident scenario similar to the previous example, A survives 
with a healthy brain and a seriously damaged body, whilst B and C are 
seriously brain-damaged but otherwise uninjured. Realising that if 
nothing is done they will all die or at least have drastically 
impaired lives, surgeons decide to cut their losses. They remove and
divide A's brain, so that one cerebral hemisphere is inserted into the
skulls of B and C. By analysing the outcome in terms of the concept 
of personal identity, Parfit says that we have four possibilities.
(In ch.2.9 I consider another, proposed by David Lewis [1983]).
1. A does not survive.
2. A survives as the B-body person, and is identical with him.
3. A survives as the C-body person, and is identical with him.
4. A survives as, and is identical with;both the B and C-body persons. 
He argues that all these outcomes are deeply unsatisfactory, and that 
such cases are analysed much better in terms of Relation R.
Starting with option 1., we have already accepted that A survives 
if his full brain is transplanted into B's body. Secondly, we've
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accepted that A would have survived with full psychological continuity 
if he underwent a hemispherectomy. Combining these considerations, we 
must conclude that if one of A ’s cerebral hemispheres were transplanted 
into B's body, the resulting person would be A. So, given this, how 
could anything happening to A ’s other hemisphere affect this survival?
(Contrast with Nozick) if anything, we appear to have a ’double
success', with A surviving twice over.
Options 2 & 3 can be treated together, as they are two sides of
the same coin. The problem is that since any argument in favour of one 
possible outcome applies equally to the other, we can have no rational 
grounds for choosing one over the other. This leaves us with option 4. 
The problem here is that the result is contrary to the logic of the 
relation of identity, which is necessarily one : one - i.e. any x at 
tl can be a stage of the same enduring object as only one such stage 
y at t2. Since identity is a transitive relation, then, if A = the B- 
body person and A = the C-body person, then the B and C-body persons 
are likewise identical, but this is not a coherent option. It is 
nonsense to say that A survives as one person with a divided mind and 
two bodies. The problem is not that it drastically distorts our concept 
of a person. I have no objections in principle about that, as I believe 
that the concept is vague and, as Brennan argues, capable of sustaining 
several incompatible developments. But this development is clearly a 
non-starter. The B and C-body persons could be separated at birth and 
never hear from each other ever again, so the claim that they never­
theless constitute one person is hollow and worthless, adding nothing 
to our understanding of the situation. This case is different from 
the one described by.Parfit in the chapter entitled 'My Physics Exam’ 
(see ch.7), where the plausibility of the claim that it involved one 
person with a divided mind came not only from the fact that only one 
body was involved, but because the division was temporary and 
reversible.
Another red herring that Parfit easily dismisses is based on 
Wiggins' [1980] example that the Pope’s crown contains three smaller 
separate crowns, but is itself a crown over and above these three. 
Presumably the analogous claim is that the B and C-bodied persons are 
distinct people, but that there is a third person also,wiMtWXs an 
integration of them. Parfit quickly refutes this, pointing out that 
such a ’person’ would have no mental life over and above that of the
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B and C-body persons. We can also mention here that the analogy fails 
to appreciate that natural and artefactual kinds are individuated 
according to entirely different principles.
John Robinson [1988] challenges Parfit’s description of his 
thought-experiments, and his assumption that the two cerebral hemi­
spheres (the two ’half-brains’) together constitute one whole brain, 
and likewise his description of hemispherectomy patients as having 
survived with 'half their brain destroyed', since in such cases the 
brain-stem must also be considered : "If we were to transplant the 
removed hemisphere into someone else's brainless body, we would not 
create a second person. It is only if we were to transplant the 
hemisphere into a body that already had some brain in it, the brain 
stem, that there would be another person as a result. Once this 
feature of the puzzle case is highlighted, then it becomes quite clear 
that the relation between a surviving subject before and after the 
removal of one of the hemispheres is not duplicated in the case where 
the surviving subject's hemisphere is removed and placed in someone 
elsels skull. In the former case, but not the latter, there is the 
persisting brain stem to consider, and the psychological abilities and 
capacities that supervene on it" (p324).
Can Parfit defend himself against this criticism? Perhaps he 
could say something like this : while obviously granting that the brain 
comprises a number of highly interdependent sub-systems, with the 
functioning of each part depending on the integrity of the other parts, 
so that the possibility of conscious experience will depend on the 
functions of the brain stem, it is a mistake to suggest that the brain 
stem is the bearer of any of the higher mental functions that are 
usually regarded as the elements of psychological continuity, and 
therefore of identity. On the contrary, the functions of the brain 
stem operate below the level of conscious awareness, dealing, for 
example, with matters of balance, control and movement, and it would 
take a strong argument, which Robinson does not provide, to say why 
t h e s e ^ rtctions should be considered in matters of personal identity 
any more than, say, the functions of cleansing the blood or of 
metabolising fats. So when A's hemisphere is transplanted into B's 
skull, there is no reason to suggest that B ’s brain stem should be 
granted any weight regarding the question of identity, any more than 
does B ’s kidneys or liver. The resulting person is clearly A.
In reply to this, I have devised a thought-experiment that would
seem to count against Parfit, and add to the chaos that is being 
brought about by the use of such fictions. Imagine that the Scottish 
Football Association, in a fit of desparation, has abducted both myself 
and the Argentinian genius Diego Maradona. A neurosurgeon has been 
employed to perform a Parfitian brain-swop, whereby our respective 
cerebral cortexes are removed and placed in the other's body. Now 
Parfit and many others would be inclined to say that by both the 
Physical and Psychological Criteria, I would be the DM-body-person, 
who will spend his time pondering over weighty philosophical tomes, 
while the JB-body-person emerges with memories of the backstreets of 
Buenos Aires. However, the finely tuned balance and poise required of 
a top-class athlete are within the domain not of the cortex, but of 
the cerebellum, which has not been transplanted - so, whilst by the 
Psychological Criterion, Maradona would be the JB-body-person, his 
football manager would not agree with this judgement if his skills 
were of the mediocre level of the impoverished apprentice philosopher. 
From his professional perspective, the one who is Maradona is the 
one who plays like him, no matter what he does or doesn't remember.
One might reply that it is misleading to talk in this way, making 
such a clear-cut division between experience memory and proctg^ural 
memory, saying that one can be lost or replaced by different contents, 
without the other being affected in the slightest. But, on the other 
hand, such a distinction is reflected in the plight of those suffering 
from amnesia due to herpes simplex encephalitis (see ch.6). One such 
victim, Clive Wearing, has suffered a complete loss of long-term 
experience memory, yet his practical skills, such as playing the piano, 
have remained intact. Of course, he doesn't know that he can play the 
piano until he actually does it, so perhaps it would be irrelevant 
that the DM-body-person would be dragged reluctantly from his books 
onto the pitch, protesting that he really wasn't all that good, if 
these skills came alive once the game started.
Leaving these doubts aside for the moment, let us return to 
Parfit and 'My Division'. Since he has rejected all possible outcomes 
described in terms of personal identity, he argues that we are forced 
to recognise that in such cases the concept is inadequate and hence 
inappropriate to describe what is going on. In such cases, even if we 
had all the relevant information, being able to describe the operations 
down to the finest detail, none of this would enable us to settle the
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questions of identity through time, so, in Parfit's terms, stxch 
questions are empty.
Consequently, it is irrational to regard such an operation as 
being ’as bad as death’, since the relationships between A and the B 
and C-body persons contain everything that really matters regarding 
survival, namely Relation R. The fact that in normal cases, Relation R 
does not take a branching form, is of no concern, as branching does 
not alter the intrinsic quality of the relation, nor does it contravene 
its 'logic^ as Relation R needn’t be 'one : one' as does identity. 
Parfit, we are led to the mistaken belief that personal identity 
is the relation that contains all that matters in survival because in 
all actual cases it coincides with Relation R. The value of the 
deployment of these thought-experiments is to devise situations where 
the relations diverge, and we have to choose between them.
2.8 THE 'ONLY X AND Y' RULE
Williams [1957] develops another argument that can be put against 
any Psychological Criterion. It arises out of a remark by Thomas Reid 
[1785] against Locke's claim that "whoever has the consciousness of 
past and present actions is the same person to whom they belong". To 
Reid, it seemed that "if the same consciousness can be transferred 
from one intelligent being to another  then two or twenty
intelligent beings may be the same person" (pi 14). Williams begins by
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acknowledging that identity is logically a one : one relation, and so 
I cannot be identical with two future persons at any given time, and 
so if it were possible that two future persons were psychologically 
continuous with me, then psychological continuity cannot constitute a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the holding of personal identity, 
since a criterion for a vone : one relation must also take this form.
He adds that even if an advocate of the Psychological Criterion 
were to compromise and propose non-branching psychological continuity 
as a criterion, this will still not do, because any criterion of 
personal identity must satisfy two requirements (which, following 
Brennan, I have called the 'only x and y' rule). The first requirement 
(which I described in ch2.1) states that the issue of whether x at tl 
is the same person as y at t2 must only depend on factors intrinsic 
to x and y - what happens to anyone else is irrelevant and cannot 
affect the issue. The second requirement states that since the matter 
of identity is of the utmost importance, then its answer cannot depend
on trivial matters.
So, by a Lockean theory, if I were to wake up one morning with 
memories of Napoleon's life, then I would bie Napoleon. But, looking 
back at Reid's remark, it seems no more implausible to suggest that if 
this can happen once it can happen any number of times, So, for example, 
if you were also to acquire these memories, then you too would be 
Napoleon, by Locke's criterion. But we can't both be Napoleon, not ' 
only because identity is a one : one relation, but because it would 
follow that you and I would be identical. Reductio ad absurdum.
Parfit considers his Teletransporter case from the point of view 
of Williams' requirements. In it, I enter a machine which records the 
exact states of all my cells, destroys my body, and relays the full 
description of my cells to Mars, where this information is used to 
create a qualitatively identical body out of new matter, while 
preserving psychological continuity, since the entire process takes 
place at the speed of light. In such a case, by a non-branching wide 
Psychological Criterion, I survive as my replica. But what if my 
'blueprint' were also sent to Io, a satellite of Jupiter, but stored 
there without making another replica? By such a criterion, I would 
only survive as the same person on Mars as long as no such other 
replica were created. But no intrinsic change would be undergone by 
the Mars-replica should the Io-replica be created. The point is that 
the question of whether or not I survive cannot, by Williams' 
requirements, depend on events in Io involving someone else. Williams 
would also add that since the Mars-replica isn't the same person as 
the Io-replica, we should deny that any singly-existing replica is 
identical with the pre-transported me.
Let me now make a slight diversion back to the previous example, 
which left us both strutting around in an advanced state of megalo­
mania, eulogising Josephine. If we were to revise a Lockean theory, 
developing the concept of memory to allow it to operate through 
various different causal mechanisms (and calling it 'quasi-memory'), 
then we could avoid the contradictions by saying that I quasi­
remember Napoleon's experiences, but that I am not the same person as 
Napoleon, and likewise in your case.
Returning to the main theme, Parfit hoists Williams with his own 
petcird by using his argument to challenge the Physical Criterion. In 
fact he goes much further, arguing that no criterion of personal
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identity could satisfy Williams’ requirements in all possible cases, 
because the matter of identity will sometimes depend on what happens 
to others, or on some other trivial matter. He devises another thought- 
experiment involving our hapless triplets A, B and C, where A's 
cerebral cortex (or ’brain’, as he puts it) is removed and divided, 
and each hemisphere is taken off to a separate theatre for transplant 
into B and C ’s bodies. A supporter of a non-branching Physical 
Criterion would say that if one hemisphere were successfully 
transplanted into the B-body, and the other operation were to fail, 
then A survives as identical with the B-body-person; but that if, on 
the contrary, the second operation were successful, then A does not 
survive as either resulting person. But such a claim violates 
Williams’ requirements, as he is committed to saying that if A = the 
B-body-person, then anything happening to the C-body-person cannot 
affect this identity. To claim otherwise is to allow a situation where, 
if there is a one-hour delay between the two operations, A survives as 
the B-body person for one hour, until the first signs of neural 
activity in the C-body-person.
The only recourse for a defender of the Physical Criterion seems 
to be to modify it to prevent the possibility of it taking a branching 
form, for example by saying that x at tl is identical with y at t2 iff 
y has a full human consciousness and more than half of x ’s brain. This
criterion was suggested by Wiggins [1980], and since it clearly can
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only take'one : one form, it satisfies Williams’ first requirement, 
not his second. If we assume, in accordance with philosophical 
tradition, that by ’brain’, Wiggins means’cortex’, then possession of 
more than half a cortex is not a necessary condition of having a full 
human consciousness, as is shown by hemispherectomy patients, which 
opens the door for branching again. But also, we can see that a tiny 
difference in the percentage of neurons may separate a ’less than half­
brain’ from a ’more than half-brain’ (i.e. 49.99...... 9% v 50.00....
...1%) and such a difference is trivial, if the two such brains function 
equally well. Otherwise we would have the situation of a hemispherectomy 
patient losing his identity if a minute fraction of his remaining 
hemisphere were removed or destroyed, without his mental abilities 
having been affected.
Because of these considerations, Parfit says that neither the 
Physical nor the Psychological Criterion can meet Williams’requirements
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and, furthermore, such problems are applicable to any possible 
Criterion. However, if we examine the abovementioned cases in terms of 
Relation R, the problems and paradoxes fall away. By turning away from 
all talk of personal identity,, then in the ’My Division’ cases, we 
don't bother even asking if A is the same person as either the B or C- 
body-persons, but rather say that A is R-related to both. (In shorthand 
this might be expressed as ARB & ARC) In advocating this view, we 
would hold that such relationships contained all that was of any 
importance in the identity relation. Such revised theories can satisfy 
analogues of Williams' requirements - i.e. ARB no matter what happens 
to C, and despite any other trivial events occurring or not occurring .
In any cases (and these will be the overwhelming majority) that seem 
to suggest that personal identity is the only relation that can 
accommodate all that really matters regarding future survival, this 
will be because in each case it coincides with Relation R.
2.9 LEWIS : THE INDETERMINACY OF POPULATION
Another, more radical solution to the problem of branching is put
forward by David Lewis [1983], who argues that in such cases of fission
where one person at tl has two persons at t2 with identity claims on
him, fki5 i* & co.56- of °r\e- , *$ H\e* oiocwp
p*opW Ike re ,.
There is a long-standing debate between Lewis and Derek Parfit 
[1971 & 1976] concerning issues of survival and identity. Parfit has 
argued that what matters to us, in a self-interested way, concerning 
the future is the maintainance of my psychological continuity by any 
means (i.e. Relation R), and not my identity as such i.e. not that I_ 
need survive. He accepts that in practice the two relations will, 
coincide, and that no problem cases where the two relations diverge 
have actually occurred. Such hypothetical cases are problematic due to 
the differing logical structures of the two relations, as identity is
necessarily a one : one relation whereas Relation R is not - it can be
/ /  ^  t *
one : many or many : one, and if such cases of fission or fusion do
occur, then the identity relation is inadequate to pronounce on the 
results.
Incidentally, in his original article [1971], Parfit seems to be 
discussing brain transplants (as in 'My Division’) whereas Lewis is 
clearly discussing cases of fission arising from duplication - "We 
demand to say that only one person entered the duplication center"(p63) .
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In the following discussion, I discuss this latter form of fission. If, 
however, Lewis’ arguments are adapted to apply to the former case, then 
my arguments against him would be those that I lay against Puccetti in 
ch. 7.
Lewis’ response is to agree with Parfit that what matters regarding 
the future is the holding of Relation R, but he also claims that what 
matters is the holding of identity through time, and that there is no 
contradiction involved in holding that both are what matters, as the 
formal discrepancy between the two relations only shows that they are 
different relations and not that they are mutually exclusive. Lewis 
rightly points out that identity and Relation R have differgAt relata - 
Relation R is a relation between momentary person-stages, whereas 
identity applies to continuant persons who have different person- 
stages - it is not between person-stages as, by definition, no person- 
stage will survive in the future - but the question is whether the 
person will. However, according to Lewis, another relation can be 
derived from identity - one which, like Relation R, does hold between 
person-stages. This is what he calls the *I-relation*, which holds 
between all the stages of a single continuant person, and, since the 
two relations have the same relata, it is this relation that should be 
compared with Relation R in judging whether Parfit is correct in saying 
that Relation R, and not identity, contains all that matters regarding 
future survival. Lewis argues that if what matters is the holding of 
identity, then this corresponds to the claim that one's present person- 
stage is I-related to future stages. However, he goes on to claim that 
in all possible cases, any stage is I-related and R-related to exactly 
the same stages, and therefore, since they are necessarily co-extensive, 
then the I-relation = Relation R . thus there is no incompatibility in 
saying both that identity and that Relation R are what matter in 
survival.
We can thereby derive a non-circular definition of a person in 
terms of Relation R : Since a person is a maximal I-interrelated 
aggregate of stages (i.e. each stage is I-related to all other stages 
and to itself, and a person is not part of any larger I-related 
aggregate) then, since relations I = R, then a person can be defined as 
maximal R-related aggregate of person-stages.
Let us turn now to the aforementioned hypothetical problem cases.
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These occur when Relation R takes a branching form, where one stage is 
R-related to stages that are not R-related to each other, or where such 
non-R-related stages are both R-related to a common future stage, these 
two situations are of, respectively, fission and fusion. In the following 
discussion I will concentrate on the case of fission. Let the single 
pre-fission stage be called S, and the two concurrent post-fission 
stages be called SI and S2. In such a situation, S is R-related to SI 
and to S2, but SI and S2 are not R-related. Such a case seems to show 
that Relation R is intransitive, and since identity is transitive, then 
surely there will be possible cases in which we will have to choose 
between the two relations regarding which contains all that matters in 
survival;
Lewis responds to this challenge by saying that while identity is 
a transitive relation, the I-relation need not be, and that in a fission 
case, the I-relation will display relationships between stages that 
parallel those of Relation R, so S is I-related to SI and to S2, but 
SI and S2 are not I-related. Lewis permits this state of affairs( r ' 
as he conceives of cases of fission (and fusion) as involving a partial 
overlap between continuant persons, so, for example, if we say that S 
occurs at tl and SI and S2 at t2, then at tl, S is shared by two 
distinct people Cl and C2, where SI is a stage of Cl and not of C2, and 
where S2 is a stage of C2 and not of Cl.
So in order to sustain his identification of relations I&R, Lewis 
is committed to the claim that two (or, in theory, more) persons can 
share the same person-stage, so that fission is not a case of one person 
becoming or resulting in two persons, as there were two people there 
all along. As Lewis admits, such an overlap leads to ’overpopulation', 
since, in counting a population,or any subset, e.g. 'the number of 
people in room A at tl', we can either count the number of people who 
have stages at tl, or we can count the number of stages themselves. Now 
obviously in a world without such ’overlap’ of persons, both methods of 
counting will always deliver the same answer, But if cases of overlap 
do occur there will be a discrepancy, with there being more persons 
than stages.
Having reached this position, and possibly to avoid its counter­
intuitiveness, Lewis changes ? . tack, arguing that we needn't do our 
counting by using the relation of identity, but rather by using the
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relation of 'tensed identity* or 'identity-at-t', wherein x and y are 
identical-at-t iff both x and y exist at t, and their stages at t are 
identical. Tensed identity is not a relation holding between stages, 
but a relation between continuants which derives from a relation 
between stages. Yet, unlike identity per se, it is not a relation of 
identity among continuants, but a weaker relation that is an equivalence 
relation and an indiscernibility relation for the class of properties 
logically determined by the properties of the person's stage at t. So, 
in a case of fission where the split took place at t2, we can say that 
by counting by the relation of identity-at-tl (i.e. before fission), 
there was one person present, but by counting by identity~at~t2, there 
were two.
Parfit [1976] challenges Lewis' parallels between the I and R 
relations in cases of fission, afg^uing that they cannot support his 
compatibilist position regarding identity and Relation R concerning 
what matters in survival. By Lewis' description of the case in terms 
of two persons, Cl and C2, Cl's stage S is R-related to C2's stage S2, 
but since Cl and C2 are different persons, and thus Cl stands in the 
relation that matters (Relation R) to someone else, how then can the 
relation that matters be, or be compatable with identity? Parallel 
with S being R-related to S2, Lewis says that we have S being I-related 
to S2, but surely if we thereby have Cl's stage S and C2's stage S2 as 
being stages of one^same person, it is surely the wrong person, namely 
C2? Lewis wants to hold that both identity and Relation R satisfy 
conditions on 'what matters' regarding survival, so, concerning 
Relation R, given that S is R-related to S2, then S2 stands to Cl in 
the relation that matters to Cl's survival - but if he wants to say 
in addition that identity is the relation that matters, he needs to
show that both S and S2 are stages of Cl, and, since S2 is not, then
his argument fails.
Lewis, in a postscript to his original article, attempts to
counter Parfit's objections by considering a case where at stage SI,
before fission takes place, but after Cl and C2 are informed of their 
imminent fission, there is a desire for survival 'of the most common- 
sensical and unphilosophical kind possible', and, since S is a shared 
stage, then this desire is a shared one between Cl and C2. Now if it 
turns out that, shortly after the fission takes place, Cl dies and C2 
continues to live for some considerable time, then C2 clearly has his 
pre-fission desire for survival fulfilled - but does Cl? i.e. is Parfit
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not correct that from Cl's point of view, regarding identity, C2 is 
the wrong person?
Lewis replies that this would only by the case if Cl's desire was 
that he, Cl, survived, but that this was not the most straightforward 
desire that could have taken place, which is rather 'let survive, 
or more precisely, 'let at least one of us survive', and so, on this 
model, Cl's desire is satisfied. Lewis adds that in cases where Cl and 
C2 don't know about their imminent fission, then the singular desire 
'let me survive' can be thought or uttered, but is unsatisfiable, as 
it rests on the false assumption of there being a 'me', a single person
So, by Lewis, we seem to have a choice. Either we count persons 
by the relation of identity, with the result that in cases of fission 
there were two persons all along prior to their splitting, or on the 
other hand we count by 'tensed identity', which produces results that 
are more in line with our intuitions. Taking these two proposals in 
turn, I find the first option by far the less plausible, as not only 
does it seem to me to be an ad hoc move, but it is prone to problems 
that reduce the position to absurdity. Let us take a straightforward 
case of fission, in which we would want to say that one per&on at tl 
results in two persons at t2. When I want to indicate their plurality,
I will call them Cl and C2, and when I want to be neutral, leaving the 
question of how many persons 'share' or occupy the pre-fission stages,
I shall simply refer to C. Now if there are two other persons present,
D and E, who do not fission in the future, then Lewis must accept that 
D and E are 'different persons' at tl iA a vastly different way than 
Cl and C2 are at that same time. They have different bodies, different 
mental states, and all in all can be clearly distinguished and 
individuated at tl, whereas Cl and C2 clearly can not. When asked 
exactly how Cl and C2 are different persons, Lewis will reply that 
they are two different people sharing a set of stages - but when he is 
asked to explicate or to justify this claim, he can only talk in terms 
of their future fission - but nothing is thereby explained.
There is nothing intrinsic to C either physically or psychologic­
ally that could bfetfay any difference at tl between C and other, 
singular persons,such as D or E ( in such a way to reveal his plurality. 
In a world in which fission is a possibility, there is no way of 
telling at tl or at any given time just how many people are present
within a given space. Since the number of people present isn't 
necessarily the same as the number of person-stages (which will be 
individuated by a physical criterion, i.e. counting bodies),we are left 
with a question that is unanswerable in principle, which should lead 
us to suspect that it is not a legitimate question in the first place 
and that the theory within which the question is grounded is incoherent.
Over and above these epistemological problems, there is the 
possibly deeper issue that the very matter of the number of persons 
present at a given time will depend on whether they undergo fission at 
some later time. In other words, the number of persons present at tl 
will be a function of events at t2, t3,etc. Thus, Lewis seems to be 
committed to the possibility of backwards causation. To bring out the 
absurdity of this position, let us consider a couple of examples :
C is sitting in the replication machine (which is depicted more 
fully in ch.4) at tl. The switch that activates the creation of a \faf>Lci-ML 
is to be pressed at t2. However, the machine is a little unreliable 
due to bad wiring. Sometimes it works and sometimes not. By Lewis's 
theory, if the machine works at t2, then there were two persons sitting 
in the replication machine at tl, and if it is out of order at t2, 
then there was only one.
But what if C is sitting in a new super-replicatof which can 
produce any number of 'copies' of C, at the rate of one per minute.
It would follow that the question of the number of persons present at 
tl would not admit of a determinate answer, as the number would be 
rising at the rate of one a minute, with, in principle, no upper limit.
Turning now to the option of counting persons by the relation of 
tensed identity, I have no objections to anyone using such a device, 
but I take a very different lesson from its employment than does Lewis, 
who seems to think that the fact that fission cases can be described 
in terms of such a relation somehow supports his main thesis that 
identity and Relation R are compatible answers to the question of what 
matters regarding survival.} I, on the contrary, note that 'identity 
at t' is a different relation to identity per se, and is not reducible 
to it, and argue that resorting to the usage of this new relation only 
confirms Parfit's argument that the logic 6f the identity-relation 
prevents it from being able to adequately describe cases of fission,, 
whereas Relation R is clearly up to the task.
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Fission cases can be described without the need for using the 
concept of identity. If such cases actually occurred, for example if a 
’replication machine1 were to be invented, then presumably there would 
be a satisfactory theory of how the process took place, and the terms 
involved would constitute the language in which such fission cases 
would be completely described, and any further questions regarding the 
identity of the pre- and post-fission persons would be empty.
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C H A P T E R  3 ASPECTS OF N O N - R E D U C T I O N I S M
3.1 BUTLER'S CHARGE OF CIRCULARITY
Contemporary versions of the Psychological Criterion can, of 
course, be traced back to John Locke [1694], and any such criterion 
has to face up to the charge of circularity, as originally proposed 
by Butler [1736], This charge has been remarkably resilient, and I put 
its survival down to the fact that it isn’t really clear what^Butler’s 
point . '■ .j_.' is, nor how to develop it in order to make it stick. I 
propose to consider several possible interpretations and extensions 
deriving from Butler, and argue that a neo-Lockean Reductionist theory 
can survive the attacks from all of them.
I will begin with Butler's classic statement that "one should 
really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity 
presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity any 
more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it 
presupposes" (plOO). In Butler’s defence, the obscurity of this 
remark is totally derivable from the vague and ambiguous terminology 
of the writer he was attacking, namely Locke. However, we can make some 
inroads into his intentions. For ’truth’, I think we can read 'the 
fact of my personal identity' and what it consists in. As for 'consci­
ousness', he clearly equates this with ’knowledge’, and in particular 
knowledge of personal identity. We can derive two interpretations 
regarding this knowledge and of the position that Butler is attacking. 
These correspond to the different interpretations of Locke’s use of 
’consciousness' (see ch.4).
On the first interpretation, Butler is denying that a direct 
present awareness of my personal ientity can be constitutive of it, 
since it presupposes it. Here, 'knowledge' corresponds to what Russell 
c s IIgcI 'knowledge by acquaintance • So he can be seen as attributing 
to Locke the Cartesian doctrine that the self is directly revealed in 
the act of introspection, but then pointing out that such an act can 
only discover, but not be constitutive of such a self. On this first 
point, we need only be reminded of Hume's observation that one never 
observes 'oneself', but only a series of fleeting perceptions. However,, 
falls into another deep error. His argument is an instantiation of an 
implicit general claim that a direct perception or experience of x 
presupposes the prior existence of x independently of this awareness 
of x, and therefore cannot be constitutive of it. However, there are
counterexamples to such a rule. For instance, one cannot say that the 
experience of pain cannot constitute pain but can only discover it as 
it presupposes a pain already thereto be aware of. This is obviously 
wrong since there is no more to a pain than the pain-experience. To 
think otherwise is to reify the pain and drive a wedge between the 
thing itself and the experience of it. This is what Butler has done 
to the self (on this interpretation) and, in his defence, he is only 
highlighting an issue that Locke never really resolved.
Clearly Butler is committed to a view of the self as a thing, a 
substance, a res cogitans. But it is due to the unique nature of such 
a purported substance that Butler's model of 'knowledge presupposing 
truth1 is not applicable to it. Unlike a case where, for example, the 
act of perceiving a car presupposes that there is a car already there 
to be seen, the act of perceiving a Cartesian Ego in introspection 
consists in the very act of the self perceiving itself - it is an 
irreducibly reflexive act, and thus, such an observer would ur ; be
merely discovering such a self, but would be, in , manifesting
•■j
its essential nature, Thus, such an act would be constitutive of the 
self and of personal identity, if such a substance existed (which, of 
course, I maintain it does not).
Also, as Wittgenstein [1958] remarks, when I am introspecting my 
mental states, I am not presented with 'myself' or 'my self' as an 
object. Such an act does not involve any identification or recognition 
of myself. For example, should I suddenly feel a pain in my leg, I do 
not verify the claim that 'I am in pain’ by observing that someone is 
in pain, identifying the pained person as myself, and then conclude 
that I am in pain. Wittgenstein argues that the concept of identifi­
cation can only be meaningfully applied in cases where there is the 
possibility of getting it wrong, i.e. misidentifying who was in pain - 
and there is no such possibility.
Turning to a second interpretation of Butler, we have the claim 
that our identity is revealed by our memories of past experiences, but 
that again such a discovery already presupposes that which is discovered. 
Again there is a logical flaw in the position that Butler is attacking 
on this interpretation, as ' being the same person as the person who 
experienced F at tl' is not a possible content of a memory. It is of 
a different logical type to anything that can be a possible memory, 
that is, a past experience. My point is parallel to Ayer's strengthening 
o^ Home's attack on the notion of a direct acquaintence with the self,
whereby it is not just a matter of fact that when he examined the 
contents of his consciousness he could only observe a succession of 
perceptions, but it is so as a matter of logic, as such a ’self’ is 
not a logically possible content of experience, and if this is true of 
the present tense, it is equally true of the past tense, in the case 
of memories of such experiences of the self, i.e. if it cannot be 
experienced, then it cannot be remembered.
Brennan [1988] follows Evans’ [1982]^of the abovementioned 
argument of Wittgenstein concerning the ’identification-free1 nature 
of memory-judgements, whereby while I can be mistaken about the content 
of a memory, or whether it is a real memory rather than just an 
imaginative fantasy, I cannot be mistaken whether it is mine. Thus, the 
memory report ’I remember F ’ should not be analysed as
(i) Someone experienced F
(ii) Their having experienced F stands in the appropriate causal 
relation to my present memory
(iii) I experienced F.
Rather, as Evans says, "Memory is not a way of possessing knowledge 
about an object of a kind which leaves open the question of the identity 
of that object. If a subject has, in virtue of the operation of his 
memory, knowledge of the past states of a subject, then that subject 
is himself". (p245).
However, two points should be made here. Firstly, such an analysis 
leaves the whole Reductionism / Non-Reductionism dispute untouched - it 
leaves it open as to what it actually i£ to be a person. Secondly, as 
Brennan acknowledges, should it ever occur that someone has quasi­
memories that were not ’real' memories, (see ch.3.2 below), then the 
former, discredited analysis would be appropriate to discuss such cases, 
where misidentification was a real possibility, but you were sure that 
your present quasi-memory was of your own past experience.
On either of my two readings of Butler, Locke is guilty of many 
things, but these needn’t include circularity. This charge is due to 
Butler interpreting Locke as saying that both
(i) An experience is mine only if I remember it, and
(ii) Only if an experience is mine can I say that I remember it.
Read in this way the circularity is obvious, but Locke needn’t be read 
as saying this. His case can be given in such a way that the identity 
relation can be given necessary and sufficient conditions that do not
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include identity itself ;
x at tl is the same person as y at t2 iff y remembers experiencing F at
tl, and x in fact experienced F at tl.
The factor that distinguishes a genuine memory isn'Vtl the circular 
condition that the said memory is mine, but that there is a causal 
connection between the experience and the memory of it, whereby the 
experience of F causes a memory trace to be stored in the brain, and 
which can be brought to conscious awareness at a later date, as a 
'memory of F'.
Returning to Butler's original statement, this can ' be
interpreted as saying that 'I remember doing F at tl' is elliptical
for saying that 'I remember my_ doing F at tl’. Now if he is just making
a logical point about the conditions of application of our concept of 
memory, then this is highly debatable - but even if we concede that he 
has made a correct descriptive analysis of the concept of memory, we 
can still hold that such a concept is a ripe candidate for conceptual 
revision, as in its present state it cannot accommodate certain 
logically possible hypothetical cases involving the transfer of 
memories, which I discuss below.
Alternatively, if we interpret Butler as describing the subjective 
experience of remembering a past experience, then it is not the case 
that 'oneself' necessarily enters into the memory as part of the content 
of the remembered event. Whether or not this will happen will depend 
on the actual experience, and, in particular, on the extent of one's 
own active participatory role in the event. The extent to which 'oneself' 
is included in the actual content of a memory is in direct proportion 
to the extent of one's own physical involvement in the event. So, for 
example, when I remember my first school dance, I can 'see myself 
there' with clumsy movements, pounding heart, and clammy hands. When I 
remember this ordeal, _I am the focus of my memory. On the other hand, 
we can acknowledge the power of a great performance or work of art to 
make the spectator 'lose himself' or 'lose the sense of himself', so 
that when I remember seeing Wim Wenders 'Wings Of Desire’, I remember 
what happened on the screen, and that is all. 1^ am not there in the 
memory. I only reemerge as the closing titles begin. Before that, my 
only contribution is that of a transparent 'point of view'.
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3.2 QUASIZMEMORY
Returning now to the claim that it is part of the conditions of 
use of our concept of memory that we can only remember our own
experiences  if so, we can then go on to introduce the new, wider
concept of quasi-memory which isn't thus constrained and which there­
fore does not presuppose personal identity. According to Parfit's 
[1984] schema, I have a quasi memory of experience F iff
(i) I seem to remember having F
(ii) Someone had F
(iii) My apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of
way, on this past experience.
Note that this is virtually identical to the analysis of 'I remember 
F' that Evans criticises.
At this point, Non-Reductionists will argue that you cannot spell 
out restrictions on what will count as 'the right kind of cause' in
(iii) without invoking personal identity (i.e. that F is m^ experience) 
and the analysis is therefore circular. But such a claim is mistaken. 
The whole force of any criterion based on memory lies in the fact that 
memory is a causal process. As I have noted, in the 'normal' case, an 
experience is encoded in the brain, and somehow stored as a 'memory-
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trace('A which t'OA^ astls:<w*34r£r(v£>i> . Now, the claim
that I could only quasi-remember my own experiences would depend on 
the assumption that this was the only causal pathway by which events 
could be recalled. However, if it were the case that memory traces 
could be transferred from one brain to another (and given our lack of 
a complete theory of neuroscience, we cannot discount such a possibi­
lity), so that for example it was discovered that specific memories 
of past experiences were located in precise sites in the brain, so 
that neuron-complex N, containing the memory of F, was removed from 
A's brain and implanted into B's brain, then it would seem to be the 
case that B would then be capable of having true quasi-memories of F.
Thus we have an example of an appropriate causal connection 
holding between experiences without the experiencer and the rememberer 
being the same person. Cases of fission would provide other such 
examples. We can also identify a causal connection between an experience 
and a quasi-memory prior to ascertaining the facts about identity. As 
Shoemaker [1984] says, if, in the case of a brain transfer, B at t2 
has quasi-memories of A's experiences at tl, then the fact that he 
has the same brain at t2 as A had at tl itself provides sufficient 
reason for saying that the quasi-memories were appropriately caused,
and this in turn is sufficient grounds for saying that A = B.
Regarding what would count as the 'right kind of cause' in his 
analysis of quasi-memory, Parfit later states that he would accept any 
sufficient cause. I agree with this, and would expand on it to say 
that such a cause would be acknowledged when we had some understanding 
of the processes involved which enabled the quasi-memories to take 
place. For example, in the case of a memory-trace implant, such an 
operation would be performed against the background of a neurologically 
based theory of memory, and thus of the cluster of laws underlying 
the process, which would ensure the regularity so that predictions 
could be made regarding y remembering F if x's neuron-set A (which 
stored this memory) was implanted in y's brain. Conversely, the 
occuCffence of sach a quasi-memory would be explained by such a theory.
No doubt, if such events ever became commonplace, our common set 
of beliefs regarding memory would gradually change so that it would 
cease to be part of our concept of memory that we could only remember 
our own experiences. In other words, the concept of memory would 
evolve into the concept of quasi-memory. It would just be that the 
'natural' or 'direct' means whereby experiences were remembered could 
be described in terms of the neurophysiology of a single brain.
Similar points to those raised in the last few paragraphs would 
also apply to any replication cases, should they ever become fact. In 
such cases, if such a machine could record someone's brain-states, 
and reproduce them in another new brain, so that ATs memories were 
'programmed' into the brains of B and C, then these newly-constructed 
persons will have quasi-memories of A's experiences.
Of course, such fantasies may well be physically impossible in 
principle - we don't know. But one doubt what is worth raising comes 
from J.Z.Young [1987] "The whole memory system may constitute one large
map, organised around certain coordinates new features are placed
appropriately on the map and retrieved by their relationship to 
features already there"(pl71). Given this, one might suspect that if 
the neurons that realised certain memories within the original brain 
were transplanted, the quasi-memories thus transferred would be non­
operative in the new brain, as they would be in a limbo, being so 
alien that they would not become integrated into the 'memory-map'. If
I can push Young's analogy further....... a feature on a map only
exists as such if it is on that map. It loses its significance if it
is removed from that map and placed in isolation. Imagine being lost, 
and being handed a tiny pin-point scrap of a map and being told 'You 
are here'. Likewise one can suspect that memory traces would be 
similarly inoperative when removed from the base coordinate system 
within which they fulfilled their causal roles, and that they cannot 
be just stuck on to another entirely diffen>$t causal network and be 
expected to be iohktt' £u/\thc vcvik\ ,
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However, this is an empirical matter, to be established in the 
event of brain-state transfers taking place. For the moment, let us be 
charitable and allow that memories can be thus transferred. Parfit 
constructs such an example, and argues that in such a case, one person 
can be said to have true quasi-memories of another person's experiences.
A neurosurgeon has implanted copies of certain of Paul's memory- 
traces into Jane's brain, so that she seems to remember events that 
happened in Venice, yet she knows that she has never visited that city. 
However, she knows that Paul has been there, and Paul confirms that 
her quasi-memories correspond to certain of his experiences there, and 
so Jane can conclude that she is quasi-remembering an experience of 
Paul's. One can even imagine Paul 'testing' Jane in order to distinguish 
accurate recollection from mere imagination, i.e. 'OK, Jane, so you 
remember being in a gondola, and catching sight of a small red-coated 
figure..... what happened next?' This would be fairly easy where Jane 
and Paul could work in tandem. There are also cases where Jane could 
work out for herself whether a quasi-memory was of one of Paul's 
experiences or of one of her own. Parfit gives one such example, of 
Jane recalling shaving and seeing Paul's face directly in front of her 
in the mirror. This is clearly correct, although Parfit doesn't bring 
out its significance, which lies in its being an experience in which 
one is actively physically involved, and where one's perception of 
one's own body plays an integral role in the action, and therefore 
will be likewise 'featured' in the corresponding memory or quasi­
memory .
On the other hand, towards what I have called the 'passive' or 
'spectator' end of the scale, ther^ will be quasi-memories that will 
not be so identifiable as such, but in such cases, it needn't be that 
such quasi-memories tell Jane what Paul's experience was like yet 
falsely tell her that they were of her experiences. Such a mistaken 
inference would not follow automatically, since she herself will be 
just as 'absent' from the content of the memory as is Paul. Such an
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experience will be recalled as being, in Parfit's words, 'from the 
seer’s point of view’, with a conditional agnosticism regarding whoever 
had the original experience, tempered by the possibility of some 
evidence being made available at a later date that would identify the 
subj ect.
3,3 SWINBURNE'S 'SIMPLE VIEW•
Richard Swinburne is virtually unique amongst contemporary 
philosophers in that he attacks Reductionist theories of personal 
identity from the perspective of traditional Cartesian dualism. He 
describes his position as holding to the 'Simple View' regarding 
personal identity, namely that it consists in some basic fact that is 
not reducible to any other facts concerning either physical or 
psychological continuity. The Simple View holds that questions 
regarding personal identity always have determinate answers in all 
possible cases, whether or not we can ever come to discover these 
answers. He says that to think otherwise is to fall into the fallacy 
of verificationism, in failing to distinguish the question of what 
counts as evidence for the holding of personal identity, and the 
question of what personal identity consists in, and thus what it means 
to say that the relation holds. Thus he describes the Reductionist 
views (a.k.a. 'the Complex View') as empiricist theories.
Clearly an empiricist theory of personal identity will not 
suffice for someone who holds that all questions regarding personal 
identity must have determinate answers, since, as we have seen, there 
are many 'puzzle-cases' to which, on all the possible evidence, no 
such answer can be derived - so any such answer must be found beyond 
the realm of empirical knowledge. In arguing that all Reductionist 
theories commit the verificationist fallacy, Swinburne, in the original 
statement of his views [1974] backs up his claim by reference to other 
examples of this fallacy which are, contrary to his assumption, far 
from being analogous, as Madell [1981] points out. For example, in 
contrast to the problem of other minds, there is no such distinction 
between grounds for belief between first-person and third-person talk, 
as, unlike in this situation, no-one is saying that only talk of 
others' personal identity transcends all evidence I could have. Rather,
the debate is about all cases, including one's own. Swinburne's second
t+X Hi'Xri ft
supposedly analogous case is^v- _ our belief in the existence of the 
external world, and of objects. However, these constitute an explana-
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tory hypothesis that best accounts for the regularities of sense- 
experiences, whereas the positing of some 'self1 as a substance over 
and above the physical body and the holding of physical and psycho­
logical continuity has no such role, being unnecessary to account for 
the comprehensibility of experience for an embodied subject.
One way into Swinburne's 'Simple View' is to consider his 
adaptation of Williams' [1970] mad surgeon story as discussed in ch.2., 
in which he combines the original plot with a scenario similar to that 
depicted by Parfit [1984] in his story 'My Division',, wherein I am 
told that my brain (or to be more precise, my cerebral cortex) is to 
be removed, and the hemispheres separated, with one each being 
transplanted into the cortexless skulls of bodies B and C. (Let us 
call me 'A'). After these operations are completed, one of these persons 
the B or C-body-person, is to be tortured, and it is up to me, A, to 
decide who is to get what, prior to the operations taking place.
Swinburne says that according to the Complex View it should make 
no difference to me either way as to who gets tortured and who on the 
contrary is to be rewarded, as "each person will be you to the extent 
that he has your brain and resembles you in his apparent memories and
character.....  both subsequent persons will be part you...,(and you
will) in part suffer and in part enjoy what each suffers and enjoys"
(pl8, Swinburne [1984]). Swinburne finds such an account incoherent, 
as "how could you have reason for part enjoyment and part terrified 
anticipation, when no one future person is going to suffer a mixed 
fate" (pl8).
In this final sentence, Swinburne seems to be pointing to the 
intransitivity that sQch 'branching' results in, and is tacitly saying 
that since B f C, then -[(A = B) & (A = C)]. Quite correct. However, 
in the above quotations, Swinburne makes his case at the cost of 
distorting his opponents' argument- ' Reductionist like Parfit is 
not saying that under such circumstances, A is the same person as B 
and/or C to any extent, but rather that A survives as the B-body person 
and as the CV-body person, as he is psychologically continuous with 
both of them. Thus it seems reasonable to say that, when faced with 
the thought of his future fission, A's mixed feelings are well 
justified, not because he or any one future person will experience 
such mixed fortunes, but because he stands in Relation R to two 
different future persons, whose combined experience will encompass
both the torture and the reward. This can be expressed another way : 
in fission, stages SI and S2 are R-related to a common earlier stage 
S, but are not R-related to each other.
Swinburne goes on to say that we can make sense of the idea of A 
making the ’wrong choice1, in other words, of finding out that he is 
being tortured, or conversely of making the right choice, whereas by 
Parfit’s theory there is no real difference between the choices from 
A*is perspective, and therefore no risk. Now it seems to me that we can 
only make sense of A making a right choice or a wrong choice in this 
way on the a^ amttttiiiPIi that personal identity involves something beyond 
the physical and psychological continuity that relates A & B and A &
C, and thus such pipriori intuitions cannot without circularity be put 
forward as grounds in favour of such a theory. If, on the other hand, 
there is no such ’further factVi wkth identity consists : , then we
cannot make sense of there being a risk/vin the choice, as there is 
nothing left to be at stake.
Swinburne's response to A's dilemma is to say that there is equal 
evidence for the claims that A = B and that A = C, but that all such 
evidence is, in principle, fallible, and the fact i ...
B :X)C C is the same person as A is independent of such evidence. But, 
as I've said, Parfit's line is somewhat different from that depicted 
by Swinburne - it is rather to say that certainly we cannot decide on 
all the available evidence whether A = B or A - C, and obviously A 
cannot be identical to both, so the problem is insoluble. However, the 
situation can be re-described in terms of Relation R, and thus we can 
say that A survives equally in or as B and C.
Swinburne remarks that the weakness of Reductionist views in 
dealing with fission cases is in assuming that "mere logic could 
determine which of the experiences had by various persons $ each of 
which was to some extent continuous with me in apparent memory and 
brain matter, would be mine" (p20), whereas in his ’Simple View', 
their being mine was a further fact, over and above any evidential 
considerations.
However, yet again he distorts his opponents’ position, as firstly 
the complex view, as I ’ve said, needn’t be cast in terms of which future 
experiences will be mine, and secondly, as Shoemaker [1985] says, the
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Complex view doesn't rely on 'mere logic', but states that in the cases 
in which answers to questions regarding personal identity can be given 
(which isn't always), then these answers will be ascertained on the 
basis of empirical facts regarding the causal relations between 
experiences, and, in such cases, that is all that is to be said on the 
matter.
3.4 NON-REDUCTIONISM AND DUALISM
I will now turn to the matter of Swinburne's dualism and its 
relation with the Simple view. Looking at the components of the Simple 
View, it is clear that dualism cannot be derived from the indefinability 
or irreducibility of person identity, since, as Shoemaker [1984] says, 
when terms refer to structured wholes, i.e. trees, cars, one can hold 
that these terms are not reducible to , or definable in terms of the 
sum of their parts, but no-one would therefore want to hold a dualistic 
account of these.
Secondly, regarding the determinateness of questions of personal 
identity, Swinburne is mistaken to hold that any opposition to his 
theory must be based on verificationism since, as Parfit notes, one 
can deny that all such questions regarding the identity of nations, 
clubs, etc, must yield a determinate answer, and this denial isn't 
based on verificationist grounds. Thus further argument is required 
to show why the situation is in any way different in the case of 
persons. Rather, the denial that all such identity-questions must 
admit of a determinate answer is due to the vagueness of the sortal 
term involved, which allows an indeterminacy in the reference of all 
items falling under such a term, which in turn results in the indet­
erminacy of truth-values of statements involving such referring terms.
Turning to another set of arguments, Swinburne seems to think that 
the truth of a dualist theory follows from the fact that he can, 
coherently and without contradiction, imagine that he could continue 
to exist in a disembodied state, being "able to operate on, and learn
about the world without having to use a particular chunk of matter
for this purpose...(where)...simply by chosing to do so, he can 
gradually shift the focus of his knowledge and control"(p24). He 
accepts that such a disembodied existence would be impossible for a 
purely physical being, so, given that he's shown that it is logically 
possible, this must be due to the truth of what he calls his 'wider 
Aristotelian principle' involving non-material stuff organised into a
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certain form
To begin with, I would dispute Swinburne’s claim that the idea of 
disembodied existence is coherent. Imagination is a very deceptive 
faculty, rendering plausibility where it is not warronted. Certainly, 
the way Swinburne describes it, there is no blatant inconsistency,but 
this is only because he offers such a fragmentary sketch. If he were 
to attempt to fill out the description to include a full theoretical 
account of how disembodied existence was possible, then it would be a 
different story, as he would then be required to account for how it is 
possible that one could perceive the world without sensory organs, or 
act upon the world without any muscles - and, it seems to me, there 
is, in principle, no way in which such questions can be answered. Also, 
I'm not convinced that one can imagine being disembodied, in the sense 
of being able to grasp 'what it's like' from a subjective viewpoint, 
without tacitly introducing some elements of the physicality that is 
being denied. I can, at a stretch, imagine being invisible, or feeling 
numb, or weightlessness, but that's as far as it goes.
On a more serious note, Swinburne's argument is not logically > 
sound. As Shoemaker [1984] argues, Swinburne's claims that one might 
survive disembodied do not constitute a de re claim that, regarding 
one particular person, it is possible that he might survive in a 
disembodied state - at most it says that it is possible that there be 
some person that could do so. Yet Swinburne goes from this lesser 
claim into the realm of the actual, saying that "for any present 
person who is presently conscious, there is no logical impossibility
......  that that person continue to exist without his body* (p29),
which does not follow.
Neither does it follow from my being able to imagine myself as 
disembodied that such a state is a de re possibility for me. Arnauld 
had long ago dismissed such an argument from Descartes, using a 
parallel case whereby I might doubt that a right-angled triangle v C 
ha§ ^ the property of having the square of its hypoteneuse equal to 
the sum of the squares of the other two sides - but it doesn't follow 
that such a triangle does lack this property, nor that it is an 
essential property of any such triangle. Likewise, it may be; > 
despite my imagining in my ignorance; that I could exist without a 
body, that I am an essentially embodied being.
49
Next, Swinburne claims that 'laws of nature' do not necessitate 
that a certain person haV& certain memories or that his bodytet made of 
certain matter. He imagines a time • . 4000 million, years ago, when the 
earth was a cooling globe of inanimate chaos, and argues that while 
natural laws would dictate the general evolution of the planet and the
life-forms upon it, including the ways in which bodies would be formed
('>)0 \ /
that could support conscious life, "what\ natural laws in no way 
determine is which animate body is yours and which is mine.... just the 
same arrangement of matter and just the same laws could have given me 
the body (and so the apparent memories) which are yours» and you the 
body (and so the apparent memories) which are now mine" (p25-6).
However, yet again, this argument presupposes what it sets out to 
prove - that is, it assumes that there is a 'me' and a 'you' prior to 
the existence of the bodies we now 'occupy1, so that somehow I am 
'alloted' one and you another. In other words, Swinburne again assumes 
the dualist theory, and the existence of immaterial souls prior to the 
existence of physical bodies.
3.5 THE SUBJECTIVE VIEW
I will finally turn to another of Swinburne's arguments for the 
Simple View, wherein he claims that the ultimate irreducible nature of 
personal identity is proved from the fact that it is revealed in 
experience, and that no other theory can account for the copersonal 
relation between experiences. He claims that "the continued existence 
of a person over a very short period of time is something that can
often be experienced by that person  without it depending on our
knowledge of anything more ultimate.... the continuing of a person is 
a datum of experience" (p41).
When we are tracking a moving object, it is not a complete 
account of our experience to say that we see it at place pi, then at 
p2, p3, etc., as such perceptions are not discrete units, but rather 
they overlap into one continuous awareness through time. He quotes 
Foster [1979] "it is this double overlap which provides the sensible 
continuity of sense-experiences and unifies presentations into a stream 
of awareness" - in other words, we are aware of all these experiences 
as mine ~ "it is in the unity of the stream that we primarily discern 
the unity of the subject" (pl76).
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Likewise, claims Swinburne, also among the data of our experience 
is the experience of oneself as being the common subject of simultaneous
experiences, which are perceived as being ’mine' in a direct, non­
inferred way, as this knowledge cannot be derived from any information 
regarding the experiences themselves, or from knowledge regarding 
their associated brain-states.
On this set of arguments from Swinburne, I am in agreement with 
Shoemaker that one can go along with these observations concerning 
'first-person knowledge', but that such admissions leave the whole 
debate between the Simple and Complex views on personal identity 
untouched. It is certainly the case that such instances of self- 
knowledge have the property of being immune from error due to mis- 
identification, and it is a form of knowledge that is immediate and 
direct, and not derivable from any other information - however, we 
can hold that it is just a fact about the way in which human beings 
are constructed that being in a certain state, or having a certain 
experience directly causes the incorrigible belief that _I am in such a 
state or am having such an experience, but it may still be the case 
that personal identity can be given a non-circular and substantial '  ^
in terms of other relations. Also, as Shoemaker observes, Swinburne has 
yet to offer any argument to suggest that a dualist theory would 
provide any insights into the peculiar properties of self-knowledge,
explanatory power at all.
A parallel point can be made regarding Strawson's [1959] argument 
that 'person' is a primitive concept, prior to such as 'individual 
consciousness' or 'Cartesian Ego'. Again, this Heaves open the whole 
question of the kind of thing a person is, and of what are the conditions 
of identity for persons. The ability to correctly apply the concept of 
a person involves the ability to identify and individuate persons, 
which demands that we can recognise others as persons and attribute 
both physical and psychological attributes to them. Yet, even if 
Strawson is correct on this, the debate between the Simple and Complex 
views remains untouched, as it is still open to question just what 
persons actually are, and what can be said about them. As Brennan [1988] 
says, it doesn't follow^that a certain recognitional capacity is 
primitive and that certain items are basic within this recognitional 
schema, that their nature is primitive and unanalysable, and that 
nothing more can be said about the conditions of identity through time
unanalysable fact has no
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of items falling under such a concept. To make a comparison, 'flower* 
is a basic concept, relative to seed, stem, blossom, etc., - that is, 
the concept of a flower enables us to identify and individuate such a 
structured assembly of parts, yet what it is to be a flower is no more 
than the structured sum of these parts organised into a whole. Again, 
conceptual primitiveness does not imply ontological primitiveness.
Returning to this matter of our direct awareness of our identity 
through time, and all our experiences recognised as 'mine', Shoemaker 
points out that this is only the case if we assume that branching (i.e. 
fission) has not taken place. Even if we are in a state of reflective 
awareness of having experiences over a short period of time, where we 
are aware of having experience 1 followed immediately by experience 2 
so that they overlap, then, if fission occured during this temporally- 
extended awareness, then the state of awareness itself branches, so 
that its earlier stages are not copersonal with its later stages.
The final nail in the coffin of Swinburne's dualistic theory of 
personal identity comes when we recall that there are classic objections 
to substance dualism that have never been answered - namely the problem 
of giving a theoretical account of how two mutually distinct substances 
could causally interact, and how a criterion of identity for minds can 
be devised that does not depend on a bodily criterion. Swinburne 
nowhere even acknowledges that these problems exist, let alone tries 
to solve them.
3.6 EMPIRICAL GROUNDS FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM?
This section is based on Parfit's [1984] argument entitled 'How 
a Non-Reductionist view might have been true'. He had already shown 
to his satisfaction that to hold a Non-Reductionist theory of personal 
identity basically amounted to the claim that identity centred on the 
continuing existence of a Cartesian Ego - i.e. one is committed to a 
substance dualism. However, rather than accepting the contemporary 
wisdom that the Cartesian Ego is an inherently incoherent concept, 
subject to insurmountable difficulties, Parfit surprisingly makes the 
concession that it is just a (contingent) fact of life that no such 
immaterial entities exist. He then goes on to suggest the kind of 
possible evidence that would be sufficient to justify the belief that 
such units of non-material substance existed as separate entities.
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The example he offers is one designed to provide evidence for 
reincarnation. This is slightly peculiar, given his later character­
isation of Buddhism (which also adheres to a belief in reincarnation) 
as a form of Reductionism, and therefore as advocating a quasi-Humean 
position, denying the existence of a self beyond this 'bundle of 
perceptions'. Incidentally, it has always been a mystery what exactly 
is reincarnated according to Buddhist theory, if there is no quasi- 
Cartesian Ego existing separately from our physical and psychological 
continuity. To suggest that the consequences of the Law of Karma 
continue, in the form of habits, desires, etc., seems to me to be 
committing the same logical fallacy as that ridiculed by Lewis 
Carroll in his tale of the grin surviving the Cheshire cat. The point 
being, of course, that propositional attitudes are not free-floating, 
self-subsistent entities, but functions o£_ entities, i.e. conscious 
subjects of experience. But to return to Parfit, and his claim that 
evidence for reincarnation would provide evidence for the continuous 
existence of a Cartesian Ego, and hence for Non-Reductionism.
He constructs an imaginary case of a modern-day Japanese woman 
who experiences what seem to be quasi-memories of having lived many 
thousands of years ago as a Celtic warrior. From information acquired 
from these memories, she goes on to make certain predictions, for 
example concerning certain as-yet-unknown archeological or historical 
discoveries, which, following her instructions, are confirmed. Parfit 
says that if
1. There were many actual well-confirmed cases such as this; and
2. There were no other ways of accounting for such detailed and 
specific knowledge of such events of the distant past;
then one would have to concede that people can have true quasi-memories 
(or, simply, memories) of past lives, and, in the absence of physical 
continuity between the subject of the remembered actions and the 
woman herself, then we would be obliged to posit the existence of a 
purely mental entity that extends through time to cover both physical 
embodiments, continuing to exist throughout the thousands of years 
separating the Celtic and Japanese-bodied persons. And, says Parfit, 
if such an entity exists, then it is plausible to conclude that such 
an entity constitutes what this person essentially i^ s. The only 
problem is, he claims, that we have no such evidence for the existence 
of such entities.
I will argue that there does exist what seems to be an abundance
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of evidence similar in kind to that which Parfit would find acceptable, 
but that this does not commit us either to Cartesian dualism or to Non- 
Reductionism. Let us examine Parfit's two abovementioned conditions, 
upon which he thinks the dualist case depends. Firstly, contrary to 
Parfit's unsubstantiated assertion, there are countless well-documented 
cases, throughout virtually all societies, that could be used in the 
place of Parfit's hypothetical example. If such cases were fully 
described they would fill many volumes and it is neither necessary 
nor desirable that I do so here. A few notable examples will suffice.
If the reader remains sceptical of the veracity of such sources, then 
he or she should just consider them to be on the same level as Parfit's 
hypothetical case, and consider my investigation as being into what we 
would say such cases were true.
3.7 CASE HISTORIES : THREE STRANGE TALES
1. Consider the strange case of Lurancy Vennum, as described by 
Watson [1974]. At the age of 13 she fell into a cataleptic state which 
lasted for five years, which was followed by trances in which she spoke 
of 'angels and spirits'. The diagnosis at the time was that she was 
'possessed' by two evil alien personalities. However, it was discovered 
that her own personality could be restored by means of hypnosis and, 
whilst in this state, she 'herself' said that the only way that these 
spirits could be kept at bay was for her to allow herself to become 
possessed by an 'angel' who wished to assist her. This angel was named 
as Mary Roff. It emerged that someone of that name had died, aged 18, 
a year after Lurancy was born. She had lived in the same town, although 
the two families had had no contact nor knowledge of each other.
After the particular hypnotic trance in which Mary Roff was 
discussed, Lurancy awoke with what appeared to be full knowledge 'from 
the inside' of Mary's life, down to the tiniest insignificant detail, 
remembering events, recognising people, etc. She even went to live with 
the Roff family, who treated her as their dead daughter, just as she 
herself regarded herself as Mary. T M s  'possession' lasted for over 
three months when suddenly, for no apparent reason, Lurency's original 
personality returned - she recaptured all her old memories which had 
been lost while living 'as' Mary, and her old personality was restored.
She recognised her family again, as they had been strangers to her as 
Mary, and she returned home to live with them. She retained no memory
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of her lost 100 days’, and no such similar phenomena happened to her 
again.
This case shares many similarities with cases of Multiple 
Personality Disorder and psychogenic fugue, which I discuss at length 
in later chapters, However there is one crucial difference, in that in 
the above case, the newly manifested personality is neither newly 
created, as in the second personality of Mary Reynolds that I call MR2; 
nor in the role of an intraconscious personality observing her ’host’, 
with access to all her thoughts and feelings, as with Eve Black in 
relation to Eve White (see ch.8). It rather appears that Lurancy, when 
acting 'as Mary', possessed knowledge that cannot be accounted for by 
any orthodox means, in terms of her own history. This is the crucial 
factor, once we reject Lurancy's own mediaeval spiritualistic inter­
pretation of her experience in terms of spirits, angels and suchlike.
This feature of unaccountably acquired knowledge is even more 
strikingly displayed in the following case.
2. This is the case of Imad Elawar, as described by Stevenson 
fl966]. As a very young child, Imad appeared to know many things that 
he hadn't been taught. He spoke of friends that his family didn't 
know, and which they dismissed as a child's fantasies, until one day 
he embraced a stranger in their Lebanese village, claiming that this 
man had once been his neighbour. The man replied that he had rarely 
been in this village before, as he lived in another village fifteen 
miles away, and thare was little contact between the villages.
Stevenson arrived to investigate the case, visiting this second 
village of Khriby with the 5 year old Imad. After several false starts, 
he discovered discovered strong qualitative similarities between Imad's 
quasi-memories and events in the life of one Ibrahim Bouhainzy, who 
had died there some years before. On examining Ibrahim's home,
Stevenson noticed many small features and items that Imad had previously
described in detail. Many of Imad's quasi-memories were confirmed *
\W\
correspond\to events in Ibrahim s life. Stevenson was satisfied that 
thertwas no fraud on the part of Imad's parents, as not only had they 
not known Ibrahim or anyone else who knew him, but they had taken no 
part in Stevenson's investigations and, in fact, had wrongly concluded, 
in disagreement with him, that Imad's quasi-memories were of the life 
of some other man. Taking all this into account, Stevenson argued that 
Imad's quasi-memories could not be explained away in terms of chance, 
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3. Finally, consider the case of 'Rosemary' (in Watson [1974]) 
who, in Blackpool in 1931, fell into a trance and began utterring a 
strange language, unknown and unintelligible to her family, and which 
was eventually identified as an ancient Egyptian dialect. In this 
language, she voiced the claim to be Telika-Ventin, the Babylonian 
wife of Pharoah Amenhotep III, of the 14th century B.C., and said 
that she could communicate through Rosemary because Rosemary herself 
had been a handmaiden of hers in a previous life.
A friend of the family, Dr. Frederic Wood, copied down a number 
of these uttered phrases phonetically, and sent them to a leading 
Egyptologist, Howard Hulme. It is acknowledged that the only written 
records of the ancient language, in heiroglyphic form, represent only 
consonant letters, so no present-day expert knew exactly how ancient 
Egyptian actually sounded, as the vowel sounds could only be guessed 
at, by comparison with other, surviving dialects. WHen the vowel 
sounds were omitted from Rosemary's words, what remained was intellig­
ible and informative to Hulme, who described the purely technical 
features of the speech that were so convincing, including "period 
characteristics, survival of archaisms, grammatical accuracy, peculiar 
popular terms, ordinary elisions and figures of speech" (pl99).
3.8 A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
One must tread a very fine line when dealing with such purported 
evidence. On the one hand, the history of parapsychology is by and 
large the history of charlatanism gradually exposed, and this encourages 
the suspicion that all such cases are fraudulent. When presented with 
such strong cases as I have described, the sceptic always has the 
option of regarding it as a conspiracy of deception on behalf of all 
the participants. On the other hand, such scepticism must have limits 
- they must at least give an indication of what would be acceptable to 
them as proof of the phenomenon under consideration. If, for example, 
any independent investigator, such as Stevenson or Hulme, is just 
assumed to be part of the conspiracy, or at least an unwilling dupe, 
then such sceptics cease to make empirical claims at all. If nothing 
can possibly count as proof for something, then nothing counts as 
disproof either. Also, as the odious neo-Nazi 'revisionist' historians 
show, it is possible to doubt the occurrence of any event, even that 
of genocide, no matter how incontrovertible the evidence seems - but 
this says more about the psychology of the doubters than about the
veracity of the events themselves.
Henry Sidgtfick " (in Wheatley & Edge [1976]) displayed a worthy 
attitude when he said, on behalf of the Society for Psychic Research,
"Vie believed unreservedly in the methods of modern science.... but we 
were not prepared to bow with equal docility to the mere prejudices of 
scientific men.... It appeared to us that there was an important body 
of evidence - tending prima facie to establish the independence of the 
soul or spirit - which modern science had simply left on one side.... 
evidence tending to throw light on the question of the action of the 
mind either apart from the body or otherwise through known bodily 
organs" (p77).
C.D.Broad [1949] located paranormal events against a background 
of 'Basic Limiting Principles', a set of assumptions that underlie 
both practical activities and opinions and scientific theories, and 
which are either 'self-evident' or are noverwhelmingly supported by all 
the empirical facts which fall within the range of ordinary experience 
and the scientific elaborations of it" (plO). (He includes psychology 
within this latter category). Psychical research, to Broad, concerns 
'ostensibly paranormal events' which, prima facie, conflict with one 
or more such principles. His Basic Limiting Principles include :
1) General Principles of Causation :
1.1 An event cannot have effects before it has happened.
1.2 An event 'a' at tl cannot cause an event 'b ' at t2 except i f xa
initiates a process of change which continues through the intervening
\ /
period and contributes to the initiation of b, or if a initiates a
structural modification persisting throughout, which cooperates with
\ J
some change taking place, together causing b.
1.3 An event cannot produce an effect at a remote place unless a 
finite period elapses between the two events, and that period is occu­
pied by a causal chain of events with spatio-temporal continuity.
2) Limitations on the Action of Mind on Matter :- a mental event cannot 
directly produce any change in the material world except certain 
changes in its' own brain.
3) Dependence of Mind on Brain :- a brain state is a necessary condition 
of a mental state.
4) Limitations on ways of acquiring knowledge :-
4.1 One cannot perceive a material object or event except by means of 
sensations which it produces in the mind, via the appropriate causal 
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4.2 It is impossible for A to know what experiences B has except
(i) via B's spoken or written accounts
(ii) via interpreting B ’s cries, movements, etc.
(iii) via seeing and making inference from material records and evidence
4.3 One cannot forecast a future event except
(i) by inference from present data from sensations, thoughts, memories
(ii) by inference via others’ trusted evidence
(iii) by non-inferential expectations based on past associations, 
stimulated by a past experience.
4.4 One cannot know that a certain past event occurred, except where
(i) it is a direct memory
(ii) via anotherBs memory
(iii) via material records and accounts
(iv) via inference from material evidence.
Both Parfit's hypothetical case and my purportedly real examples 
are in conflict with (at least) Principles 2, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.
However, While Broad's schema has some merit as a purely descriptive 
analysis of the relation of paranormal events to our entrenched 
commonsense assumptions about the world and ourselves, nothing follows 
from this analysis as to how we should regard such phenomena - nothing 
forces us to deny their possible or actual occurrence just because of 
an incompatibility with this set of assumptions, as it may be that it 
is these principles themselves that may be in need of revision in the 
light of such events. After all, what is the status of these Basic 
Limiting Principles? Despite Broad's claim that they are 'assumed' 
to be true by scientific theories, they are not implied by any funda­
mental scientific theory, as is often taken for granted as when it is 
claimed£.bat paranormal events are incompatible with accepted scientific 
theories. As Braude [1988] says, "No well-supported global scientific 
theory (e.g. Quantum Theory, General or Special Theory of Relativity, 
Theory of Evolution) precludes the existence of any cognitive or 
intentional phenomena, normal or paranormal" (p278). The position is 
similar with theories of perception, which merely "describe the opera­
tion of familiar or known sense modalities.... it is not their 
business to legislate the full range of possible forms of information 
acquisition or organic interaction" (p278). In fact Braude suggests 
that those who hold that paranormal phenomena are in any way special 
concerning an incompatibility with physical science "have simply 
failed to appreciate the insurmountable obstacles to explaining normal 
intentional phenomena in physicalist terms" (p293). While I would
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quibble with his claim that the obstacles are, in the latter case, 
insurmountable, (who can foretell the future and how our theories will 
develop), I think Braude's point is correct.
Let us now return to Parfit's Japanese woman, and to his second 
condition regarding grounds for belief in reincarnation, and thereby 
in Non-Reductionism - that there is no other explanation for the 
phenomenon. Since I am prepared to accept the reality of my own 
examples, and since I reject Non-Reductionism, is the onus not on me 
to suggest an alternative explanation?
Ducasse [1961] observes that ESP is the classical counter­
explanation of paranormal phenomena, where information is derived
a) telepathically from living people who know these facts,
b) by retrospective clairvoyant observation of the events, or
c) by clairvoyant observation of existing records or circumstantial 
evidence of past events.
However, as Williams [1957] has argued, in the absence of bodily 
continuity, we can have no corroborating evidence that could decide 
between the hypothesis of ESP and that of an identity claim, via a 
purely immaterial substance, and manifesting through memory. For the 
same reason, he argues, we cannot draw a distinction between identity 
and exact similarity in the case of token memories of character traits 
in the way that we can for material objects, i.e. bodies, where the 
issue is settled by the criterion of spatio-temporal continuity.
Adherents of ESP regard it as the most economical hypothesis, as 
it doesn't multiply entities unnecessarily,bu(r r-eL^ on certain 
purported capacities of the mind of the 'medium'. However, such an 
explanation cannot cover all cases of paranormal cognition without 
attributing a virtually unlimited range of powers to the person 
concerned, and this is an ad hoc mano&wre, as we have no other, 
independent reason for ascribing such powers. In fact, this ESP 
hypothesis doesn't qualify as an explanation at all, as there isn't 
the slightest suggestion of how the mind acquires this knowledge. In 
the absence of anyKtheory, the claim that the mind acquires the 
information telepathically or through clairvoyance is akin to the 
fallacy of saying that opium puts you to sleep because of its! 
'dormitive virtue'.
I seem to be left with the option of classing paranormal events
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as Anomalies’ in Kuhn's [1962] sense. While these anomalies have 
certainly been accumulating over the centuries, they are no great 
threat to any scientific paradigm, since one thing conspicuous by its 
absence has been any sign of a new paradigm or a developed body of 
theory that makes sense of these events. Any attempts that I am aware 
of are stuck at the level of unfalsifiable pre-scientific metaphysical 
dogma and woolly speculation.
As H.H.Price [1949] says, *The theoretical side of psychical 
research has lagged far behind the evidential side, and that, I believe, 
is one of the main reasons why the evidence itself is still ignored by 
so many... highly educated people. It is because these queer facts 
apparently 'make no sense1... that they tend to make no permanent 
impression on the mind.... If we could devise some theoretical 
explanation, in terms of which the facts did make sense, it would be a 
great gain. Such an explanation is needed for its own sake, and it is 
also needed to get the evidence attended to and considered* (p20).
So this is the gist of my response to Parfit's second condition - 
I need not find any alternative explanation, as nothing worth the 
name of 'explanation' has been offered in the first place. Like 
dualists generally, students of psychical research can offer no 
significant body of theory concerning the nature of this 'res cogitans' 
or of what psychophysical laws might maintain its interaction with a 
body. As Paul Churchland [1988] says, "There is no settled core of 
theory whose past successes have unified the community behind it, whose 
current form has been shaped in response to past experimental failures, 
and whose experimental agenda drives the assembled discipline forward" 
(p233).
So I admit that these paranormal events are mysterious, and not 
explained by science, but that they are equally mysterious from a 
dualistic perspective, which has the additional disadvantage of 
lacking even the beginning of any theoretical resources within which 
to construct an explanation.
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C H A P T E R  4 IDENTITY. SURVIVAL. AND S O R T A L  C O N C E P T S
4.1 INTRODUCTION
David Wiggins [1980] claims that in all cases of material objects 
that fall under the extension of a natural kind term, where ’a ’ and 'b' 
are temporal stages of such an object, any identity statement 'a = b' 
that says that they are both stages of the same temporally enduring 
object entails firstly that there is a principle whereby a and b can 
be located on a single unbroken spatio-temporal track, and can thereby 
be identified as being stages of the same thing, and secondly that a 
and b can be identified under a sortal concept of the type that affords 
the best answer to the question as to what sort of thing the object is.
I will cast doubts on both of these conditions in due course, but firstly 
I will continue to develop Wiggins' theory. To quote :
"a = b if and only if there exists a sortal concept f , such that
1. a and b belong to a kind which is the extension of f
2. to say that 'a is an f' is to say what a is_ (in the sense Aristotle
isolated)
3. a is the same f as b (a = b)" (p48).
This second requirement refers to a special class of sortal 
concept, one that Wiggins calls a 'substance-concept', which can apply 
in a present-tense form to a given object throughout its entire life­
span, and which specifies its 'form of life' and its 'principle of 
activity'. He distinguishes these substance-concepts from 'phased 
sortal concepts', which apply in a present-tense form only to specific 
and limited portions of the individual's life-span. So, for example, 
in the case of a human being, such terms as 'infant', 'teenager',etc., 
would be among the class of phased sortal concepts available.
It should be noted that whilst it is the case that 'a = b' entails
that 'a | b', we needn't be able to describe, or have any knowledge of 
the specifics of f, . - ‘ : rather^ 6 iat we are merely committed to
saying that'a and V a r e  the same something - that is, the natural kind 
term that is the appropriate substance-concept. The nature of f is a 
matter for empirical investigation, and 'f ' will be a term within the 
taxonomy of an ideal scientific theory.
4.2 LOCKE'S MAN/PERSON DISTINCTION
So what is the appropriate substance-concept that is implicitly 
invoked in issues regarding identity-through-time for creatures like 
myself? One would have thought that the answer would be unproblematic, 
but, looking back over the history of philosophy, a great deal of 
confusion and complexity has developed, which needs to be understood 
and disposed of. In order to do this, I will make a detailed study of 
the first-serious attempt to deal with these issues, and one whose 
influence extends to the present day, namely that of John Locke [1694]. 
Once the errors in his analysis are out in the open, the way ahead will 
be clearer.
Locke was the first to recognise that,there was a real issue here, 
and one that required to be resolved by philosophical analysis.
Previously, the likes of Descartes would have regarded the matter as 
self-evident, in the knowledge that man was essentially a thinking 
being, a 'res cogitans1, and therefore any naturalistic, biologically 
based sortal concept was out of the question regarding the issue of 
saying what such a being essentially is. Locke himself recognised the 
conflicts that were inherent in such a dualistic conception, but his 
own errors are equally rooted in dualistic assumptions.
Locke made a distinction between the issue o f va(tl) being the 
same man as b(t2 ) and the issue of a(tl) being the same person as b(t2 ).
He regarded the concept of 'person' as standing for "a thinking 
intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places" (II xxvii 9). Such a definition makes an implicit reference 
to his criterion of personal identity, which consisted in the possession 
of an uninterrupted flow of self-conscious awareness : yas far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, 
so far reaches the identity of that person" (II xxvii 9).
However, as I have mentioned, Locke regarded beings like myself 
as falling under a second, quite different sortal concept, namely 
'man'. Whilst the concept of 'person' is essentially concerned with a 
subject as a bearer of a rational and reflective consciousness, this 
latter concept of 'man' is what we would now call a biological class­
ification, and as such focusses on the beings in question as living
 ^ /
physical systems. It follows that the questions of whether a(tl) is 
t , . / \ ■ 
the same man as b(t2 ) and of whether a(t2 ) is the same person as b(t2 )
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must be distinguished as their answers are determined by reference to 
different criteria, namely, in the first case, whether there is a 
spatio-temporal track upon which both a and b can be located and 
thereby identified; and in the second case, whether b has memories of 
a's experiences at tl and at all other times leading to t2 .
Locke believed that it was possible in principle for the two 
criteria to diverge and thereby to yield different answers to questions 
regarding the identification of a and b. As he states in one of his 
most (in)famous passages, in the context of devising a thought- 
experiment in which two entire sets of memories were somehow exchanged 
between one body and another, "should the soul of a prince, carrying 
with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform 
the body of a cobbler, he would be the same person with the prince"
(II xxvii 15). Yet, Locke maintains, such an embodied bein^ would 
remain the same man as the cobbler.
So why did Locke make this distinction between ’man’ and ’person', 
and why did he attach so much importance to it? This distinction of 
sortals, and the criteria of identity that underlies them, prefigures 
the division that is still debated in contemporary investigations, 
between the Physical and Psychological Criteria, with these now, of 
course, not implying substance dualism, but pertaining to different 
levels of functioning. Contrary to appearance, and in particular to 
the previous quotation, it would be wrong wholeheartedlyvattribute 
to Locke the Cartesian doctrine that persons are essentially incorporeal 
souls, who are temporally and contingently embodied in an edifice of 
flesh and blood - but certainly some passages can be produced to 
the contrary. Perhaps the safest thing to say is just to accept that 
here, as in so many cases, Locke does neither himself nor the reader 
any favours by his sloppy and ambiguous use of key concepts such as 
’soul’ or 'consciousness', and thus that it is a futile enterprise to 
try and maintain any one consistent interpretation. Perhaps it is the 
prerogative of a pioneer to paint in broad brush strokes, and leave 
the finer details to those who follow in their wake. Three main usages 
of 'consciousness' need to be distinguished :
(i) our normal waking state;
(ii) a state of reflective self-awareness; and, most importantly;
(iii) memory.
As for the concept of 'soul', sometimes, as in the last quotation, he 
uses it in a quasi-Cart^/Sian sense, and elsewhere in a way that is 
vaguely synonymous with 'consciousness' in some rough amalgam of the
usages that I have just distinguished, without the implication of 
substance-dualism.
However, Locke also denies that there is any possibility of our 
attaining any knowledge of such a soul-Substance : "it being, in respect 
of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive
that God can superadd to matter a faculty of thinking.... than he
should superadd to it another substance with the faculty of thinking" 
(IV iii 6), and he goes on to explicitly deny that such a soul is the 
essential bearer of personal identity. Due perhaps to a rational 
concern for his personal survival, he didn’t risk provoking the wrath 
of the church and state authorities by offering an out-and-out denial 
of the existence of individual souls, restricting his argument to the 
claim that the existence, and the issue of the identity conditions 
regarding these soulsaf-c irrelevant to the issue of personal identity.
Continuing with his strategy of thought-experimentation, he 
argued that even if such souls do exist.(composed of some non-extended 
immaterial substance^) it is possible that one such soul could trans­
migrate from one body to another, for example in reincarnation. So in 
such a hypothetical case, the present mayor of Queensborough may now 
have what was once the soul of Socrates, but if he has no consciousness 
(i.e. no memory) of being Socrates and of having his experiences, then 
by Locke’s criterion, he is not the same person as Socrates. Here,
Locke is moving away from a purely Cartesian position equating the 
immortal soul with the res cogitans, which was the bearer of memories, 
whether they be those of this present life, or of previous lives.
Such a move was necessary if he was to maintain that memory was 
constitutive of personal identity. A Cartesian^on the contrary, would 
say that memory could only discover this identity.
Locke goes on to argue that if the same soul, in the same body, 
were to carry two separate and distinct alternating sets of thoughts 
and memories, there would be two persons in one soul : "could we 
suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting on the same 
body, one constantly day by day, the other by night.... I ask, whether 
the day and night man would not be two and distinct persons as Socrates 
and Plato" (II xxvii 23). Here, Locke dramatically anticipates modern 
discussions of Multiple Personality, and the challenge that such well- 
substantiated phenomena pose for our everyday beliefs regarding the 
unity of mind and personhood. Locke's main point appears to be that 
he regards the holding of memory itself, and not the possession of a
soul, as the necessary and sufficient condition of identity through 
time.
If this is Locke's theory, then insuperable problems result from 
this reluctance to regard the soul as the essential bearer of memory 
and consciousness. The point is that something must be the bearer of 
these functions - they are not free-floating, self-sufficient entities, 
any more than was the grin on the face of Lewis Carroll's Cheshire 
cat. So Locke is trapped on the horns of a dilemma - either he falls 
back and admits that the soul is the essential bearer of memories, in 
which case he is open to the classical, and I believe insurmountable 
criticisms of substance-dualism, or alternately, he attributes it to 
the brain. However, such a tactic would destroy his distinction 
between 'man' and 'person' (at least as prospective substance-concepts) 
and subsequently of any divergence in their answers to identity- 
questions. His 'prince and cobbler' story would be impossible, as the 
mental properties (associated with personhood) would be embodied by 
the neuronal properties, attributed to the man. Of course, the door 
is still open for related thoiight-experiments such as that from 
Williams [1970], as discussed in ch.2.
So I conclude that Locke's formulation of the man/person 
distinction is incoherent. The fundamental flaw in Locke's approach 
is that in focussing on memory and consciousness alone, without 
reference to any underlying substance or means of embodiment, he 
therefore places these functions in a vacuum, in a limbo, untouchable 
by any nomological factors which are essential in determining what is 
and isn't a possible state of affairs for them to enter uteo. It 
follows that Locke cannot locate memory within any theory, and 
hasn't a hope of explaining anything pertaining to it. I take up this 
task in ch.6 .
As to why Locke placed so much importance on the man/person 
distinction, I think we have to return to 'consciousness' in its wider 
sense, as incorporating all the higher mental faculties, as involving 
the exercise of rationality, intentions, choice, etc.. Locke thought 
that 'man', as a biological catagory, could not possibly accommodate 
or account for such matters, nor, therefore, such areas of crucial 
importance for him as ethics and moral responsibility. However, like 
Descartes, he adhered to a mechanistic model of biological systems, 
and much of what must have been at his time an intuitively powerful
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position regarding the impossibility of such systems possessing the 
ability to display reason has been robbed of its plausibility since 
the arrival of computers that can manipulate symbols in terms of 
logical relations.
4.3 NATURAL KINDS AND NATURAL LAWS
Let me now return to my question raised at the beginning of this 
chapter, namely what is the most appropriate sortal concept - the 
substance-concept - to use in application to beings such as myself?
In common non-philosophical usage we have a number of candidates, such 
as 'man', 'person', 'human being', etc.. In such everyday contexts 
these terms are used fairly interchangeably, but in technical contexts 
we require more precision. My tactic will be to examine these concepts 
and the relationships between them, to shed some light on my question.
I regard 'human being' and 'homo sapiens' as bearing the same 
relation to each other as do 'gold' and 'the element with the atomic 
number 79'. That is, 'human being' picks out a class of individuals 
in response to outer visible characteristics, but also makes implicit 
reference to a more precise principle of classification, and it is 
this latter classification that the term 'homo sapiens' goes some way 
to supplying, as it locates the class of individuals as a species 
within the framework of a scientific theory. Thus 'homo sapiens' and 
'human being' are natural kind terms (or at least surrogate natural 
kind terms), being classifications of a particular kind of animal. As 
such, they correspond to Locke's concept of 'man'.
Next, we come to the concept of 'person'. Is Lt a natural kind 
term? There is a strong argument that can be offered against such a 
claim, based on the fact that it fails to meet a crucial test that 
natural kind terms must satisfy. Wiggins, following Kripke and Putnam's 
causal theory of reference, argues that "any would-be determination of 
a natural kind stands or falls with the existence of law-like 
principles that will collect together the actual extension of the kind 
around an arbitrary good specimen of itt and that these lawlike 
principles will also determine the characteristic development and 
typical history of members of this extension" (pi69). Clearly, the 
terms 'human being' and 'homo sapiens' pass this requirement, however 
when we consider the concept of a person, it is not so obvious. As a 
piece of descriptive analysis, Locke was roughly on the right track
when he said that our usage of the concept of 'person1 is essentially 
connected to the attribution of consciousness, in the wide sense of 
the term.
Starting from this insight, Wiggins has developed what he calls 
an 'animal attribute' model of personhood, in which he takes 'person' 
as a concept that has to be analysed firstly in terms of a natural 
kind component, which will name the particular species of animal that 
each individual can be classified as, plus a 'functional' or 'systemic' 
component, involving the attribution of higher cognitive faculties.
So Wiggins' schema takes the following form :
"x is a person iff x is an animal falling under the extension of the
kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember...... t conceive of
themselves as perceiving, feeling, remembering........ conceive of
themselves as having a past accessible in experience-memory and a 
future accessible in intention, etc." (pl71).
The dots here represent the class of intensional predicates. Another 
way of filling in these dots, in a way that seems to me to be completely 
compatible with Wiggins, is to list Dennett's [1976] 'conditions of 
personhood', namely being rational; being the subject of intentional 
ascriptions; the necessity of a certain attitude being taken to one' 
as a moral agent; the ability to reciprocate this stance; being a
A
language user; an<fKthe possessor, of self-consciousness.
Regarding Wiggins' 'functional' component, care must be taken, 
since this term is also used in application to artefact-kinds, and 
while the concept of a person may share some significant features with 
artefact-kind concepts in the way that they differ from natural-kind 
concepts, persons are obviously not artefacts, and so the two categories 
should be kept distinct. In other words, a person is not 'for' anything 
- a person is not 'for' reasoning in the way that a knife can be said 
to be for cutting, as knives were created and designed by people in 
order to cut. Human persons, like all animal species, are in themselves 
functionless. However, their parts, i.e. their organs and bodily 
systems, can be legitimately regarded as having functions within the 
overall 'division of labour' involved in the process of life- 
maintainance - and it is in this sense that the mental attributes that 
Wiggins associates essentially with personhood can be regarded as 
functions, but not functions of persons, but of minds, and hence of 
brains.
So, according to Wiggins, 'person' is not a natural kind term,
but is a term that applies to a subset of animal kinds, with these 
latter kind terms being scientific classifications which are located 
within a corpus of biological and zoological theory. While I am for 
the most part in agreement with Wiggins here, I would guard against 
any tendency towards ’carbon-based chauvinism' regarding the attribution 
of consciousness, and I would leave it open, as an empirical matter, 
as to whether any future artefacts, silicon-based of otherwise, would 
satisfy any ideal Turing test and thereby deserve to be regarded as 
falling under the extension of the class Wiggins describes, and thus 
merit the attribution of personhood. From this perspective, 'person' 
can be seen, rather than as applying to a subset of natural kinds, as 
a cross-classification, cutting across the boundaries of all kind 
terms, both natural and, potentially, artefactual.
I would also add that we should regard 'person' as a secondary 
classification, for two reasons. Firstly, personhood is conferred by 
virtue of having some physical structure that is capable of supporting 
such psychological attributes constitutive of personhood - -• Secondly 
these psychological attributes are only contingently possessed by any 
member of any species. We can all sustain injury or suffer disease 
that would be sufficient to -'c ~ diminish^or even destroy such 
'higher' functions, while the individual survives as a human being 
(or as whatever animal) by virtue of the continuation of the vegetative 
functions that keep the body alive.
'Person' cannot be treated as a natural kind concept since there 
are no lawlike principles that gather together all the individuals 
in its extension. This point is parallel to the argument of the 
functionalists against type/type identification of mental states and 
brain states. That is, what counts as a certain type of mental state 
is anything that is in the appropriate causal relations to certain 
stimuli and behavioural responses, and with other mental states; and 
since this specification can, in principle, be satisfied by more than 
one form of physical embodiment, then mental states cannot be identified 
with any one of these realisations, and hence psychology is irreducible 
to neuroscience. Likewise in our present discussion, what counts as a 
person is any subject that possesses the cognitive and self-reflective 
abilities as outlined by Wiggins and Dennett.
Thus we see the similarity between 'person' and artiefadt kind
terras. Not only must the class of aniraal-kinds that prospective 
’person-tokens’ fall under be kept open, but such a set of species 
that are so diverse in physical structure precludes the possibility 
of there being any norttilogical principles that could gather these 
individuals, and these alone, in the way that is required of a natural 
kind term. In classifying an individual as an example of a particular 
artefact-kind, we are not making any implicit reference to any set of 
nomological statements, nor to any theories composed of them, as the 
individuals in question cannot be gathered together a£ members of 
the given kind by reference to such laws. Nor can they likewise be 
collected by reference to some hypothesised inner structure underlying 
outer characteristics, since the materials and structures that various 
members of such a kind can be composed of may be totally different and 
divergent, and are in principle without limit, so no finite complete 
characterisation can be given of the physical embodiments of all 
persons at any time in such a way. Rather, such individuals can only 
be grouped together in the way we demand for artefact-kinds, that is, 
under a functional description, which is irreducible to any physical 
description.
Wiggins, an essentialist, puts it this way : each token person 
will have a real essence, which will be the essence of the particular 
species-kind he belongs to. Thers is no real essence as a person per 
se. To quote : "Every person would belong to some natural kind that 
determines a sound Leibnizian principle of identity through change
for some one kind of person (human-person, dolphin-person)......
indirectly this would be the real essence in virtue of which he was a 
person" (pl72).
As I have already mentioned, to classify individuals under a 
substance-concept like ’human being’ involves a commitment to there 
being a set of nomological principles that gather the extension of 
that kind. In fact, according to Putnam [1970], it is a condition of 
the sense of such a predicate that such a set of natural laws hold for 
individuals that fall under such a term, and in such a way that they 
enable us to «.'•> -r discover, what Wiggins calls the principle
of activity’ of that kind, including the characteristic forms of 
development for a typical member of that kind, and the limits of that 
development beyond which it ceases to be a member of that kind. Such 
a theoretical structure should provide us with principles of individ-
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-uation for members of that kind, and enable us to identify and re- 
identify them, and thus provide us, in principle, with an answer to 
any query regarding the identity of any individual falling under such 
a description. It would seem to follow that the sense of such a sortal 
concept precludes us from even entertaining the possibility of any 
hypothetical example which involves human beings in situations that 
run contrary to the natural laws that contribute to the delimitation 
of the kind. For example, such fictions as depicted by Parfit [1984] 
concerning individuals whose bodies could fuse together, or those who 
could 'reproduce by natural division', i.e. fission, surely shed no 
light upon issues of personal identity as applied to humans, as such 
creatures could not be human beings. I will discuss this issue in 
detail in the following chapter.
4.4 ONCE AN F , ALWAYS AN F?
One other implication of Wiggins' theory is that any individual 
falling under a given substance-concept cannot change from being a 
member of such a kind to b e i^~ a member of another one and still 
remain the same individual, i.e. once an F, always an F. Wiggins 
regards spatio-temporal continuity as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of identity through time, as any such identity must be 
identity as something - it must be 'sortal-covered'. It goes without 
saying that such a condition does not cause any problems in the real 
world (unless one takes the Biblical story of Lot's wife literally !) 
but since a criterion of identity is intended to apply to all possible 
situations, it is worth seeing how such a restriction would apply to 
some counterfactual problem cases.
Parfit [1984] relates a science-fiction tale involving a 'Tele- 
transporter', a machine that facilitates interplanetary travel at the 
speed of light. The Teletransporter contains a 'Scanner' at departure 
point A, which destroys my entire body, while "recording the exact 
states of all my cells" (pl99). Idiis encoded information is transmitted 
by radio, at the speed of light, to a 'Replicator' at destination 
point B, which can, in principle, be anywhere in the Universe, and 
"will then create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like 
mine" (pl99). Upon entering the Scanner, and once the mechanisms are 
activated, I will lose consciousness at point A, and wake up, seemingly 
instantaneously, at point B, as if emerging from a short nap. However, 
my original body is no more, as I will have woken up in a new body,
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qualitatively identical to the original, down to the finest structures. 
And since the process involves the replication of my neurons, all my 
psychological attributes - my memories, my entire personality, will 
be unchanged.
Parfit then goes on to describe a second thought-experiment 
involving a new improved Teletransporter which incorporates a Scanner 
that can record the exact states of all my cells without destroying 
my body. However, it turns out that a design fault in the Scanner 
induces an irreversible cardiac disorder which causes the inevitable 
death of the original person within a few days, whilst the replica at
point B is unharmed. Parfit notes that in this case there is some
overlap between the lifetimes of what we might call (without begging 
the question) ’myself’ and 'my replica'. So, in theory, during this 
time, we could talk to each other, and even see each other by means of 
two-way televisual phone systems. This fact of our coexistence means 
that I and my replica cannot be identified, since identity is a 'one : 
one^relation. Our identification is also precluded by the branching 
of our respective tracks of spatio-temporal coordinates.
Another point, which Parfit doesn’t fully bring out, is that 
immediately after the replica is created (and I am talking about minute 
fractions of a second), I and my replica will cease to be exactly 
similar. By the time it takes for my replica to phone back to me on
Earth to assure me that he’s arrived sfely, our physical forms will
have diverged irreversibly. The two of us are living in different 
environments and receiving different stimuli, in response to which our 
(common) DNA will control and advise each cell in each respective body 
as to the production of appropriate proteins. Since each protein 
selection in turn becomes a factor influencing the selection of further 
proteins (again in response to surroundings and circumstances), myself 
and my replica will become increasingly dissimilar - so that if the 
design fault in the Scanner had been located and repaired prior to my 
entering it, and I had survived for another thirty years, then if 
after that time, I and my replica were to be compared, our qualitative 
similarity would fall far short of identity. It goes without saying 
that this divergence would take place on the psychological level as 
well. At most we would be like brothers - twins - and perhaps this is 
how we would come to regard one another.
Obviously these situations are not practically possible at the
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moment. However, Parfit doesn’t think that this fact invalidates their 
use as thought-experiments. He draws a distinction between the ’deeply 
impossible' - cases which would involve a contravention of the laws of 
nature - and the merely ’technically impossible’ - cases whose 
impossibility is contingent on our technological limitations, which 
could be overcome in the future. One factor that Parfit doesn’t deal 
with is the difficulty in telling whether a given hypothetical case 
is deeply or just technically impossible. If something is deeply 
impossible, then it is also technically impossible, but the reverse is 
not the case. For example, a heart transplant was a technical 
impossibility for an 18th century barber-surgeon, and, from his 
perspective, such an accomplishment may well have appeared to be 
deeply impossible. We, with hindsight, know that this is not the case, 
and that it was only deeply impossible in relation to his theoretical 
assumptions, which have in time been replaced. The history of science 
abounds with such misjudgements. All talk of deep impossibility can 
only be understood within the context of an underlying theory.
However, there are good reasons to be careful regarding the use 
of such thought-experiments. A cursory description (which is all that 
we are able to give in cases like Teletransportation) can easily fool 
us into thinking that we understand what is going on in such a 
situation - but in fact we are glossing over a vastness of ignorance, 
as we couldn't begin to describe more than a tiny fraction of what 
would be involved in such a case. I will return to discuss these 
issues in depth in chapter 5. But ignoring these doubts for the moment,
I wish to investigate some implications of these thought-experiments.
I will do this by devising three more thought-experiments, extending 
Parfit’s line of inquiry. Let us call Parfit's original Teletransport­
ation case T 1 , and his second, where the lifetimes overlap, T2.
T3 : I have been seriously injured in an accident, and my death 
seems to be inevitable. I am offered an alternative : space scientists 
have been attempting to colonize planet Z, in a far-off galaxy. The 
problem has been that humans cannot survive in the atmosphere of Z, 
and are restricted to specially insulated and controlled environments. 
Intelligent life has been discovered on Z. In fact, neurophilosophers 
have established that such Z-persons possess mental faculties just 
like our own, despite having a genetic structure that differs 
considerably from ours. In spite of this difference on the micro­
level, Z-persons look just like humans on the macro-level. (Philosophers 
noted an uncanny likeness between these Z-persons and the subjects of
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the twentieth century philosopher Putnam's 'Twin-Earth' story),
Anyway, the offer is this : A Scanner will record all my brain states, 
thus recording all my memories, character traits, etc. My body is 
then destroyed. The information is sent to Z at the speed of light, 
and is programmed into a brain in a body made out of new matter, 
according to the blueprint of the body of a Z-person who looks exactly 
like me. It is in this new body that I will awake on planet Z.
T4 takes a similar scenario, except that it concerns planet Z', 
where Z'-persons, while again sharing the same set of mental attributes 
as humans and Z-persons, have a physical structure that is drastically 
different from our own both at the micro and macro levels, and so 
look nothing like human beings. It is as embodied in the form of a Z'- 
person that I shall awaken on planet Z ’, td be greeted by a hand- 
picked team of psychologists to help me get over the shock of my new 
appearance. All mirrors will be removed from the room.
T5 : Again I am terminally injured, and no alternative way out 
is open to me. Yet I am not despondent, as I know that this life is 
not the end for me. My psychological continuity will survive the 
death of this body and brain. I will lose consciousness, and awaken, 
as if from a sleep, in what seems  ^ r my physical
body, and will see and recognise my friends and family who have also 
'passed over'.
In T1 and T2, the traditional substance dualism has been replaced 
by a new dualism of matter and information in the form of my 
'blueprint', including the exact specifications of the DNA molcules 
in the nuclei of my cells. T3 and T4 focus on the information comprising 
the exact states of my brain cells, and incorporates the functionalist 
claim that the same mental states can be realised by different 
physical systems. These cases also t ~ involve the survival of my 
psychological continuity through a change in kind - that is, the 
person that emerges from the Replicator is classed under a different 
substance-concept than is the person who stepped into the Scanner.
T5 is an adaptation of the Christian view of the afterlife, but 
in a form that is not fundamentally different from that of T 1 . God 
merely replaces the Teletransportation technology and somehow provides 
a me®M whereby such 'passed-over-people' can identify each other, by
r v ^ - . y W -
somehow re-embodying them or giving the appearance of/. * Clearly, 
this version of the afterlife does not involve a commitment to 73
Cartesian Dualism. Indeed it seems to me that traditional Christian 
thought is metaphysically vague and underdetermined on the issue of 
what exactly survives the death of the physical body. Cartesianism 
is one development (and by now by far the dominant one) and, as I've 
argued, highly unsatisfactory because, among other reasons, it cannot 
account for how such pure disembodied souls can be identified and 
individuated. My story T5 is merely another development that avoids 
these problems. Like all the other 'T-cases', it involves the 
continuation of what Parfit calls ’Relation R', that is, psychological 
continuity by any causal means.
Marjorie Price [1974] devises a case involving Rover, a dog sent 
to Mars on a NASA mission, and who unfortunately becomes affected by 
Martian radiation, with the result that he gradually transforms into 
a living yet structureless blob, whose cellular structure does not 
even retain Rover's DNA. This amorphous mass is named 'Clover'. Now 
the question is raised as to whether Rover = Clover, i.e. are the 
pre-radiation Rover-stages and the post-radiation Clover-stages stages 
of the same enduring entity? By Wiggins' criteria we are forced to 
answer in the negative as, while they are certainly spatio-temporally 
connected, as one continuous 'track' can be d r a w  between them, there 
is no continuity under one same substance-concept. Clover is not a 
dog, and the only sortal concepts general enough to cover both Rover 
and Clover - 'organism', are excluded by th&/ very generality
ffl)(A qualifying as substance-concepts. Price, on the other hand, does 
identify the two, at the cost of claiming that sortal-covered 
continuity is unnecessary for the holding of identity through time.
Another problem case is depicted in David Cronenberg's film 'The 
Fly', in which a scientist, Seth Brundle, devises a machine that is 
similar in principle (if not in scope) to Parfit's Teletransporter, 
whereby it records the genetic blueprint of the being inside the 
Scanner, and then creates a qualitatively new body out of new matter 
in the replicating chamber. However, it all goes terribly wrong,
When Brundle attempts to transport himself across the room, a fly 
ventures into the Scanner with him, and the computer records the fly's 
genetic code in addition to Brundle's, and, since it has been 
programmed to deal/with one teletransported entity at a time, it
integrates both genetic blueprints into one hybrid structure. Thus, 
when the scientist reemerges, it is with a genetic structure that is
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neither completely human nor fly. To begin with, he looks and feels 
normal, but soon, grotesque mutations begin to take place as he is 
gradually transformed into a giant insect. His table manners decline 
dramatically. As these transformations begin to take hold, the 
scientist wryly re-christens himself 'Brundlefly'. So again we need 
to ask ' fs Brundle = Brundlefly?' By Wiggins' criteria, again we seem 
forced to say no, but this is counterintuitive. To show just how 
counterintuitive, compare it with a structurally similar example, T3, 
where my mind-set is programmed into a newly created Z-body, which, 
although exactly similar to my old body on the visible level, has an 
entirely different cellular structure. In this case, we would 
intuitively say that I survive - after all, not only do I look the 
same, but I also retain full psychological continuity. Yet here again, 
according to Wiggins, I and my Z-replica cannot be identified due to 
the lack of a common substance-concept between us.
4.5 CONDITIONS OF SURVIVAL
However, another option is open to us. Possibly Parfit's greatest 
contribution to the subject of personal identity was to turn the focus 
away from the question of whether x(tl) was the same person as y(t2 ), 
to examine instead whether Relation R held between them. As we have 
seen from Chapter 2, a major reason for making this shift was the 
existence of certain problem cases in which the question of identity 
was either undecidable or indeterminate. Secondly, Parfit argued that 
all that really mattered in survival was captured in Relation R, i.e. 
the existence of certain psychological states that are causally 
connected to one's own present psychological states. Unlike identity, 
which holds between an object and itself, and is therefore not 
transferable, Relation R can hold between two different beings. Also 
unlike identity, which is an 'all or nothing' relation, Relation R 
can hold to different degrees.
Andrew Brennan [1988] has substantially developed Parfit's 
theory, replacing Relation R with the 'survival-relation' (which I 
will call the S-relation). Like Relation R, the S-relation can occur 
between two different individuals, and can hold to different degrees. 
However, unlike Relation R, its application is not restricted to the 
psychological domain, but is used by Brennan to construct a general 
theory of what is involved in one thing surviving in or as another
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thingr or in some future stage of the same continuing object. He 
regards this S-relation as being a more primitive relation than 
identity-through-time, and as being capable of covering and explicating 
’what matters' regarding the future in cases of purported identity.
He accounts for the S-relation in terms of a set of ’S-conditions’. 
Firstly he gives two conditions that necessarily hold when x survives 
in or as y :
Structure Condition : x and y must share the same structure. That is, 
their component parts must be of the same relative size, shape and 
positions to each other.
Causal Condition : x must play a significant and direct role in the 
production of y; specifically, x must be the ’prototype1 of y.
A set of sufficient conditions under which x survives in y is obtained 
if we augment these with a third condition .
Matter Condition : (N.B. x ’s survival a£ y involves the holding of
the S-relation to a higher degree than in x ’s survival iji y.) 
x survives as y if, alongside the satisfaction of the Structural and 
Causal Conditions, y is constructed of matter of the same kind as x. 
^Note that this third condition cannot be a necessary condition of 
the holding of the S-relation, as, by it, x can survive in something 
else).
Before I go on to discuss whether I survive in or as my replica 
in cases T1-T5, mention must be made of another duality that employment 
of replication stories raises, namely that of types and tokens. At 
first glance, it is tempting to say that in all cases of replication, 
an item and its replica(e) are each tokens of the same type, with 
'type' here not referring to a broad class of things falling under 
the same sortal concept, but in the narrower sense that any replica 
would be a token of the type 'Jim Baillie'. But the situation is more
complicated than this. For a fuller account we need to look to
Brennan's S-conditions. Brennan says that x and y are tokens of the 
same type if one survives (in his technical sense) to a suitably 
high degree as the other. To make this point clearer, let us look 
back at his Causal Condition, and employ yet another important 
distinction, between 'copying processes' and 'production processes'.
In a copying process, one item is used as the prototype, the model 
on which the others are based. By contrast, an example of a 
production process would be a machine producing soupcans, each one 
qualitatively identical to the next, but where, taking any two
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consecutive products, soupcan n and soupcan n+1 , soupcan n does not 
survive as soupcan n+1 , since soupcan n does not play any causal role 
in the production of soupcan n+1 , but it is rather that they are both 
produced by the same causal processes deriving from the machine.
For Brennan, regarding copying processes, to say that two items 
are tokens of the same type is to say that one survives to a high 
degree as the other, whereas for production processes, it is to say 
that they have the same sort of structure and matter, and are produced 
by a common causal process, without themselves being causally related.
In such a case, we have replication without survival. Such an account 
might fit Robinson's counterexample to Parfit's 'Physical Spectrum' 
argument.(see ch.2. 6 ), where my twin and I are not causally related, 
but have been produced by the same production processes, via our 
parents. Another sort of case in which two items can have qualitatively
identical structure and matter without one surviving as the other is
K'-o
in cases of 'adventitious copying' i.e.' .qualitatively identical 
items produced JWj entirely different causal processes. (It is easy 
to construct an analogue for Robinson's case here.) Brennan argues 
that strictly we shouldn't even call such a pair tokens \>f the same 
type^ but rather just 'two qualitatively identical items', but this 
seems unnecessarily stipulative, especially since he himself has 
provided the means for distinguishing different ways in which items 
can be tokens of the same type, and has isolated the sorts of cases 
where the S-relation holds between the items.
4.6 TELETRANSPORTATION REVISITED
I will now return to my cases T1-T5, and re-examine them in the 
light of this S-relation.
In T1 (and T5), I clearly survive in my replica, as teletrans- 
portation is an example of a copying process, : ~ the prototype
for my replica,(since all my structures, down to the finest level, 
have been copied), Clearly this ahalysis applies equally to T2. It is 
irrelevant that I also survive in my original body for a short time 
following the creation of jny replica, as this result just enables there 
to be survival of myself twice over - I survive both in my original 
body, and as my replica.
T3 is more problematic in that it forces us to investigate the 
issue of structure in greater detail. If we say that I survive in my
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Z replica, are we saying, as Brennan suggests, that the Structure 
Condition is more important than the Matter Condition? Or can we make 
the point in another way by saying that structure at a different 
level - the macro level - is more important regarding the S-relation 
than is structure at the cellular level? The structure/matter 
distinction is not clear-cut, as matter, particularly on the organic 
level, is intrinsically structured.
T3 has similarities with pseudomorphism, a natural phenomenon 
discussed by Brennan, where the atomic ingredients of a crystal are 
gradually replaced by different elements which, although they form 
unit cells of a different structure (a unit cell is the basic structure 
of a crystal - crystals develop through repetition of unit cells), 
the overall crystal shape is very similar to the way it was before 
these changes took place, despite such changes in the constituent 
matter, e.g. although the atomic ingredients of fluorite (calcium and 
fluorine) have been replaced over a period of time by the ingredients 
of quartz (oxygen and silicon).
On the other hand, in the case of T3 we could focus on the fact 
that my psychological continuity remains intact despite having been 
teletransported into a body with a different genetic structure - in 
other words, we could say that what matters is the holding of Relation 
R. However, if we say that it is this feature which is of paramount 
importance, and that the form in which these psychological states are 
embodied is irrelevant, or is at best of secondary importance, then 
we must apply this view equally to T4. Another way of developing this 
Parfitian position and bringing it closer to Brennan is to return to 
the Structure Condition and note that on the psychological level 
there exists not just a bundle of perceptions, but an essentially 
structured bundle - the mind is essentially holistic,
. comprising a highly complex network of mechanisms for
the input-, processing, storage and retrieval of information. So 
instead of talk of psychological continuity, we can talk of the 
survival of this cognitive structure. In normal cases, the survival 
of the brain is paramount because it is the only physical structure 
in which this cognitive structure is realised, and so in such cases, 
the survival of a functioning brain is a necessary condition of the 
survival of the cognitive structure. However, the possibility of 
teletransportation looks as if it frees us (in principle) from this 
requirment.
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But can T3 and T4 be accurately described as cases of copying?
It seems strange to say that something composed of an entirely 
different type of matter can be a copy. But let us remind ourselves 
that copying, like the S-relation, can hold to different degrees, and 
guaging to what degree a Z or Z'-replica is a copy of me will depend 
on how we list our priorities. For example, we might say that my T1 
replica is a better copy than my T3 replica (and therefore that I 
survive to a greater degree in my T1 replica) because we attach value 
to the retention of genetic structure as well as psychological 
structure. Likewise, we might say that my T3 replica is a better copy 
than my T4 replica due to the retention of my original physical 
appearance, which, while perhaps not as important as my genetic 
structure, still has great value to us, as is ironically shown by the 
fact that we go to so much trouble to look a certain way - we can 
easily imagine another case where I survive in a body that I ’d much 
prefer to my original ! The overall important message, though, 
seems to be that the survival of our psychological structure is of 
utmost importance to us, and this corresponds to Parfit’s claims 
regarding Relation R.
We can apply this S-relation model to the other problem cases.
In both the Rover-Clover and the Brundle-Brundlefly cases, it is clear 
that the former survives in the latter to some extent, as can be seen 
by looking at the Causal Condition. Even in the case of Rover-Clover 
there is a continuous causally-connected chain of events governing 
the relations between each contiguous pair of time-sli<&sr throughout 
the process of mutation. This is also the case with Brundle-Brundlefly, 
which, in Brennan’s terminology, was a botched attempt at a copying 
process, with the intended prototype being Brundle himself. Even 
despite the disastrous consequences, we can still accept that the 
information regarding his genetic blueprint played a major causal 
role in the creation of Brundlefly. Also, there is a high degree of 
structural and material similarity between Brundle and Brundlefly as 
he was immediately following teleransportation. Even though the seeds 
of his imminent mutation were beginning to develop on the cellular 
level, at this point his physical appearance was identical to that 
of Brundle on the macro-level. This urges us to ascribe the S-relation 
as holding to a high degree, and, of course, this claim is greatly 
strengthened when we recall that Brundle and Brundlefly are psycho­
logically continuous. His memories remain intact, and while his 
character goes through a drastic set of changes (notably as regards
his preference in food !) the relation of psychological continuity is 
flexible enough to cope with these changes. In the course of time, 
Brundlefly goes through a succession of sudden and massive physical 
changes, but these are not sufficient to preclude the ascription of 
the S-relation, or even in some cases the ascription of identity 
through time - we need only recall the way in which a caterpiller is 
transformed into a butterfly. The important factor in both cases vs  
that the changes are not random, but are causally induced.
I feel that these arguments by Parfit and Brennan are sufficient 
to tell us ’all that matters' regarding future survival. Once this 
content is subtracted, the further issue of identity is seen to be 
empty; and since the S-relation, unlike identity, need not be sortal- 
governed, we can solve such problem cases that Wiggins’ theary runs 
up against.
4.7 IS IDENTITY SORTAL-RELATIVE?
My story T3 opens the door to another problematic issue, relating 
to debates concerning the relativity or absoluteness of identity.
Those who hold to the thesis of the Relativity of Identity argue that 
the following situation is possible :;•
[(a f b) & (a + b) & (f(a) & f(b)) & (g(a) & g(b))],
 ^ o
whereas 'absolutists’ like Wiggins deny that this is a possible state
of affairs. This was precisely the situation envisaged by Locke in his
passage about the prince and the cobbler. If we take ’a ’ and ’b ’ to
refer to what I will call, in order not to beg the question, the
cobbler-body-being at times pre and post-transmigration respectively, 
and ’f’ to refer to the sortal concept ’man’, and ’g ’ to refer to the 
sortal concept ’person’, then Locke's argument amounts to the claim 
that a is the same man as b, but not the same person as b. I've 
already shown that Locke's argument is incoherent, given his
treatment of memory.... but what if we were to update it and present
it as a case involving a mind-swop, wherein the prince and the cobbler 
have been seized by our old friend the mad neurosurgeon, who records 
their respective brain-states by some electronic device whilst erasing 
them from their respective brains, and then switches them, with the 
result that the cobbler-body-being will now have the memories, 
character, etc., of the prince, and vice versa. In such a situation,
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we are clearly inclined to say that the cobbler-body-being at pre­
transfer time tl is the same person as the prince-body-being at post­
transfer time t2 , yet we want to deny that identity as a man holds 
between these two, as this relation holds between the tl and t2 stages 
of the cobbler-body-being, and between the tl and t2 stages of the 
prince-body-being.
Shoemaker [1984] is troubled by such a possibility, and its 
apparent status as a counter-example to his desired advocacy of the 
absoluteness of identity. His only way out is to suggest that when we 
say that a person 'is' an animal (i.e. a man), this 'is' is not the 
'is' of identity or of predication, but is rather the same usage of 
'is' as is employed in sentences such as 'this statue is a hunk of 
bronze'. In other words, it would translate into something like 
'is composed of the same stuff as', and thus the person and the man 
can share the same matter and the same spatio-temporal path, without 
being identified. I'm not sure how well this analogy travels, as in 
my neo-Lockean case we are not dealing with such a straightforward 
distinction between matter and form, but the more difficult distinction 
between matter and consciousness.
For my own approach, let me return to example T3. If I refer to
myself as JB, and to my Z-replica as ZJB, then, given that there is
complete psychological continuity between us, we would be inclined to
say that JB was the same person as ZJB, but not that JB was the same
man, nor the same animal as ZJB, since we are of different species,
and, indeed, these species are located in entirely different systems
of species-classification. So T3 corresponds to this :
[(a i b) & (a = b) & (f(a) & -f(b)) & (g(a) & g(b))]. 
t 8
So there appears to be a tension within my overall position, 
sinc&;on the one hand, I want to hold that the most basic answer to 
the question 'What am I?' - i.e. what is the correct substance- 
concept to classify me as - is human being, yet on the other hand, in 
these problem cases, what seems to matter most of all is the retention 
of my psychological continuity, over and above the survival of my
tv'y.s-o
physical body,./over and above my survival as a member of the species 
'homo sapiens.' In other words, it seems that what matters above all 
else is that I survive as a person, or at least that some person , 
continues to exist who is psychologically continuous with me. Still,
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I think that my overall position is correct. Perhaps some tension is 
inevitable when we try to apply our concepts to such radically different 
counterfactual conditions. The important point is that my position is 
internally consistent, as I have shown that 'person* is not a substance- 
concept, and so, in such examples where what is under scrutiny is the 
question of what I am, 'person' is not in opposition to 'human being', 
as they are not mutually exclusive categories.
4.8. DISCONTINUOUS PERSONS?
I will now examine Wiggins' other condition for the holding of 
identity through time. He argues that for all members of all natural 
kinds, if a = b, then it must be the case that an unbroken spatio- 
temporal path can be drawn on which both'a and b are located. This 
condition is commonly not regarded as being essential in the case of 
artefact-kind members, so, for example, if my watch is dismantled for
repair, and lies in this dismantled state for some time (whether a day
nso j&S
or a year, it no difference) and later reassembled, we would
still regard it as being 'the same watch'. In the absence of any 
nomological factors pertaining to such artefact-kinds per se, and of 
any 'real essence' in the form of inner structure, we have nothing to 
go on beyond the facts of common linguistic convention. It is just a 
fact that we do regard it as the same watch, and it is hard to see any 
utility in any alternative convention whereby we would regard dis­
assembly as being a breaching of the conditions of identity through 
time in the way that Wiggins (and virtually everyone else) thinks it 
does in the case of natural kind members.
On the contrary, I maintain that there are possible cases where 
we would say that identity was preserved in cases of the disassembly 
of such a 'natural' object, and I will show this even in the most 
challenging case, namely human beings. We only need to recall the 
rate of development of surgical techniques over the past few decades. 
Surely if one bisected a worm and stitched it together again using 
microsurgery, the 'survivor' would be the same worm as before? In the 
case of human beings, we commonly tolerate such examples of splitting 
such as the loss of organs and limbs, and if one's arm was severed, 
and sewn on again by microsurgery, issues regarding identity would not 
be thought to arise, as these would only be raised if the brain was 
tampered with. But imagine a case in which I am in need of brain
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surgery that involves the removal of my cerebral cortex, and the 
temporary bisecting of it by the cutting of the corpus callosum, while 
work was done to it and to my sub-cortical brain structures, while my 
body is placed on a life-support machine. Once these operations are 
done, my corpus callosum is microsurgically repaired and the intact 
cortex is reattached to my brain-stern. This, I believe, would be a 
case in which we would be overwhelmingly drawn to say that I was the 
same person after the operation. . |ip, in the face of this, . . one 
protests that the one : one logic of identity has been breached by the 
splitting of the cortex, and that therefore we cannot say that my 
identity has been maintained, then, as I have suggested, all the more 
reason to drop all talk of identity in favour of the S-relation.
4.9 WHAT AM I?
So, in summary, many considerations have led me to the conclusion 
that the substance-concept that applies to a being like myself is 
* human being *. I am not, however, urging a linguistic reform, urging 
that we should stop talking of 'persons’ and 'people', because these 
concepts work perfectly well in their everyday contexts, where they 
are virtually synonymous with 'human being', 'man', etc. It is only 
when they take on their more philosophical sense that care is needed.
There are further reasons why I think that this specialised 
sense of 'person' not only does more harm than good, but is quite 
unnecessary. On the one hand, it admits less than the full extension 
of the class of human beings, and on the other hand its own extension 
stretches beyond the class of human beings. In the first case, large 
numbers of humans are born, or will become so handicapped that they 
will always lack the cognitive functions by which Wiggins & Co. 
specify personhood, and thereby, such unfortunates will be humans, but 
will not qualify as persons, and any talk of granting them some status 
as 'honorary persons', or treating them 'as if they were persons' is 
just a desperate ad hoc manouvre to get out of one of the unpleasant 
consequences of this form of the human/person distinction. Not only 
is such a denial of personhood repugnant to me, but we have no need to 
make such a pronouncement in such cases, as we can describe the 
situation perfectly well without making this sortal distinction, and 
without reference to this rarified sense of 'person'. They are just 
mentally handicapped humans (or 'persons', in the ordinary sense of
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the term). Also, it is all too easy to see how such a distinction 
could be used to form the basis of arguments to the effect that 
'persons1 per se have more intrinsic rights than mere human beings.
In the second case, looking at the cross-classificatory aspect 
of the concept of 'person', we would be forced to speak of 'human- 
persons', 'dolphin-persons', and so on for any other species that we 
come to regard as displaying the appropriate cognitive faculties. 
(Martian-persons, anyone?) But again, such awkward ways of speaking 
are unnecessary because, should we discover that members of various 
species typically display the range of cognitive abilities previously 
thought to be unique to humans, then in time these abilities will be 
accommodated into the meaning of each particular substance-concept.
To be more precise, it will become part of the conception (to use 
Frege's terminology) or? (as Putnam puts it) the stereotype of the 
concept - that is, it will become part of our theory, our network of 
significant beliefs about typical members of the given kinds, £o again 
the suffix '-person' falls away as unnecessary.
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C H A P T E R  5 ME T H O D O L O G Y  MATTERS
5.1 USES OF THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT
This short chapter is strategically placed around the midpoint of 
the thesis, and represents a kind of watershed, separating and 
distinguishing two different methods of enquiry, which could loosely 
(too loosely, in fact) be described as being, respectively, primarily 
’conceptual’ and ’empirical'. In this chapter, I want to cast doubt on 
the whole foundation of the enquiries, and therefore on the conclusions, 
of the previous chapters, and to suggest another, more fruitful way in 
which the issues of personal identity can be studied. This will involve 
a rejection of the methodology that has been adopted by most of the 
major figures in the field, and thus it will not be surprising that I 
will arrive at a quite different conception of just what the main 
'issues' are regarding personal identity.
It will have been observed that in the preceeding chapters I have 
followed a fairly conventional approach to the-subject, relying 
heavily on the use of thought-experiments, in accordance with a 
tradition that goes back as far as, at least, Descartes and Locke. One 
might say that, in essence, nothing has really changed since then 
after all, what are Williams, Parfit & Co.'s neuroscientifically 
induced 'mind'swops', if not Locke’s prince and cobbler soul-swop, 
clad in pseudo-scientific trappings? Surveying the copious literature, 
it seems possible that one can, with sufficient ingenuity, devise a 
thought-experiment that purports to provide support for an£ theory 
regarding personal identity, whilst in the near-certainty that an 
equally convincing counter-example lies around the corner. After a while 
one begins to wonder whether any progress has actually been made, and 
whether such techniques are appropriate to the tasks. The most noticeable 
trend in recent work has been the sheer proliferation of thought- 
experiments, with this expansion being not only in quantity, but in 
diversity and ingenuity of theme, which can seem to stretch our powers 
of credulity beyond breaking point. Yet such outlandish fictions are 
still taken as having some bearing on life as it really is. Most 
philosophers have not argued for this, being content to trade on the 
assumption that the events described in these stories were in some 
sense 'possible' and thus any criterion of personal identity must be 
able to accommodate them.
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Recently however, Derek Parfit [1984] has taken a more sophisticated 
line, arguing that these bizarre counterfactuals have the power to ^■<;•■.V 
sharply _ many of our most deeply rooted beliefs regarding the
concept of a person, and concerning what it is to be the same person 
through time; and since these beliefs underlie actual events in the 
real world, the employment of such thought-experiments is justified.
As well as this capacity for the edification of concepts, such a method 
can provide opportunities for conceptual revision. As Wilkes [1988] 
describes it, by "stretching a concept into the unknown one may find
out more precisely what it is to which we are committed if the
concept fractures under the strain - if, that is, we would not know 
what to say in the hypothesized circumstances - then too the scope and 
limitations of the term's range and extent become clearer" (p5).
To adequately assess such claims, we need to examine the 
applications of thought-experiments in more detail. In what follows, I 
will draw upon the recent work of Kathleen Wilkes [1988], which, if 
correct, has the iconoclastic consequence that a great deal of 
influential recent work on personal identity is rooted in fundamental 
error. After describing and assessing her arguments, I will then return 
to survey some notable thought-experiments as employed in previous 
chapters, re-evaluating them and their conclusions from a new 
perspective.
The use and justification of thought-experiments can be stated 
quite simply. Suppose that we want to test some theory, or to find out 
the consequences of such a theory being true; or again, suppose we 
wpnt to investigate the range of application of a given concept. We can 
do this by asking a 'what if....?' question. In other words, we imagine 
that a certain state of affairs has taken place, and then try and work 
out the implications of such an event, and then reassess the theory, 
concept, or whatever, in the light of these judgements. Or, using 
'possible worlds' terminology, we can say that such events have happened 
in some possible world. However, it is essential that these events take 
place in "a world like our own in all relevant aspects, except for the 
existence in that world of the examined phenomena" (p2). In other words 
"the possible world is our world, the world described by our sciences, 
except for one distinguishing difference. So we can know or assume 
everything else that it is relevant to know, in order to assess the 
thought-experiment" (p8). (All quotations in this chapter are from 
Wilkes [1988]).
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However, it is not the case that 'anything goes' in the employment 
of thought-experiments. They are quite literally experiments, and as 
such are bound by the same methodological canons as all experiments 
which aim to tell us about the world. One major constraint that all 
thought-experiments must conform to, whether in philosophy or in the 
sciences, is to state, or be able to state the background conditions 
against which the event under scrutiny takes place. This rule is 
essential because the thought-experiment is specifically designed to 
draw out the consequences of a given event, or factor within an event, 
and this can only be done if we can ensure that the same consequences 
could not be due, in sum or in part, to some other auxiliary factors. 
So, since we require that the possible world in which the event takes 
place be like our world with the exception of this one alteration 
under scrutiny, we must ensure that the background conditions to this 
event are well-specified, and remain consistent with conditions in 
our world.
When such requirements are satisfied, then the derivation of the 
consequences of the experiment is a relatively straightforward matter 
(although it is not absolutely immune from the possibility of error). 
Such successful thought-experiments tend to occur mainly in the natural 
sciences. In contrast, the history of thought-experiment in philosophy 
and in particular as applied to the subject of personal identity has 
been, according to Wilkes, one long catalogue of disaster. To see why, 
we must return to the above-mentioned requirement of the specification 
of background conditions. Let us by contrast examine the situation in 
the natural sciences, where we not only see the satisfaction of this 
demand of strictly defined experimental conditions (in particular, 
since the experiment often takes place within a closed system) which 
allows a complete description of the relevant background, but we also 
have the advantage of an explicit and developed theory governing the 
experiment, couched in theoretical terms that are strictly defined, 
which allows any assumptions and entailments regarding the experiment 
to be correspondingly clear-cut. Thus, under such circumstances, it is 
a straightforward matter to determine whether or not a particular 
factor is relevant to the results achieved.
5.2 ABUSES OF THOUGIIT-EXPERIMENT
By contrast, the concepts in which theories of personal identi ty 
are couched, are not capable of such strict definitions, and so any
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inferences that we do attempt are not straightforward, but are 
problematic and without a firm basis. We are left at the level of
deciding 'what we would say if ' with no trustworthy means of
evaluating such conclusions over and above our intuitions, which are. 
of course, conditioned by our beliefs, S;o : "when we are dealing 
with the rich and riotous chaos of commonsense concepts, we are dealing 
with terms that generally do not pick out natural kinds, and so there 
is no body of explicit theory or shared and agreed generalisations 
about them; we are rather dealing with implicit and partial, rough 
and^ady assumptions. Hence the importance of intuition grows in 
direct proportion to its precariousness" (pl6).
But the most serious problem with the typical philosophical 
thought-experiment li&Snot -n lA the vagueness of natural language, but 
 ^; in the fact that such experiments fail to sufficiently fix the 
background conditions. In the absence of such specifications, the 
experiment fails to be adequately described, and this has the crucial 
consequence that we do not know if the hypothetical situation depicted 
within it is a real possibility.
We are now getting to the heart of the matter. Very often, 
philosophers have made an illicit jump from the fact that they can, in 
a sense, 'imagine' or 'conceive of' some state of affairs,'and this 
does not appear to them as self-contradictory), to the claim that such 
a situation is a real possibility.Thus Descartes reckoned that he 
could imagine his continuing to exist as a thinking being while being 
disembodied, and he took this feat of suspended disbelief to support 
the claim that such a situation could actually happen. In fact, rather 
than describe his error as being in some jump from 'imaginability' to 
'possibility', it is more accurate to say that whatever the mental 
imagery involved in such a thought-experiment, one cannot imagine 
being disembodied. It only seems as if you imagine this due to the 
cursory description given to the contents of the experiment. Once you 
try and think it all through, things look less obvious - for example, 
what would such an existence be like? How could you move without a 
motor cortex and muscles? How could you perceive without sense-organs, 
and so on. As Wilkes says in her general point about such cases, "the 
fact that we may not have identified all the relevant laws makes no 
difference, except to misleadi since we are largely ignorant of these 
and their interconnections, it of course seems easy to imagine the 
transformationst the obtrusive facts are not there to obtrude" (p31).
Likewise, it is easy to be fooled into thinking that you can 
imagine a bar of iron floating in a pool of water. But once the physical 
properties of both these substances are taken into account, and once 
the background conditions are specified to preclude the introduction 
of invisible strings suspending the bar, unusual anti-gravitational 
forces, etc.,it soon becomes clear that no matter what the mental 
image you are having looks like;it is obt -g-. c&tT£C4 a'cu^iAt o}
\tO>\ <3/ uJCwfcf . ’
It is not enough to say that the event described in the thought- 
experiment is logically possible - it must be ’theoretically possible*
- in other words, a satisfactory description of the background conditions 
provides us with a theory of the kinds of objects involved, and this 
structure enables us to decide whether the hypothetical event is a real 
possibility for the kinds of object involved. Wilkes describes this 
theoretical possibility as providing "something between stringent 
essentialism and loose conventionalism, something that will allow us
to insist  that the human species is a kind governed by law, while
not denying that some of these laws may fail to hold of individual 
members of the species." (p28). I will attempt to develop this idea 
further by returning to the ideas of Wiggins and Putnam, discussed in 
the last chapter.
We can follow Putnam in saying that natural kind terms are ’law 
cluster concepts', where there is a determinate set of 'core facts’, 
most of which must hold for a given object to qualify as a member of 
that kind. This cluster of laws will limit what is theoretically 
possible for a member of that kind, and help determine what presupp­
ositions and implications are relevant to any thought-experiment 
involving a typical member of that kind. Wilkes develops this position, 
pointing out that such laws governing biological kinds do not apply in 
isolation, totally independent of each other, but on the contrary are 
closely interrelated. So, "it will be rare that we find an isolated 
breach of a single law. It is far more likely that such a violation 
will have consequential effects upon other laws, where such laws are 
either at the same sort of level (in the same or a different theory) 
or where they are more fundamental laws that describe the operationa 
and the limitations of such higher level laws as are supposed to be 
violated", displaying the fact that "the physical, as well as the 
mental, is holistic, with laws arranged in a systematic hierarchy of 
mutual dependence" (p30).
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So, with all this in mind, let us examine a typically adventurous 
thought-experiment devised to reveal our deepest beliefs regarding 
personal identity, namely a popular one in which we are asked to
consider what we would say if people could divide like amoebae - so,
if A split to form B & C,oVq- j^ rA 's ” r& lk H j/ i a. pcFSxin p i, both B and C? 
As neither/ B nor C? As B but not C? As C fx.it n°t I needn't repeat 
all the problems with each choice.
Now it should be fairly clear that we cannot leave the description
of this hypothetical state of affairs at this level, that is, super­
imposing this radically different form of human development over our
world, with its cluster of la’wcgoverning biological processes, and
a
assume that everything/ goes on as ..i , normal. Firstly, the
background conditions haven't even begun to be described, and, as I 
have said, since such a development is taken to occur outwith the 
strictly defined limits of a scientific experiment, such a statement 
of the background conditions will need to include a significant 
proportion of the possible world. Indeed it is hard to specify a limit 
on the amount of information that is relevant to the description of 
such a thought-experiment that we would need to know before we could 
derive reliable conclusions from it. When we attempt to spell out all 
that is required, the whole enterprise descends into farce. I can do 
no better than to quote once again from Wilkes : "It is obviously and 
essentially relevant to the purposes of this thought-experiment to know 
such things as : How often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable 
and sometimes not, like dying? Can it be induced, or prevented? Just 
as obviously, the background society, against which we set the 
phenomenon, is now mysterious. Does it have such institutions as 
marraige? How would that work? Or universities? It would be difficult, 
to say the least, if universities doubled in size every few days, or 
weeks, or years. Are pregnant women debarred from splitting? The 
entire background here is incomprehensible. When we ask what we_ would 
say if this happened, who, now, are we?" (pll).
This last question brings us back to David Lewis, and the question 
of how many people there are in a room at a given time, if such people 
are subject to fission. I argued in chapter 2 for the incoherence of 
his views. Wilkes comes to the same conclusion by a different route.
We can now relate all of this to the point about the holistic 
nature of the law-cluster that limits the real possibilities for
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members of natural kinds. It is, I think, clear that any possible world 
in which persons could split like amoebae would be highly different 
from the real world in ways that we could not even begin to conceive 
of, and thus we don’t know to what extent, and in what ways, the 
background conditions in such a thought-experiment are consistent with 
conditions in the real world. The most that we can say with any 
certainty is that they will differ greatly - but this is not sufficient 
to put us in a position to determine the theoretical possibility of the 
phenomenon posited, or of these conditions themselves. A related point 
is that any beings that could divide like this would
a physical structure that is radically different from our own, and thus
k>
they could not be of the same species as ourselves, and may^’ be indiv­
iduated along entirely different principles to us. So no matter what 
we would want to conclude about the identity-conditions for such 
creatures, we cannot use it to derive conclusions about ourselves - 
but, of course, this was the whole point of constructing the thought- 
experiment in the first place.
5.3 HUMAN FREEDOM AND NATURAL LAWS
It might be argued that all this talk of clusters of laws that 
constrain human possibilities misses a crucial point. Such an analysis 
seems to locate human beings in the position of passive slaves of 
immutable laws which strictly and absolutely delimit their range of 
possible activities and developments. It might be argued that such a 
depiction doesn’t take into account the fact that human beings are 
active participants in a dynamic, changing universe. It is becoming 
clear that human knowledge and expertise (and abuses thereof) have 
reached a level where we ourselves now constitute an active initiatory 
factor in determining r .7 the development of our species, and that
of other species. Take genetic engineering for example. Or consider 
the consequences of the desrtuction of the tropical rain forests, ,»<Vc,lud 
the * * ’greenhouse effect' which could possibly involve large
climatic disruption in the near future. While I don't imagine that we 
will start splitting or fusing, or anything as outr& as that, who can 
say what forms our species may evolve into in order to survive in the 
face of such challenges? And who is to say, by some principle, that 
such future beings would not be human?
WHile our physical structures (anatomical, physiological,biological
etc.) place us under significant practical limitations at any given 
time, they do not do so completely, in other words, any Wiggins-style 
’principle of activity’ that applies to human beings is not an absolute, 
static and determinate affair, but is open-ended, and we ourselves play 
a part in its development. To talk in Sartrean terms for a moment, our 
principle of activity is waiting to be actualised by us, and does not 
have any ’essence’ prior to this.
I make these rather melodramatic remarks as a prelude to discussing 
one prominent philosophical thought-experiment that is far away from 
the excesses of amoeba-like fission, fusion, time-travel and the likes, 
and focusses on a more credible case that involves the possible 
application of human ingenuity in initiating certain events that would 
seem to force us into making radical revisions to our beliefs about 
personal identity and unity. It is of course an empirical matter, but 
it seems to me that there is one type of splitting that could be shown 
to be within the r&lm of real possibility in the forseeable future, 
namely the transplantation of intact neural structures^ (note that I 
do not say 'brains’).There has been an extraordinary rate of develop­
ment in the practice of transplant surgery, in the techniques of micro­
surgery, in overcoming the problems of rejection, and so on, all within 
my lifetime. For example, thirty years ago a successful heart transplant 
was considered an impossible dream —  yet it was a dream that was 
realised in the ’60’s, and since then the techniques have gradually 
been improved and refined to the extent that at the present time a 
single person can survive the transplant of the heart, lungs and liver. 
Add to this the fact that numerous experiments have been performed in 
which various parts of the brains of salamanders/\exchanged, and, as 
Wilkes informs us, the entire heads of monkeys have been swopped.
Given such astounding achievements, all which • 1 _, until
recently,\been probably judged to be 'deeply impossible', we can 
surely have no apriori justification preventing us from accepting that 
human brain-transplants, or hemisphere transplants, look as if they 
are theoretically possible.
Now do all these considerations go against the position regarding 
the validity of thought-experiments that Wilkes has proposed? I do not 
think so.? I believe that any decent account of the conditions of 
legitimacy of thought-experiments regarding personal identity must be 
able to accommodate these points. We can rtAiU/ CcsApa^bk. the two
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seemingly divergent strands by saying the following :
1. What is and what is not theoretically possible is a function of a 
given background theoretical structure - there is no ’theoretical 
possibility' as seen from an outside, theory-free standpoint.
2. No theory, no matter how well corroborated, is immune from error, 
even fundamental and widespread error.
3. So if some state of affairs S is judged, on the basis of theory 1,
to be theoretically impossible, and theory 1 in time becomes replaced
by theory 2, it does not follow that S is theoretically impossible {’ac 
theory 2 .
4. It is also the case that we have no unified, complete and satis­
factory theory of human beings that could, even within the scope of
freedom that I've argued for, lay down precise limits upon what is a 
theoretically possible state of affairs for human beings to enter into 
for all future times. We have a variety of theories, in physics, 
chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, and so on, at various 
degrees of maturity.
Taking all these points together, we have to say that we just 
don't know if the situations depicted in philosophical thought- 
experiments are real possibilities in the real world. Some may well be 
so. However, it does not follow that any thought-experiments based on 
such situations can yield trustworthy conclusions about this world, 
or regarding the theories or the concepts employed by us in the real 
world, since we still lack the ability to fill out the background 
conditions adequately. It is one thing to say that we don’t know that 
the situation depicted therein is impossible. It is another thing 
entirely to say that it actually is a real possibility, and, as Wilkes 
says, "ignorance is a poor justification for any experiment, scientific 
or philosophical" (p20). So we have no real grounds for saying that 
such hypothetical situations are real possibilities, and, on the 
contrary, surely the sheer fact that we are, on occasion,unable to 
even begin to flesh out the background conditions is, if anything, 
evidence against its possibility, despite the limitations of any 
theories we currently employ.
5.4 THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS REASSESSED
I will now, as promised, return to some of the most influential
thought-experiments used in the study of personal identity, and re­
assess their worth in accordance with the new line taken in this 
chapter. One useful division that can be made among these experiments 
is between those involving some form or degree of brain-transfer, and 
those involving a mind-transfer. In other words, the first sort of 
experiments involve the removal and subsequent replacement of neural 
structures, i.e. the 'hardware', whereas the second sort concentrates 
on the 'software', that is, the actual contents of the mind/brain.
I will begin with the first sort, and take issue with experiments 
involving 'brain-swops'. Now this term can clearly mean several 
different things. As I have mentioned, philosophers are often far too 
lax in their talk of brains, equating the brain per se with the 
cerebral cortex. Now if we literally mean brains, whole brains, that 
are to be removed and exchanged, then it is clearly not enough to 
remove the cortex. The brain stem will also need to be removed. And 
what of the spinal cord? This is integrally connected with processes 
required for the possibility of conscious experience. Can be 
removed? The central nervous system functions as one overall system, 
and any distinction between those parts that can be called 'brain' and 
those that can not will be rather grey. But over and above this 
conceptual issue, we don't know what would happen if all these structures 
were exchanged and put in new bodies. We are not monkeys, and so any 
results regarding the swopping of monkey heads is not conclusive 
evidence that a brain-swop or head-swop is a real possibility for human 
beings. And even if it succeeded on the basic physical level, and both 
humans survived the operation, we don't know what state their higher 
cognitive faculties would be in. Granted, we do have a strong hunch 
that person A would wake up in the body into which his brain was 
transplanted, but such guesswork is not a strong enough foundation 
to base a philosophical theory on.
On the subject of cortical or hemispherical exchange (e.g. 'My 
Division'), I have two points to make. Firstly, one of the major 
premises used in constructing this thought-experiment is wrong - a 
split-brain patient - one in whom the corpus callosum has been sectioned 
- does not have 'two minds' and is not 'two persons'. Furthermore, the 
brain is not split, but rather the means for direct intercommissural 
information exchange is removed. But any fragmentation or division in 
consciousness resulting from this operation takes place against a
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background of great unity, both structural and functional, via the 
intact subcortical structures. (I discuss this in detail in ch.7). 
Secondly, we have the problem of ignorance again - we do not know what 
would happen if, say, one cerebral hemisphere was transplanted into a 
cortexless skull. We do not know if the memories, character traits, etc. 
of the person whose hemisphere it was will be preserved intact, or if 
those of the person whose body and subcortical brain systems would 
dominate, whether they would integrate, whether they would conflict, 
or, more likely, whether death would ensue.
Thirdly, let us examine thought-experiments involving brain-exchange 
on a cell-by-cell scale, such as in Parfit's Physical and Combined 
Spectra. Such stories seem to me to be based on at least one false 
premise concerning the nature of memory storage in the brain. It is 
assumed that memories come in discrete quanta, one (or however many) 
located within each neuron. So the neuron itself is assumed to be the 
container of memories. But strong experimental evidence suggests that 
this is not so, and that long term memories are stored in the form of 
an altered electrical resistence in the synapses between neurons. So 
we cannot 'atomise' the brain in such a way as to achieve any^neuron : 
memory'correspondence, as there is an irreducibly relational factor 
between neurons regarding memory.
Regarding experiments where a qualitatively identical brain or 
body is created from the original prototype, I have little more to say 
than : merely/stress our virtually complete ignorance of what would 
be involved in this, and so we have no way of telling if it is 
theoretically possible to do so. Wilkes makes the good point that a 
qualitatively identical replica means precisely that, and so all the 
original's structures would have to be reproduced, down to the sub 
atomic level.
I will now turn to mind-swops. Again, the illusion of coherence 
within such tall tales is purely down to our ignorance of any of the 
'obtrusive facts' that might get in the way. We cannot state the 
background conditions of such experiments with any clarity, and so the 
experiment is inadequately described, and therefore not only do we not 
know if it describes a real possibility, but we cannot use such an 
experiment to derive conclusions about personal identity in the real 
world. So we can now see the root cause of all the confusions and 
contradictory beliefs that resulted from Williams' [1970] two cases of
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mind-swop. Both contrary conclusions we are led to by the respective 
cases are unwarranted and untrustworthy, as they are based on different 
but equally inadequate descriptions of the conditions involved in such 
an experiment. Our intuitions are conditioned by our beliefs, and in 
this case, we are not in a strong enough position to acquire a set of 
well-justified beliefs concerning the pair of thought-experiments. The 
fact that the two cases that elicited the opposing responses were 
alternative descriptions of the same state of affairs merely exposes 
how out-of-its-depth our intuitions are in such a situation.
As will be expected, if the undisciplined use of thought-experiments 
is curtailed, and if the ’problem cases’ which could only exist within 
the confines of such fictions are deemed irrelevant to real-life issues, 
then clearly we will emerge with a very different conception of what 
the central philosophical issues regarding personal identity are, and 
some well-pedigreed problems will be made obsolete. In the following 
three chapters I will deal with some issues regarding personal identity 
without thought-experiments.
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C H A P T E R  6 MEMORY
6.1 LOCKE'S CRITERION
I will begin this chapter with a detailed discussion of John 
Locke's theory of the relationship between memory and personal identity. 
This may appear as if I am trying to smash an egg with a sledgehammer, 
devoting far too much time and energy in attacking a position that can 
be easily dismissed. However, it should be borne in mind that Locke's 
theory has been the starting point for virtually all contemporary 
forms of the Psychological Criterion, and whilst these latter theories 
involve significant modifications and improvements on Locke, I will 
argue that they share some fundamental errors with him, rooted in an 
erroneous conception of what are the essential issues regarding 
memory and personal identity. I will also argue that some contemporary 
neurologically based theories of memory share some mistaken assumptions 
with Locke, and so I am justified in paying his theory serious 
attention.
John Locke [1694] explicitly associates the holding of personal 
identity, and indeed of personhood itself, with the ability to 
remember one's past experiences : "As far as this consciousness can be 
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the 
identity of that person" (II xxvii 9)f "That with which the conscious­
ness of this present thinking thing can conjoin
itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with 
nothing else, and so attributes to itself and owns all the actions of 
that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no 
further" (II xxvii 17). {>3 v\)
To start the discussion, let us examine the second of these two 
quotations. Anthony Flew [1951] noted that this passage can be 
interpreted in two very different ways, depending on how the term 'can' 
is understood. On the one hand, it can be interpreted in the 'logical' 
sense, which could be spelled out as meaning 'can without contradiction' 
and on the other hand it can be read in the 'factual' sense, as meaning 
'can as a matter of fact'. Flew argued that Locke's position (or 
positions) can be made more explicit by recasting it as the claim that 
having memories of one's past experiences constitutes the necessary 
and sufficient condition for the holding of personal identity through 
time. Looked at in this way, turning first to the interpretation
involving the 'logical' sense of 'can', we have the claim that 
x (tl) is the same person as y(t2 ) iff x and y are both persons and y 
can (logically) remember what x experienced at tl.
However, this clearly will not satisfy the requirements of a 
criterion of personal identity, as it is far too lax. Too many hypo­
thetical cases would be able to satisfy such a criterion, where we 
would certainly not want to confer identity. For example, there is no 
formal contradiction involved in an imaginery case wherein various laws 
of nature are broken or overruled so that I now remember experiencing 
certain events as they were originally experienced by Napoleon. But, 
as I have already argued in previous chapters, any purported criterion 
of identity that can accommodate such counterfactuals leads to 
absurdity if its implications are followed through. The problem can be 
expressed like this : If I remember experiences that were undergone by 
Napoleon, then by the above criterion, I must fcie Napoleon. If I then 
remember experiences as undergone by Nelson, then I must be Nelson.
But if so (since if x=y and x=z, then y=z) it follows that Napoleon and 
Nelson must be the same person, and since this conclusion is false, 
it follows that at least one of the premises is wrong. I needn't go on 
to list all the contradictions issuing from such an identification, 
i.e. one both being and not being one-armed in 1805, etc.
If, on the other hand, we try to rehabilitate the criterion by 
fixing the meaning of 'remember' so that, as a matter of logic, one can 
only possibly remember experiences that are one's own, then the 
resulting formulation is a tautology, and, as such, cannot function as 
a criterion at all, since a criterion must actually say something 
substantial, it must have some empirical content. Such a move would 
throw the baby out with the bathwater. Problems would be glossed over 
at the expense of precluding the possibility of making any significant 
statements about the relevance of memory to personal identity. And 
anyway, even if we were landed with such a restriction on the meaning 
of 'memory', 'remember' and related terms, we could then go on, as 
contemporary philosophers have done, to introduce the more general 
concept of 'quasi-memory' (see ch.3), which is free of such 
stipulated logical restrictions, and we would be back at square one, 
with the same old problems rightly reinstated.
Turning now to Flew's second formulation of Locke's criterion, we
have the claim that x (tl) is the same person as y (t2 ) iff x and y are
both persons, and y can, as a matter of fact, remember what x experienced
at tl. (Incidentally, if we are being strict, x and y are not persons, gg
but person-stages). However, in stark contrast to the previous 
formulation, this one is clearly far too strict, as it excludes real- 
life cases where we are bound to accept that x and y are stages of the 
same person. In fact, such a criterion would exclude all actual cases 
of purported identity through time, since we are all constantly 
forgetting some of our experiences, and in order to satisfy this 
criterion, we would have to remember all our past experiences, and 
clearly none of us, not even Luria's celebrated mnemonist, can claim 
to do this. In fact, if we spell out the demands of this criterion, it 
seems that not only must one remember every experience that has occurred 
throughout ones life, but one must retain this all-encompassing memory 
at every moment of onefls life, if the criterion is not to fall prey to 
the paradoxes that Reid exposed (see ch.6 .3). Since I at t2 will only 
remember at most some of my experiences up to and around tl, yet, roP 
Locke on this interpretation,what constituted my identity and person- 
hood at tl was the possession of all the experiences at that time, then 
Locke cannot identify me at t2 with any person at all at tl, _ Rather, 
he only offers us a theory of how some experiences undergone at tl are 
taken on by a person at t2, and subsequently, as Mackie [1976] so 
eloquently puts it, what we have is "hardly a theory of personal 
identity at all, but might better be described as a theory of action 
appropriation" (pl83).
6.2 'MEMORY' DISMANTLED
An immediate response to my objections is to say that they mer£^ 
highlight the fact that there was a virtual absence of theory in Locke's 
day concerning the nature of memory, beyong it being a 'storehouse of 
ideas' in the mind. Indeed, despite the enormous advances that have 
been made since Locke's day, we still do not have a complete and 
satisfactory account of memory. Most theories assume the existence of 
a 'memory trace* or 'engram', it being the ultimate physical embodiment 
of each specific memory, these being representations of past experiences, 
and each being in some way a 'structural analogue' (in Martin & 
Deutscher's [1966] words) of its corresponding experience, but there 
remains great conceptual obscurity regarding exactly how such a 
structural isomorphism can take place. It also remains the case that 
no memory trace has ever been discovered, no doubt due in part to this 
conceptual difficulty entailing that we don't really know what it is 
we are looking for. The memory trace remains a theoretical entity, 
inferred to exist because to deny its existence in some form would
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mean that memory involved 'action at a distance', and it is a deeply 
entrenched belief (and one of Broad's 'Basic Limiting Principles') 
that there can be no direct causation through a temporal gap, _
We require a continuous causal chain, and there must be some physical 
basis for thd-Jj?ob^‘Kj'gf-fKi^ ’ process, bridging the gap between the 
time of the experience and its later recall, and, whatever this physical 
basis is, its unit has been called a ‘memory tracel Given our ignorance 
regarding memory, we have tended to base our explanations of memory on 
analogies with things that we do understand, from Plato's impressions 
in wax, through Penfield's videotape recorder playbacks, to more 
contemporary computer models in terms of input - storage - readout.
Various distinctions and divisions lAr types of memory have been 
suggested, and, at the very least, these catagories are useful in 
describing and ordering diverse phenomena, and cautious employment of 
them will enable me to take the traditional philosophical arguments 
relating to memory and personal identity considerably further. Let us 
begin by dismantling the old unitary concept of memory, and talk instead 
in terms of a tripartite division of registration, storage and retrieval. 
Looking at the distinction between information storage and retrieval, 
one might argue for a reconstructed neo-Lockean criterion, saying that 
we needn't demand that any stored memory should be able to be retrieved 
at any given time, but merely that we should insist that all information 
regarding past experience is stored in the form of memory traces 
throughout one's entire life, whether or not these memories can in 
practice be retrieved, and thereby recalled to conscious awareness at 
any given time.
Locke, of course, would find such a revision incomprehensible, 
since his primitive model of consciousness could not accommodate the 
concept of information that was stored yet was beyond the reach of 
conscious awareness, since he had inherited from Descartes the idea 
that all that one knows must be known-to-be-known by the knower :
"that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it 
seems to me, essential to it, it being impossible for any one to
perceive without perceiving that he does perceive consciousness
always accompanies thinking” (II xxvii 11).
The introduction of this storage/retrieval distinction will 
enable a reconstructed Lockean theory to move away from its Cartesian 
assumption of the epistemically privileged position of first-person
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psychological reports, and accommodate Freud’s insight into the existence 
of unconscious mental contents whose existence is unknown to the 
subject. But even without mentioning this Freudian distinction, it is 
quite obvious that this last statement quoted from Locke is totally 
wrong. To see how, let us distinguish two mental states :
i) The state of being happy at tl. This involves the form of ’conscious­
ness* described in passages such as when he defines the self as "a
conscious thinking thing...... which is sensible or conscious of
pleasure or pain, capable of happiness or misery" (II xxvii 17).
ii) The state, at tl, of being aware of being happy at tl. This is the 
form of consciousness referred to in II xxvii 11 above, where Locke 
seems to say that this stateii) necessarily accompanies state -i).
Such a ii)-type state is dependent on the occurrence of what we 
might call the ’first-order’ mental states of type i). It is also a 
higher, more sophisticated type of state than a i)-type state, in that, 
for example, while we would ascribe i)-type states to higher animals, 
we would not do so for ii)-type states. But for my purposes, the main 
point is that Locke is wrong to say that such ii)-type states are 
"inseparable from thinking" (i.e. from i)-type states), but, on the 
contrary, are occasional fleeting states that are absent for the vast 
majority of waking life. This is not sufficiently recognised, partly 
due to our internalisation of Cartesianism and partly, I believe, due 
to a ’trick1 relating to the nature of ii)-type states, namely that
drawing them to one's attention brings such a state into existence.
For example, if I say to you 'What are you thinking about?’, and you
reply ’My dinner’, and I then ask 'Are you aware of thinking of your
dinner?’, then, presuming that you understand my question, you become 
thus aware. But this awareness soon slips away unnoticed.
6.3 MEMORY STORAGE
But let us return to this proposed revised criterion, that the 
continuity of memory that is necessary to preserve identity requires 
only that the memories continue to be stored, whether or not they are 
retrieved. Is this a credible criterion? Can it cover everyday cases?
The problem is whether there can be any other evidence, apart from the 
retrieval into conscious awareness, that memories are stored. Until 
the time of death, it can never be conclusively known that a memory of 
a given experience was not irretrievably lost to conscious awareness - 
the most that we can ever say is that it has not been remembered yet.
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It is undoubtedly true that we store an enormous amount of information 
more than we can retrieve at any given moment - but is it possible that 
every experience is stored in some memory-system for one’s entire life, 
and can, in principle, be retrieved if one is presented with the 
appropriate cue or stimulus? The major problem with such a claim, when 
offered as a serious scientific hypothesis, is that it is clearly 
unfalsifiable in principle, since the non-retrieval of any information 
can always be put down to the lack of suitable stimuli, rather than its 
not having been stored in the first place. But even if there is no 
possible evidence that could falsify the theory, is there any evidence 
that might be put forward in favour of it?
j Wilder Penfield's [1958] experiments, where precise points on the 
exposed temporal cortex were stimulated by live electrodes while the 
patient was conscious, r  - A ' provide such 
evidence, as they resulted in the surprising phenomenon that patients 
experienced extremely vivid sensations when the electrodes administered 
stimulation., • : These experiences were thought by Penfield to be
recollections of past experiences. From this, Penfield theorised that 
every individual memory is stored in some stable and specific location 
in the temporal cortex, and, secondly, that if a given point were 
stimulated, whether artificially or ’naturally’ within normal brain 
function, then the appropriate’embodied memory would be brought to 
conscious awareness.
However, both Penfield’s experimental results and his theoretical 
model have been discredited. He thought that whenever we pay conscious 
attention to something, we simultaneously ’record’ this experience, 
which is then stored in some structurally isomorphic form within the 
temporal cortex. So he saw memory in terms of a tape-recorder model, 
where every experience is stored completely and, given the appropriate 
stimulus, can be 'played back' in full. But Penfield’s actual results 
are far too humble to warrent such dramatic conclusions. Firstly it 
should be kept in mind that all these experiments were carried out on 
epileptics (in fact the phenomenon was discovered by accident while 
operating on patients to reduce seizures) and so any findings relating 
to these people should not be extrapolated in order to propose theories 
regarding the functioning of normal brains. Secondly, the aforementioned 
phenomena were extremely rare occurences - out of 520 patients, 40 
reported having some sensation whenever the electrode touched the cortex, 
and out of these, only 12 could be put forward as possible cases of 
genuine recall - that is, under 3% of his total. Thirdly, of this 3%,
102
no independent check was ever made to corroborate the claim that these 
experiences were genuine memories. Fourthly, the results can be 
explained within other equally plausible theories, for example that 
they were genuine memories, but that their recall had nothing to do 
with the electrode, but that they were somehow associated with what 
the patient was thinking about at that time. Fifthly, there is always 
the possibility (albeit an unverifiable one) that if another point on 
the cortex had been stimulated instead at exactly the same time, the 
same experience would have been recalled.
Penfield himself made an observation that would seem to disprove 
his theory, when he noted that if the same point was stimulated twice, 
a few minutes apart, the same experience was not summoned twice, and 
indeedo a .occasion different experiences were brought about. This would 
at least go against a ’static' theory of memory traces. It has long 
been a controversial issue in the neurosciences whether the memory trace 
has a static/structural basis or a ’dynamic’ one, or whether these are 
combined, with short term storage being dynamic, in the form of a 
patterned current continuously running betw*&) neurons, and long term 
storage being static, based on an altered electrical resistance in the 
synapses between neurons.
In relation to this whole issue, in studies of people who have had 
substantial areas of their cortex either removed or significantly 
damaged - i.e. up to 40% - there seem to be no specific and selective
ftJVjtoXiPA
gaps/, as would seem to be implied by any theory positing a precise, 
staticvone : one’correlation between memories and points on the cortex. 
So perhaps there are many tokens of each memory trace, distributed 
throughout the cortex. Finally, from an evolutionary standpoint, it 
would seem to be unnecessary to have a brain that stored everything, 
every last insignificant detail. It makes much more sense to have a 
brain that actively selects rather than passively records, that can 
sort out the wheat from the chaff (however imperfectly) and retains 
information that appears to be useful and relevant to the future.
6.4 PARFIT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERION TESTED
Returning to Locke, one of the most noteworthy attacks on his 
theory, and the one most responsible for the modern modifications 02
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it, is Reid's [1785] argument that,/!;- Locke's theory, " a man may be, 
and at the same time not be the same person that did a particular 
action" (pi 14). This argument involves the famous example of the 
officer who had been flogged as a boy for stealing apples from an 
orchard, who had later captured a standard on his first military 
campaign, and who had ended his career as a general. The paradox arises 
that "it is possible that, when he took the standard, he was conscious 
of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, 
he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost 
the consciousness of his flogging" (pi 14). It follows from Locke's 
theory, says Reid, that, given that both he and Locke mean by 'being 
conscious of', being able, given the appropriate cue, to remember the 
relevant experience, that the schoolboy was the same person as the 
young officer, and the officer the same person as the general, but 
that the general was not the same person as the schoolboy - but since 
the transitive nature of the identity relation demands that these two 
be identified, given the previous two identifications, it seems that 
by Locke's theory, the general both is and isn't the same person as 
the schoolboy.
This argument succeeds against Locke's theory. More contemporary 
forms of memory-based criteria of personal identity, versions of the 
Psychological Criterion, are designed to cope with Reid's objection.
They do so by rejecting Locke's restriction of the criterion to the 
holding of direct memory connections between experiences and their 
future recall, and replacing it with a model of psychological continuity 
involving overlapping chains of memory-relations. So, returning to 
Reid's counter-example, and calling the boy, the officer and the 
general a,b and c respectively, c remembers b's experience, and b 
remembers a's experience, and at all times in between there is a 
continuous chain of memory connections that is sufficient to maintain 
identity despite the loss of any direct memory connections between a 
and c. Such is Parfit's Psychological Criterion, discussed in ch.l, 
which I will restefe, in a shorter, clearer form : 
x (tl) is the same person as y (t2 ) iff x is psychologically 
continuous with y and with no-one else at t2 .
Clearly this criterion can, unlike Locke's, accommodate such
commonplace phenomena as forgetting, since our normal rate of forgetting
is not great enough to threaten either of the criterion's two integral
relations of psychological continuity or psychological connectedness.
It can also deal with another common phenomenon which I have never
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seen mention of in any philosophical discussion of personal identity, 
but which is fatal to Locke’s theory, namely infantile amnesia. In 
virtually all cases, adults can remember virtually nothing of the first 
three years of life, so it follows that by Locke's theory that one is 
not identical as a person with the infant from which one developed. 
However, even though I now have no direct memory connections with 
myself at one year of age, I can be sure that some form of strong 
connectedness held _ . then between successive days, albeit in some 
pre-conceptual way, i.e. recognising familiar faces, places, objects.
But I accept that there is an oddity in even applying a psychological 
criterion in the case of the very young, i.e. the new-born. Surely 
infants and adults encode and interpret the world in very different 
ways. What if Piaget [1971] is correct in stating that cognitive 
systems are not staticly structured systems that remain in essentially 
the same form throughout one's life, but are subject to change and 
development, proceedot^rom infancy to adulthood by a series of
stages that are qualitatively very different from each other, and 
that this cognitive development is not a uniformly gradual process, 
but is subject to leaps, . ’ . While it might not be exactly right
s u l K 1-tkpS
to describe^ ' as paradigm shifts in ways of worldmaking (as to talk
in these terms would seem to imply a change in explicit theory, which 
would imply the use of language and the ability to think in concepts, 
whereas an infant's early stages are pre-conceptual), it might be held 
that a leap from one stage to the next results in the child seeing the 
world in a fundamentally different way, for example coming to understand 
that objects exist independently of one's perception of them.
Does the existence of such profound changes in our modes of 
representing and interpreting the world pose a threat to our notions 
of psychological continuity? This might be so if the qualitative 
changes took place in instantaneous 'quantum leaps', but this is not 
what Piaget is arguing for - it is a more gradual process than this, 
and the rate of change in conceptual development is still compatible 
with the holding of psychological continuity. Also, these stages 
proceed in an invariant order, with a rich network of causal connections 
underlying this process. In connection with this causal aspect, Piaget 
stresses that the child plays very much an active role in his own 
cognitive development. This is in opposition to another feature of 
Locke's treatment of memory, and indeed Penfield's (it is remarkable 
how similar their assumptions are),with their passive 'storehouse' 
model whereby experiences are somehow copied and filed away for future 
reference. However, as the noted neuroscientist J.Z.Young [1987] has
recently remarked, in direct opposition to such a theory, the brain 
*is not simply a storehouse of records» but a very active organiser" 
(pl7). Likewise, as Frederic Bartlett [1932] says, ”The first notion 
to get rid of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative 
or reproductive" (p32). In various tests, Bartlett showed that people 
do not merely register events passively, but interpret them according 
to previous knowledge, values and interests, and that when information 
is stored, it is not left in one permanent form, but is constantly 
undergoing modifications, reevaluations and simplifications as 
information is gradually lost, so that what is remembered at a later 
date will not be an exact copy of what was initially experienced, but 
a 'version' of it.
So far, then, Parfit's Psychological Criterion looks to be in 
good shape. It faces a more serious challenge when we come to consider 
various forms of amnesia, which are sometimes seen as undermining the 
continuity that such a criterion requires. I will now discuss some 
forms of organic amnesia (that is, where there is a known physical 
cause, as opposed to psychogenic amnesia, where the trouble is 
psychologically based).
Traumatic amnesia is a common consequence of receiving a severe 
blow to the head, for example following a road accident. It has three 
main phases. The first stage is post-traumatic amnesia, commencing 
when the subject first regains consciousness. It is characterised by 
a general disorientation, of not knowing where you are, what day it is, 
how you came to be where you are, etc.. This is followed by a period 
of retrograde amnesia, where one's equilibrium becomes more reinstated, 
but where events prior to the accident cannot be recalled. At the 
beginning of this stage, this amnesia can stretch back to cover a 
period of many years. However, in time, memories are gradually regained 
although the moments immediately prior to the accident can never be 
recalled. The common explanation for this is that the information has 
not been sufficiently consolidated, as the trauma of the accident has 
interfered with the transfer to long-term storage. The third stage, 
anterograde amnesia, which overlaps somewhat with the second stage, is 
characterised by tiredness and by difficulties in concentrating, which 
result in problems in learning and retaining new information.
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6.5 THE SLEEPING PILL
Given the limited and temporary nature of this form of amnesia, 
it is clear that Parfit's Psychological Criterion will not be threatened 
by it. However, Parfit constructs an argument involving retrograde 
amnesia to draw some startling conclusions. This occurs within his 
thought-experiment entitled "The Sleeping Pill" (in [1984]), in which 
he makes a challenging comparison between the predicaments of such an 
amnesiac and the subject of a teletransportation scenario. The story 
begins with the well-acknowledged fact that some drugs, notably some 
sleeping pills, can produce retrograde amnesia, whereby I will remain 
awake for one hour after having taken the pill, but on the following 
day I will not remember anything that happened during the half-hour 
before I fell asleep the previous night. So if I've taken such a pill 
just over half an hour ago, the person who wakes up tomorrow will be 
psychologically continuous with me as I was before taking the pill, 
but not with me now. I am, according to Parfit, presently on a 
'psychological branchline' which will come to an end when I fall asleep.
During this half-hour, I will be psychologically continuous with 
'Myself-in-the-past', but not with 'myself-in-the-future',, and so the 
relationship between 'me now' and 'me tomorrow' is like my relationship 
to someone else, in as much as any intentions that I form now will not 
be acted upon tomorrow, and any bright ideas I have at present will 
not be remembered the following day, unless I resort to public means 
of communication, such as writing myself a note.
Parfit says that this predicament is analogous to a variant of 
the teletransportation story T2 (let us call it T2') in which my 
replica is not created until I die. He suggests that the situations 
are structurally identical in the sense that if we give the names a, 
b and c respectively to, firstly in the sleeping pill case, myself 
before taking the pill, myself after it has taken effect but before I 
have fallen asleep, and myself when I wake up the next day, and 
secondly in T2', respectively to myself before entering the Scanner, 
myself in my original body after the teletransportation of my genetic 
blueprint, and my replica, then in both cases we have psychological 
continuity between a & b, and between a & c, but not between b & c.
If Parfit is correct about his assimilation of these two cases, 
then we seem to be landed with a difficult dilemma, since, if the cases 
are structurally isometrical, then, given that in T2' we do not want 
to ascribe stages a & b & c to one person, then we seem to be equally 107
constrained against doing so in the sleeping pill case, but this is 
enormously counter-intuitive. On the other hand, if in the sleeping 
pill case we d£ admit all three stages as being of the one same person, 
we seem bound to do so in T2', which again is most undesirable.
Andrew Brennan [1988] argues that such a dilemma is an illusion, 
since Parfit is mistaken in comparing the two cases. He analyses the 
cases in terms of his ’survival conditions' (see ch.4) and argues that 
in the case of T2', a survives both as b and as vc', but that I) does not 
survive as c, since c is not causally related to b. However, both b 
and c 1are causally related to W, b through physical continuity, and c 
being an example of a copying process, using a as the prototype. By 
contrast, in the sleeping pill case, the amnesia experienced by c is 
causally dependent on events happening to b, as the pill has 
interfered with the brain's processing functions, so that any 
experiences occurring at that time cannot later be retrieved by c.
Brennan is correct in pointing out the asymmetry between the two 
cases. However, it seems to me that his analysis of the sleeping pill 
case, despite any intrinsic merits it may have, has moved away 
from anything that can with any accuracy be understood in terms of a 
psychological criterion, as his analysis invokes causal processes that 
fall under a physical description of events, .... if it were to be
Kii>
fleshed out,/." would be in the language of neurology and pharmacology 
and not of psychology. This is no problem for me, but it may be for 
Parfit.
An alternative way of dealing with the problem of retrograde 
amnesia in the sleeping pill case and similar situations is just to 
say that the Psychological Criterion is loose enough to accommodate 
such lapses in memory, as psychological continuity still holds to a 
high enough degree to maintain identity, given the continuity between 
a and c. This position is strengthened considerably when we reject the 
privileged status of memory-connections within the Psychological 
Criterion and widen it to include such factors as consistency of 
character, of likes and dislikes, the continued ability to use 
language, to perform learned tasks, all of which are unaffected by 
retrograde amnesia. To combine this with Brennan's argument, we can 
say that we have a theory of amnesia which can be inserted as a clause 
within a larger theory of persons based on a wide version of the 
Psychological Criterion.
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6 , 6  VARIETIES OF MEMORY
One point that I keep returning to is the need to discuss memory, 
and therefore any Psychological Criterion, in terms of a far more ■ .
conceptual scheme than has usually been employed in philosophical 
treatments of the issues of personal identity. Far too often, philo­
sophers have unwittingly followed Locke & Co. in taking a unitary view 
of memory. However, it is now well-acknowledged that memory involves 
not one single unitary system, but a number of complex interconnecting 
systems, each with a different specialised function, but cooperating 
in the shared general task of storing information for future use. It 
follows that all talk of someone 'losing his memory' is rather 
misleading, if not incoherent, as such a statement tacitly assumes 
this discredited unitary model. Amnesic syndrome is not a general or 
overall loss of memory function, as in such a case one would in all 
probability be dead or at most confined to a 'vegetable' existence.
Nor does it involve a general deterioration in memory function, but a 
selective impairment in long-term storage, where some systems can be 
severely damaged while others are relatively unaffected.
The following discussion of severe forms of organic amnesia will 
make use of the well-known distinction between long-term and short­
term storage. For our purposes, short definitions will suffice. Long­
term storage refers to all information that has been stored in such a 
way that it is potentially retrievable over times greater than a few 
seconds, whereas short-term storage comprises the set of systems 
facilitating the temporary storage of information required to perform 
another more inclusive mental operation - for example, the practice of 
mental arithmetic requires the temporary storage of numbers which can 
be retrieved at the appropriate stage of the operation, after which 
they can be discarded. Likewise, in understanding a sentence, one 
needs to be able to remember the first words in the sentence when the 
last words are being spoken or read.
Organic amnesia is caused by damage to the limbic system of the 
brain, in particular to the medial temporal lobe of the cerebral 
cortex, and a subcortical region called the diencephalon, including 
the hippocampus and mammiliary bodies. Major contributary factors 
include encephalitis, brain tumour, stroke, and Korsakoff's syndrome, 
the last of which I will now discuss. Korsakoff's syndrome is a result 
of chronic alcoholism and subsequent thiamine (vitamin Bl) deficiency,
One problem in ascertaining the degree of amnesia suffered in such 
cases is that the syndrome is usually accompanied by other intellectual 
and cognitive impairments. However, in general some major memory 
systems remain unaffected. Short-term storage is usually intact, as 
are linguistic abilities and motor skills. SnJch patients retain 
semantic memory, that is, general knowledge, but in severe cases this 
can be restricted to information acquired before the onset of the 
disease. For example there are numerous reported cases who, on being 
asked who is the present Prime Minister, will reply 'Harold Wilson', 
or some other name that would have been the correct answer had the 
question been asked at the time relating to the portion of the past 
still accessible to the patient's memory. This peculiar phenomenon is 
due to the fact that Korsakoff patients have great difficulty in 
learning (and therefore remembering) any new information - so they 
suffer from both anterograde and retrograde amnesia.
Korsakoff patients show some residual learning capacity, which 
shows that procedural memory (information in long-term storage relating 
to complex skills that can only be given a partial description, e.g. 
riding a bike) isn't fully destroyed. SUch patients can also retain 
the ability to perform various tasks and skills that they acquired 
prior to the disease. THis was strikingly exhibited by Clive Wearing, 
the subject of a Channel 4 documentary 'Prisoner of Consciousness'.
He was not a Korsakoff case, but his amnesia was caused by the herpes 
simplex encephalitis that affected his frontal and temporal lobes. He 
was, and remains an accomplished musician, and continues to read 
music, to play, arrange and conduct just as before. The peculiarity 
of his predicament was dramatically displayed when he was invited to 
play on a church organ, on an instrument that he had regularly 
performed in the past. He protested vehemently that he had never seen 
it before in his life and that he'd never played any musical instrument 
before. He was astonished when the music began to flow from his 
fingertips.
Returning to Korsakoff's syndrome, the other major area of 
disfunction is in episodic memory, that is, 'autobiographical memory', 
the ability to remember past experiences from the inside. Again, this 
can remain intact for periods prior to the onset of the disease, so 
that, for example, the patient may retain vivid memories of his youth, 
to the extent that he may believe himself still to be that age. By 
contrast, with reference to times since the disease took hold, (and 
sometimes for years before this), his past is a stranger to him. For
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example, in a severe case, if you were to meet such a patient for the 
first time one morning, and left, returning the same afternoon, he may 
not recognise you, nor remember having met anyone. It is therefore 
understandable that such patients are not aware of there being anything 
wrong with them - how could an amnesic remember that he couldn’t 
remember? Perhaps this is a blessing. Two case histories, recall' by 
Oliver Sacks [1986];will serve to display the horror of such a 
predicament.
6.7 TWO CASE HISTORIES
Jimmie G. suffered from severe retrograde amnesia due to Korsakoff's 
syndrome. When Sacks first met him in 1975> Jimmie thought that the 
year was 1945, and that he was still 19 years of age. When Sacks 
confronted him with his mirror image and asked if the middle-aged man 
reflected there could be a youth of 19, Jimmie went into a blind 
uncomprehending panic, which, perhaps mercifully, was extremely short 
lived, since the experience was forgotten within a few seconds, once 
his attention was distracted. In general, he had no sense of the 
passing of time at all. As Sacks observed, "he is a man without a 
past, stuck in a constantly changing, meaningless moment" (p28). On 
being interviewed at the hospital where he had lived for many years, 
he asked of Sacks ’What is this place,doc? Do I work here?'. He 
possessed no semantic or episodic memory concerning anything after 
1945. Beyond this date, there was no certainty, and he was left with 
only guesses, instantly forgotten, to try and make sense of his 
situation. Sacks recalled Hume's [1739] account of the inner life of 
man as essentially comprising "a bundle or collection of perceptions, 
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in 
perpetual flux and movement” (Bk.l ch.4 p6), and ruefully reflected 
that such a picture is realised not in people at large, but in such 
damaged cases as Jimmie G., the 'Humean being'.
William Thompson presents an even more extreme case of Korsakoff's 
syndrome, having, unlike Jimmie G., no 'base', no recall of any part 
of his life, nor knowledge of any facts. He has no idea who he is, 
adopting and casting aside personae rapidly and randomly, and 
likewise seeing any other person addressing him as being up to a dozen 
different people in the space of five minutes, moving from one 
construction to another, apparently unaware of any discontinuity, and
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delivering each ’version of reality' with equal force. In fact, to him 
each of these conflicting accounts were equal in value (i.e.virtually 
valueless), and such basic distinctions as true/false, real/unreal, 
relevant/irrelevant, important/'trivial cease to apply to his ontology.
To quote Sacks, "for him they were not fictions, but how he suddenly 
saw or interpreted the world....its radical flux and incoherence 
could not be tolerated, acknowledged for an instance" (pl04). He could 
perceive there to be nothing wrong with himself, precisely because he 
was lacking any stable viewpoint or perspective from which to make 
such a judgement. In his state of permanent Korsakoff psychosis, he
was "continuously creating a world and a self  such a patient
must literally make himself (and his world) up at every moment" (pl05).
6.8 WHAT IS THE REAL ISSUE?
Do these tragic cases present serious problems for Parfit's 
criterion? Firstly, turning to the relation of psychological connect­
edness : since short-term storage remains intact, one could say that 
most Korsakoff patients possess a fair degree of psychological 
connectedness in the extremely short term, i.e. moment to moment, 
although even this may be denied in the case of William Thompson. By 
Parfit's definition (see ch.l), such a relation would only count as 
connectedness to a very low degree, since the relation of 'strong 
connectedness', which is required for identity to be maintained, 
requires that at least half the direct psychological connections are 
retained into the following day. This condition would definitely 
disqualify William Thompson. In the case of Jimmie G., one could argue 
a case for his having psychological continuity of a sort, on the 
basis of his well-established memories of events and experiences prior 
to 1945. However, it would be impossible to decide if this number of 
memory connections surviving day to day would count as sufficient to
maintain his identity (apart from anything else, we do not have
strict criteria for counting such things). However, if we broaden the
Psychological Criterion as I have suggested above, and include in the
equation such factors as continuity of character, of tastes, of 
values, then Jimmie G. is seen as possessing a much higher degree of 
psychological continuity than was previously judged. This approach 
gains support from the testimony of Clive Wearing's wife, who stated 
that, throughout her husband's illness, "I&ve never lost touch with
the 'Cliveness' of Clive  his soul, his person is unchanged....
he's still the same man". I understand her to be pointing at least in
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part to the forms of continuity I have mentioned. However, even after 
all this, William Thompson still fails to make the grade, as in his 
case the flux extends to even these newly included aspects of mental
("O
life. He cannot with any accuracy be said even/have a personality, 
likes and dislikes, opinions, etc., as such concepts assume an 
underlying consistency that he does not possess. He cannot be even 
said to have a self (in the sense that I will explicate in ch.8 ). So 
even my new Broadened Psychological Criterion fails to accommodate 
him.
A criterion of personal identity must be able to apply to all 
cases where identity holds, and any version of the Psychological 
Criterion will have insuperable problems in achieving this, since 
psychological continuity is not realised by one unitary system but by 
a complex structure of interrelated systems, and, basically, anything 
that is structured can be dismantled, to varying degrees, often leaving 
only the empty shell. No version of the Psychological Criterion can 
accommodate all of the disparate mishaps, catastrophes, and malfunctions 
that can afflict us. Any criterion with any real substance will fail 
some severe cases, such as William Thompson.
Let us return to the beginning of the chapter, to Flew’s 
distinction between the ’logical’ and ’factual’ uses of the term ’can’ 
regarding the ability to remember past experiences. We saw that both 
usages failed to provide a satisfactory criterion of personal identity 
within a Lockean framework. Flew was mistaken in thinking that he had 
exhausted the possibilities inherent in the term ’can’. What we need 
here is the ’can’ that limits what is theoretically possible, in the 
sense described in ch.5. For this, we need an account of how memory 
works, and, within this, an explanation of when and how these functions 
break down. I have supplied an outline of this in this chapter. The 
introduction of this ’theoretical possibility' into the arena forces 
us to ask fundamental questions regarding what a criterion of personal 
identity is, and what it is for. For example, from Locke through to 
Parfit and his contemporaries, their various formulations of the 
Psychological Criterion are located within their theories of personal 
identity in terms of their opposition to, and their juxtaposition to 
a Physical Criterion. This conflict, this ’either/or' structure 
developed because it was considered 'possible' that the two criteria 
could diverge and provide different answers to questions of identity.
Hence it was a very real question as to which of the two criteria
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was correct or had primacy,/which covered what was essential to 113
personhood and identity. But if such a divergence is not theoretically 
possible, this whole enterprise has been one long red herring.
Turning back to Clive Wearing, Jimmie G. and William Thompson, 
what exactly are we asking when we raise doubts as to whether their 
personal identity is maintained over time? For in one sense there is 
no mystery, no doubt as to who they are. We know who they are. There 
is only a 'philosophical' question here if the Physical and Psycho­
logical Criteria are put in opposition to each other. If we do so, the 
problem is that by the restrictions imposed by any substantive 
Psychological Criterion, someone like William Thompson fails to be 
anyone. (Of course, one can argue that, in terms of the 'philosophical' 
sense of the term 'person', he is not a person, but merely a human 
being, but for reasons given in ch.4, I will ignore this easy option). 
Once a cease-fire is declared between the criteria, we can clearly 
see that to ask something like 'Given the holding of physical 
continuity between them, is this person addressed as 'William Thompson' 
at tl the same person as addressed as 'William Thompson' at t2?' is 
just the wrong question to ask. In Parfit's terms, it is an empty 
question, it being possible for one to say 'yes' and for another to 
say 'no' (i.e. 'he's not a person'), yet be in full agreement about 
the 'facts of the matter', both neurological and psychological. There 
is no philosophical mystery here concerning identity, just the 
philosophical error of asking the wrong question.
5.9 Appendix : PSYCHOGENIC FUGUE
However, matters are more complicatedj another form of amnesia, 
namely psychogenic fugue, a condition which acts here[a 'bridge' 
between the amnesic disorders discussed in this chapter and the 
dissociative disorders to be discussed in chapter 8 . 'Psychogenic 
fugue' is characterised as covering cases where a person typically 
disappears, wandering far from home for days or weeks on end, during 
which he has no recall of his life before his flight - that is, he 
suffers a complete loss of episodic memory (but with his semantic 
and procedural memory unaffected), but with this amnesia remaining 
unrecognised by himself. Such fugue conditions typically end as 
suddenly as they started, with the person suddenly 'snapping out of 
it', often after sleeping, with the memories of his past life prior 
to the fugue fully restored, but with his memories of times during 
the fugue state now lost.
William James [1890] describes a typical case of psychogenic 
fugue, wherein one Rev. Ansel Bourne of Providence, Rhode Island, 
disappeared on 20/1/1887, and nothing was discovered concerning his 
whereabouts until 14/3/1887 when, in Norristown, Pennsylvania, one A.J. 
Brown, who had arrived in the town some six weeks before and had 
opened up a general store, awoke one night in panic;J>.jai?y‘X«j( recognised 
himself as Ansel Bourne, and not knowing where he was, how he had got 
there, what he was doing there,j remembered;aA^thing about the previous 
few weeks in Norristown ’as' A.J. Brown. The last thing he remembered 
was withdrawing some money from a bank in Providence on 20/1/1887.
Three years later, William James hypnotised Bourne in order to 
retrieve these lost memories, but when Bourne recalled them in a 
hypnotic trance, he, ’as Brown’, was amnesic regarding his life ’as 
Bourne', saying that whilst he had heard of him, he "didn't know as 
if he had ever met the man". James confessed that "I had hoped by 
suggestion, etc, to run the two personalities into one, and make these 
memories continuous, but no artifice would avail to accomplish this, 
and Mr Bourne’s skull today covers two distinct personal selves" (p393). 
James assumed that Bourne's state of fugue was a spontaneous hypnotic 
trance, since only by putting him under hypnosis did he succeed in 
recovering his lost memories 'as Brown'. However, it doesn't follow 
from this success that hypnosis produced the amnesia in the first 
place.
But it is ’ James' claim that the man before him constituted 
'two distinct selves' that I wish to investigate in chapter 8 , io ofcUk k  
see whether any sense can be made of a literal, non-metaphorical 
interpretation of this claim. This will lead me to investigate the 
fundamental concept of 'unity of mind'. This is also the central issue 
of the following chapter, on the implications of split-brain research.
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CHAPTER 7 COMMISSUROTOMY AND THE UNITY OF MIND
7.1 'THE BRAIN' DISMANTLED
I want to turn now to consider another contemporary area of 
investigation that has been recognised as having profound and far- 
reaching implications for the study of personal identity and the 
central concept of ’unity of mind’. In particular, the whole question 
of synchronic identity, resting on a notion of ’psychological unity-at 
-a-time’ has been called into question by experimental findings in 
the field of split-brain research.
Looking back over the history of philosophical inquiries into 
personal identity, one of the most noticeable developments taking 
place in the present century has been the convergence of the two 
traditionally opposing positions, the Physical and Psychological 
Criteria, due to their common acknowledgement of the unique 
significance of the brain to their inquiries. Firstly, in the case 
of the Physical Criterion, the brain was regarded as the one organ or 
physical structure that one absolutely could not lose and yet 
continue to exist, or to exist as the same person. It was assumed 
that, given that the continued identity-over-time of a material object 
requires that there be an unbroken spatio-temporal path by which this 
object and it alone could be identifiedi / "  then in the case of 
living human beings, the essential ’traveller’ along this path is 
the brain. In other words, I go where my brain goes. I can lose my 
hair, my arms, my heart, lungs and liver, yet still remain me, but 
the brain is the exception to this rule. Thus, in thought-experiments, 
it was argued that if APs brain were transplanted into B ’s body, the 
resulting person would be A, and the operation would be more 
accurately described not as B having a brain transplant, but as A 
having a body-transplant, with this situation being merely the limit 
to common cases of organ transplant. For their part, supporters of 
the Psychological Criterion conferred special status on the brain as 
being the physical means whereby all distinctly psychological phenomena 
- notably memory - were realised.
In all such discussions, the brain was treated as a single 
unitary organ in the sense that it was regarded as being the 
indivisible bearer of consciousness and of selfhood. In other words, 
it was taken for granted that the functional integrity of the brain 
could not withstand division or substantial diminution, and that no
less than a complete and fully operative brain could succeed in 
embodying a full human consciousness. However, once a more detailed 
and systematic knowledge of the workings of the brain began to be 
acquired, this assumption began to be undermined, with the result 
that, in Nagel's [1971] words, it began to look possible that "the 
personal, mentalist idea of human beings"..(and in particular "the 
idea of a single person, a single subject of experience and action")
  "may resist the sort of coordination with an understanding of
humans as physical systems, that would be necessary to yield anything 
describable as an understanding of the physical basis of mind" (pi47)
Although, as we shall see, this unitary conception is so deeply 
entrenched that it may be impossible in practice to prevent ourselves 
from thinking of ourselves in terms of a single unified subject of 
experience, this inability of ours does not negate, defuse, or 
diminish the deep conceptual problem that Nagel is pointing to.
7.2 COMMISSUROTOMY DESCRIBED
Turning no«^ to split-brain research, it should be noted, zi 
' - ■ of course, that 'split-brain' is something of a misnomer,
smacking slightly of journalese. The expression refers to commissur­
otomy, which, strictly speaking, does not result in the bisection 
of brains (as the brain is a highly complex organ, and many of its
component parts remain intact after the operation) but is restricted
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There are various forms of commissurotomy, all involving the 
cutting of the corpus callosum (literally 'thick-skinned body'), a 
large transverse band consisting of around 800 million nerve fibres, 
which directly connects the cerebral hemispheres, thus facilitating 
direct communication between them, (see figure 1). In a complete 
commissurotomy, the entire corpus callosum is sectioned, along with 
the underlying hippocampal commissure, one fornix, the anterior 
commissure, and the massa intermedia of the thalamus. This results in 
the division of the cerebral cortex, with the cerebral hemispheres 
being connected only indirectly via the brain-stern and subcortical 
routes, and thus causing the splitting in sensory and motor functions 
to be discussed shortly.
A central commissurotomy involves the severing of the corpus
1
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callosum and the hippocampal commissure, resulting in a tactual split 
but not a visual split. A frontal commissurotomy involves the 
sectioning of the anterior portion of the corpus callosum, the 
anterior commissure and one fornix, and results in relatively little 
splitting of functions, even under experimental conditions.
At the present time, complete commissurotomies are rare, as 
modern diagnostic techniques (EEG, CAT scans, PET scans, CT scans, 
nmr scans) can precisely chart the area of the cortex that the 
epileptic s^.zure (which warrants the operation) is issuing from( _
' - _ and thus we need only section the corresponding part of
the corpus callosum that would relay the discharge to the other 
hemisphere. However, it was complete commissurotomy that was the 
common form of the operation for some time, and it has been this 
operation that has been the focus of philosophical interest.
Accordingly, in the following pages, unless otherwise stated, I will 
use the term ’commissurotomy’ to refer to the operation in its 
complete form. I will, however, return to the more limited forms of 
the operation later, as they form crucial evidence for my final 
assessment of the philosophical implications of split-brain research.
Commissurotomy was introduced in the 1940’s as a drastic measure 
to control grand mal epileptic seizures, which originate as an 
electrical disturbance in a particular site in one cerebral hemi­
sphere, spreading across it to the other hemisphere via the corpus 
callosum. Since the disturbance increases in magnitude as it proceeds, 
the idea behind the operation was that by cutting the corpus callosum, 
the disturbance would not only be limited to its hemisphere of 
origin, but its magnitude would thereby be severely curtailed. In 
this respect, the operation proved to be successfull beyond all 
expectation, as attacks not only became less severe, but also less 
common, and in some cases disappeared entirely.
Despite the operation's undoubted success regarding epilepsy, it 
was in time discovered that it had some peculiar consequences, which 
I discuss below. However, these side-effects were not immediately 
apparent. Much of the literature on the subject tends to exaggerate 
the cognitive and behavioural consequences of commissurotomy, as 
they understandably concentrate on the anomalies. Rather, the fact is 
that such patients' everyday behaviour appears, both to the patient 
himself and to observers^ to be virtually unaffected most of the time. 
Indeed, close investigation by clinical researchers at the time did
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not discover any peculiar results. This led many neurologists of the 
day to ascribe only a minor role in brain function to the corpus 
callosum - of, indeed, to wonder if it had any function. One wit 
suggested that it was only there to transmit epileptic sLtzures 
between the cerebral hemispheres.
By the 1960's it was discovered that under certain controlled 
experimental conditions, the responses of split-brain patients was 
found to be highly unusual, and alarming in its implications. 
Specifically, when sensory input was restricted to one hemisphere 
alone, and a response to this stimuli was requested from that hemi­
sphere, it appeared, in Sperry's [1968] words, that such patients 
possessed "two separate spheres of conscious awareness, two separate 
conscious entities or minds running in parallel in the same cranium, 
each with its own sensations, perceptions) cognitive processes, 
learning experiences, memories, and so on"(p296) .
However, despite a misleading gloss of unanimity that is some­
times presented by neuroscientists and philosophers on this subject, 
it must be kept in mind that patients' responses were by no means 
uniform, even under the most controlled conditions. Large differences 
in performance have been recorded between different patients and also 
in the same patient over a period of time, especially when comparing 
recent post-operative responses with those of a few years later, when 
a marked improvement has frequently been noted. It seems that in time 
some direct communication can be re-established between the hemi­
spheres despite commissurotomy. I will return to this fact later on, 
but for the moment I will confine the discussion to cases that 
suggest, prima facie, that the operation has resulted in two separate 
minds in one body. In order to investigate these cases satisfactorily, 
we need to be acquainted with some physiological details concerning 
the ways in which sensory stimuli are transmitted to the normally 
functioning brain.
7.3 THE EXPERIMENTAL BACKGROUND
Tactile stimuli originating in a given side of the body are 
transmitted to the cerebral hemisphere on the other side (that is, 
contralaterally) with the exception of stimuli to the head and neck, 
which are directly transmitted to both hemispheres,
With visual stimuli (see figure 2) the retina is functionally sub­
divided in such a way that the left sides of both retinae, which scan
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the right side of the visual field, send impulses to the left hemi­
sphere, and conversely, the right haL/^of both retinae, scanning the 
left half of the visual field, send impulses to the right hemisphere. 
Auditory impulses from either ear are transmitted to both hemispheres, 
with the signal to the contralateral hemisphere being the stronger. 
Olfactory impulses are only transmitted ipselaterally - that is, each 
nostril sends impulses to the hemisphere on its own side of the body.
Regarding motor control, each hemisphere controls the movements 
of the opposite side of the body, with the exception of the head and 
neck, which are controlled by both hemispheres together. Each hemi­
sphere has some small degree of ipselateral control of the body, but 
this is negligible in comparison to the other's contralateral control, 
and is overruled by it in cases of normal brain function. However, 
this ipselateral control should not be dismissed as being an inevitably 
small and inadequate facility under all circumstances. It comes into 
its own in cases where the contralateral hemisphere has been removed or 
significantly damaged. Under such circumstances, the remaining hemi­
sphere can be trained to develop greater and more refined ipselateral 
control. A similar development has been observed in some cases of 
commissurotomy, with a gradual but significant improvement in ipse­
lateral control being developed in the years following the operation.
In general, it appears that the brain's ability to adapt and take on 
roles and functions usually assigned to missing or inoperative sub­
structures is at its strongest in children, tending to decrease with 
age.
For the vast majority of people, the areas of the brain that are 
responsible for the various aspects of linguistic abilities are 
located mainly in the left hemisphere. Thus, should someone suffer a 
stroke incapacitating this hemisphere, he will be left speechless and 
with vastly impaired linguistic comprehension, although in time he can 
learn to retrieve some of this function, to a degree, by means of the 
right hemisphere. Many left-handed people have their linguistic 
functions primarily located in the right hemisphere, and there is also 
a small percentage of people in whom the neural regions responsible 
for these functions are distributed fairly equally between both hemi­
spheres. Incidentally, the hemisphere responsible for controlling 
linguistic functions is called the dominant hemisphere.
I will now go on to describe some common forms of experiments
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that have been performed on split-brain patients, during which the 
controversial responses/\ .1 i! have been the subject of
so much philosophical debate. ^  cVst-\>v■-<?cl
The patient is sat in front of a blank screen, onto which a 
tachistiscope flashes signals to a particular side of the screen. The 
patient is asked to stare at a spot right in the centre of the screen, 
ensuring that his head and neck movements are minimised. These 
procedures ensure that the signals are only directly accessible to 
one hemisphere. The signals are flashed for 200 milliseconds, which is 
just long enough to allow them to be registered by one half of the 
retinae, corresponding to one half of the visual field, but not long 
enough to allow any saccadic eye movements that would bring the 
signal within the range of the other half of the retinae and thereby 
dAh'fL'kJ tjo|.ayw(A.hoA to their associated hemisphere. These signals can take 
the form of words, simple images of familiar objects, or small patches 
of colour. In this last case, two colours are normally involved, two 
which are easily distinguishable from each other. (So, for example, 
red and green is an ideal coupling, as opposed to, say, red and 
orange). One each of these coloured patches is restricted to half the 
visual field, so that, for example, the left hemisphere has direct 
access to the red patch only, and the right hemisphere has access to 
the green patch only. The left hemisphere is not, and cannot be 
directly aware of the colour flashed to the right hemisphere, and vice 
versa.
In the majority of cases, where the left hemisphere is dominant, 
colours flashed to the right of the screen can be reported verbally, 
but not colours flashed to the left side of the screen, since the 
right hemisphere is mute. Similar results apply when words are 
flashed to the respective sides of the screen, and also in cases 
where objects are touched, unseen, by the hands . When the object is 
held in the right hand, the patient can verbally attest to his 
recognition of it, but not if it is in his left hand.
However, if a word, i.e. ’pencil’, is flashed to the left side 
of the screen, the left hand will pick out a pencil from amongst a 
pile of concealed objects, while the patient claims that he saw nothing. 
Likewise, if two different words, corresponding to two different 
objects, are flashed onto a screen, one on either side of the mid­
point, the two hands, hidden from the patient's sight by curtains, 
will search through a pile of unseen objects, seemingly oblivious to
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the other and its search, and unconcerned with the object of the other's 
search, until they finally locate their respective targets.
Another set of experiments, by Levy, Trevarthan and Sperry [1972], 
used composite or 'chimeric' imagery ; While the patient continues to 
look straight ahead at the mid-point of the screen as before, a 
composite image of two half-faces (the left side of one face an<A the 
right side of another) was flashed upon vertical axis of the mid­
point of the screen,so that each hemisphere only had direct access to 
one half-face. When asked to verbally indicate what image was seen, 
patients would report seeing the one sent to the left hemisphere, but 
when asked to point to the one that was seen, they chose the face 
sent to the right hemisphere. One further, unexplained oddity was 
that in both cases, the patient would report seeing whole faces - 
somehow each hemisphere managed to 'complete' the partial image into 
the more familiar whole form.
7.4 MINDS, BRAINS, PERSONS
As Wilkes [1978] argues, when theorists say that these results 
show that split-brain patients have two distinct minds or centres of 
consciousness, they are assuming that to deny this interpretation 
would involve a breach in theLaw"/ofNon-Contradiction - i.e. that the 
same person at time t both knows and does not know that p, or both 
sees and does not see q, so that the person both knows and does not 
know that the word 'pencil' was flashed within his field of vision.
Given that the experimental results seem to provide cases where, say, 
the left hemisphere knows that p and simultaneously that the right 
hemisphere does not know that p, such theorists conclude that the left 
and right hemispheres must logically constitute two minds, two 
subjects of experience.
Certainly we feel strongly tempted to say that such patients 
have two of something... but to go further than that raises problems.
As Patricia Churchland [1986] says, our old, commonsense 'folk- 
psychological' concepts such as 'mind', 'self', 'centre of conscious­
ness' are so vague and theoretically undefined that we don't have 
clear ruleS as to how to individuate them, as we don't know
what we are counting. As with other conditions that I discuss later, 
such as multiple personality, alexia, and visual agnosia, these pre- 
scientific mentalist concepts are unable to provide an adequate
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explanation, or even description, of such/conditions. However, it is 
instructive to draw out the confusions that are an inevitable 
consequence of such attempts, and therefore to question the privilege 
of some of our deepest assumptions regarding the mind.
As I elaborate < in the following chapter, a single mind is 
attributed to someone not as some mysterious extra entity put forward 
to explain the otherwise baffling coherence of one's mental life, but 
merely as a mark that such coherence holds to a significant degree. 
However, when it comes to specifying precisely the minimum degree of 
coherence required, we soon realise that there is no black-and-white 
dividing line, due to the vagueness in the application of the concept 
However, we are still able to offer paradigm cases that would most 
definitely fall under the heading of 'one mind', and those that are 
more problematic. As I argue at length, 'unity of mind' is always a 
matter of degree, being a mark of the amount of integration of the 
set of one's mental contents. Before returning to the main body of 
experimental results regarding split-brain patients,I wish briefly 
comment on a couple of side-issues concerning forms of mental 
division that are not sufficient to warrant the ascription of two 
minds vfccD- one body.
One of the peculiar side-effects of commissurotomy that was 
occasionally displayed in everyday non-experimental settings was the 
simultaneous manifestation of two sharply conflicting emotions, with 
the two dissociated hemispheres seeming to be in oppositionals was 
exhibited in the much-documented case of the man who both embraced 
his wife with one hand and pushed her away with the other. However, 
it is often conveniently ignored by philosophers seeking to use this 
case that the patient in question had extensive damage to his right 
hemisphere, and thus any results concerning him cannot be employed 
to derive conclusions about all split-brain patients, as his peculiar 
behaviour may be due to this brain damage rather than c-- - to the 
commissurotomy. Regarding this patient, Gillett [1986] remarks that 
"it would be implausible, on a moment's reflection, to claim that one 
of his hemispheres loved his wife and the other one hated her"(p227) . 
Gillett makes this assertion not on empirical grounds, but because he 
thinks that to make such a claim involves a category mistake. But 
this misses the point, as such a claim is no more peculiar than to 
say, in the case of someone with an intact cortex that 'his brain 
loves his wife'. To be sure, we don't commonly ascribe emotions, or 
propositional attitudes, to brains or half-brains, but to persons.
However, as I ’ve previously argued, given the inadequacy of our 
commomsense mentalistic concepts in dealing with such anomalous cases, 
we can make such ascriptions in the case of split-brain patients, due 
to the fact that we lack any fully appropriate ways of describing the 
state of affairs, and this is as good a way as any, and better than
most, and should therefore be regarded as a ’caretaker' form of
expression, in the absence of a better one.
The mode of expression that Gillett derides has the merit of 
highlighting the obvious emotional conflict. However, we all experience 
conflicting emotions simultaneously without our mental unity being 
called into question. We can all feel attracted to and repelled • 
something or someone at the same time. In fact, often this apparent 
conflict does not involve a contradictory state of affairs, it being 
elliptical for a pair of non-mutually-exclusive wants. One can only 
speculate in this particular instance, but perhaps the man had two 
different reactions to two different factors relating to his wife, in 
which case the only difference between his attitudes and our own is 
the peculiar and extreme way in which his internal conflict was 
manifested.
I will now turn to another example, relating to a further aspect 
of simultaneous knowledge and absence of knowledge of certain 
information within the same person, which again applies to all of us, 
with normal brains. My example concerns an experience of my own. In 
fact, I can remember having had two such experiences, and, assuming 
that I am perfectly healthy, with no undetected neurological damage 
or peculiarity, I see no reason to doubt that such experiences are 
not unique occurences, but merely that they are rarely noticed^or 
appreciated as having any significance. One morning I had to make a 
phonecall, and I was in a hurry. I located the number in the phone- 
book, closed the book, and began dialling. Once I had reached around 
the third digit of the number, I said to myself, 'Now what was that 
number again?' and found that I could not recollect it, or, more 
precisely, I found that I could not inwardly, sub-vocally, recite 
the number to myself. Nor could I form a mental picture of the number. 
Yet throughout my cogitations, my finger (my right index finger, 
incidentally) kept on dialling 'as if it knew what it was doing'.
Over and above my puzzlement regarding this peculiar state of affairs,
I felt confident that I had somehow dialled the correct number. I 
felt confident that I, in a sense, knew the number in question ,
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Although I could not manifest this knowledge by uttering the number,
. 4 could do so by the very act of dialling it - and it turned out 
that I had dialled the right number.
One obvious way of attempting to account for my experience is to
dissolve the apparent contradiction by appealing to different types
ko tKfi- * i Ox ■>' ■>
of knowledge, for example/between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', 
where I knew the number in the former way, but not in the latter. 
While my example doesn’t easily fit this distinction, it may well be 
that, given sufficiently careful rewording, a solution could be found 
by this device. It is all too tempting just to say 'my body knew but 
my mind didn’t', but, no matter how phenomenologically accurate such 
a description seems, it is theoretically dubious, relying on a 
dualism that I don't want to encourage, as well as being devoid of 
any explanatory power, as it leaves the nature of these two forms of 
knowing totally opwjuv
My example also reminds me of Wittgenstein’s [1953] remarks on 
understanding and rule-following, to the effect that having a mental 
image before the mind is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition of being able to follow a rule, or, in this case, a self- 
instruction. No doubt, given a fully satisfactory neurophysiology, we
ic\ CXA wvxy
could describe/the processes by which both of my cognitive modes 
were realised^ * • : without reference to any single
subject of experience, which would, of course, avoid any contra­
diction.
Having dealt with these couple of asides, I will now return to 
the main body of experimental findings regarding split-brain cases. 
One of the first things that any theorist must account for is the 
divergence between, on the one hand, the patients' seemingly 
perfectly integrated behaviour virtually all the time under normal 
conditions (which would seem to encourage the attribution of a single 
mind) with, on the other hand, the results of controlled experiments 
as I have described, which have been cited as grounds for saying that 
such a unity has been fundamentally split, and that we must therefore 
see such patients as having two separate minds..
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7.5 PUCCETTI'S 'TWO PERSON' THEORY
There have been a wide range of responses to these experimental 
results. By far the most extreme has been from Roland Puccetti [1973], 
who sees the data as providing grounds for the claim that all human 
beings, including those of us with an intact cortex, *’ have two 
minds, and, in fact, should be more accurately described as being 
two persons cohabiting a single body.
Puccetti agrees to a large extent with the arguments put forward 
by Sperry et al, to the effect that split-brain patients have two 
separate and distinct centres of consciousness, or 'minds'. (I will 
discuss Sperry's theory in detail shortly). However, he extends these 
arguments, saying that they support his position regarding all human 
beings. He offers several arguments to back up this truly bizarre 
claim, some of which are largely conceptual, and some of which are 
factually based. Firstly, he asks, "How could commissurotomy create 
two minds or persons if there was just one before? Which mind - the 
left-based one or the right-based one - is brand new? And how are we 
to make a choice here? Both brains, as we have seen, were conscious 
and functioning in their rather specialised ways before the operation. 
It is just that they functioned more synchronously - because of the 
commissural connections - and no longer do so in, test situations.... 
thus even in the normal cerebrally intact human being there must be 
two persons"(p351). He is saying that the fact that our two 'minds' 
are connected by the corpus callosum will not significantly alter 
their functioning, except in making a little more information 
available to them.
He backs up his theory by pointing to well-documented cases of 
hemispherectomy, wherein "the same personality, character traits, and 
long-term memory traces persist post-operatively. The only way I can 
see to explain this is to say that the same 'person' did not survive 
hemispherectomy at all. Because this former 'person1 was never a 
unitary person at all. He or she was a compound of two persons who 
functioned in concert by trans-commissural exchange - what has 
survived is one of two very similar persons with roughly parallel 
memory traces, nearly synchronised emotional states, perceptual 
experiences, and so on, but different processing functions. (p352).
Regarding his question of how two minds could be created out of 
one, apart from his claim, on neurophysiological grounds, that there
always were two minds present prior to the operation, he seems to be 
making a general conceptual point that one F cannot result in two Fs. 
This claim works in tandem with his usage of the word 'create', which 
suggests that he is making the mistake of reifying the mind (in a way 
that is incompatible with his wider stance), and asking how some 
thing (a new mind) can be made out of nothing. However, as Margolis 
[1975] says, "Every analogy regarding the puzzles of numerical
id'&jfitity makes it quite clear that one entity of a given kind
mayt under specifiable circumstances, yield two entities of that kind. 
There simply are no fixed rules regarding the individuation of things 
that would preclude such a possibility" (p277).
Regarding hemispherectomy, this operation and its results does 
not point unequivocally to the conclusion that two minds existed 
prior to the operation. As Ritgerink [1980] says, "Surely there is a 
big jump between saying that the two hemispheres are capable of 
operating as two minds and saying that this potential is being 
realised in either a normal human being or in a split-brain patient" 
(p442) .
In fact, as Marks [1986] argues, even if we grant for the moment 
that there exist two distinct minds following commissurotomy, this 
need not require there to have been two beforehand (whether we 
interpret Puccetti 'strongly' as saying that this state of affairs is 
implied, or 'Weakly' as offering the two minds hypothesis by 
inference to the best explanation), since all that is required is 
that there be the potential for two distinct minds within our one 
presently integrated mind. And given the high degree of redundancy 
in the neural structures embodying such a mind, we should not find 
such a result too surprising.
James Moor [1982] offers this analogy for hemispherectomy : 
imagine a large tree which forks into two equally large branches, 
which are thus fairly independent of each other. Clearly this is one 
tree, and if one of these branches were chopped off in full, one and 
the same tree would clearly remain. If one follows the analogy 
through, the branches, representing the two cerebral hemispheres, 
are connected to a common trunk, which represents the brain-stem,
spinal cord, etc  but I will not push this any further at the
moment, because it would expose the crucial flaw in Puccetti's 
argument, a flaw that he shares with Sperry, and I want to withhold
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this argument until I have discussed Sperry’s case in detail.
But before I leave Puccetti and his claim that all of us possess 
two minds, I must say that his criterion for the individuation of 
minds is not clear to me. He would surely accept that information is 
directly exchanged between the hemispheres by means of the corpus 
callosum, and, in virtue of that fact, the cerebral cortex functions 
as one integrated system (within a larger system). He must then 
acknowledge that a person can have an overall integrative awareness 
of simultaneously having two mental contents (i.e. thinking about 
supper while listening to music) whose neural embodiments are spread 
out over areas including both hemispheres. Given this, it is hard to 
see how he can individuate two distinct minds without begging the 
question by reifying minds on a hemispherical model.
Another position that we can quickly dispose of is the false 
compromise that attempts to c. divergent results)by
f: _ « that split-brain patients have one mind under normal conditions
and two minds under experimental conditions. This is an entirely ad 
hoc move, with no explanatory force, and encouraging no independent 
grounds for support. It also has the untenable implication that the 
number of minds present is determined by something completely external 
to the patient,(contravening what Brennan [1988] has called the 'only 
x and y' rule)* Also, as Nagel says, "there is nothing about the 
experimental situation that might be expected to produce a fundamental 
internal change in the patient. In fact it produces no anatomical 
changes and merely elicits a noteworthy set of symptoms. So unusual 
an event as a mind's popping in and out of existence would have to be 
explained by something more than its explanatory convenience" (pi61).
7.6 COGNITION IN THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE
No.?oA£ _iv likely to be able to sustain a telling argument to 
the effect that the right hemisphere does not deserve to be regarded 
as a mind because the left is dominant. Such a position is held by 
Sir John Eccles [1977], who writes of "the uniqueness and exclusive­
ness of the dominant hemisphere in respect of conscious experience".
Of course, we could sidestep such a challenge by restricting the 
argument to the previously mentioned cases where the language- 
related functions are shared by both hemispheres. But such a 
mancH'wre is unnecessary, as I can easily show that Eccles' argument
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is/on very weak grounds. It is perfectly obvious that the inability 
to produce linguistic signs is no proof of the absence of conscious 
experience, as to make this claim would be to reduce pre-verbal 
children to the level of automata. Likewise, as Puccetti observes,
"if speech is a necessary condition of consciousness* then the aphasic 
who can play piano - as Ravel did - is playing unconsciously" (p342). 
Also, one need only become acquainted with the modes of cognition 
associated with the right hemisphere, and their degree of complexity, 
to see the untenability of Eccles1 view. As Nagel says, "There seems 
no reason in principle to regard verbalisability as a necessary 
condition of consciousness... what the right hemisphere can do on its 
own is too elaborate * too intentionally directed and too psychologic­
ally intelligible to be regarded merely as a collection of unconscious 
responses... the right hemisphere follows instructions* integrates 
tactileT auditory and visual stimuli* and does most of the things a 
good mind should do" (pi56).
If one is still in any doubt over the legitimacy of calling the 
right hemisphere conscious, one need only be reminded of its ability
oA tS-
to adapt and take over functions - including language related/, to a 
degree - that had been in the province of the left hemisphere, in 
cases where this latter hemisphere has been removed or is largely 
incapacitated. It has been suggested that in normal conditions, the 
left hemisphere inhibits the right's latent linguistic abilities, 
but in cases of strokes or of left-hemispherectomy these effects are 
removed. The two cases of left-hemispherectomy that I am aware of 
showed a gradual marked increase in linguistic skills, but both 
patients died before the extent of the remaining hemisphere's full 
linguistic capacities could be ascertained.
There have been numerous studies published, both popular and 
academic, describing the different but complementary modes of 
cognition typical of the two hemispheres. For some light relief, I 
reproduce one of the most extensive, by Joseph Bogen (in Campbell 
[1982], a pioneer of split-brain research.
LEFT RIGHT
intellect intuition
convergent divergent
intellectual sensuous
deductive imaginative
active receptive
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discrete continuous
abstract concrete
realistic impulsive
propositional imaginative
transformational associative
lineal non-lineal
historical timeless
explicit tacit
objective subjective
Looking at this list of complementary-opposite pairs, I am 
inclined to suspect that Dr. Bogen received a Thesaurus for 
Christmas, as it repeats and elaborates on a couple of vague 
distinctions by means of near-synonyms and associated concepts.
Rather than talking in such terms, it is perhaps safer to stick to 
descriptions of what the respective hemispheres can actually do.
So Eccles' claim that the right hemisphere is not a subject of 
conscious experience most certainly underestimates its abilities. 
However, in fairness to him, his view was once widely held, and seemed 
somewhat plausible, but in more recent times some experimental 
results have suggested that the right hemisphere has more language- 
related abilities than had been previously reckoned. In the 1960’s, 
various tesrfcS; by Gazzaniga, Bogen, and Sperry showed that in split- 
brain patients, the right hemisphere could not initiate a verbal 
response to questions regarding sensory stimuli that it alone was 
exposed to. This left it open whether the hemisphere merely lacked 
motor control to allow speech, or whether there was a more general 
lack of capacity for linguistic understanding. Later tests indicated 
that it had some albeit limited linguistic comprehension, for example 
it could match simple concrete nouns with pictures, but could not for 
complex nouns, or for verbs. Also, it seemed to be oblivious to 
synctactical distinctions. And when a verbal command was given, the 
left hand could retrieve the relevant object, whether it was asked 
for directly, or by means of clues, such as ’What do monkeys eat a 
lot of?’,/to which a banana was retrieved.
In the mid-seventies, Zaidel [1975] devised a set of experiments 
to see whether the right hemisphere’s linguistic comprehension 
improved if images of words were presented for longer time intervals 
than tachistoscopic techniques allowed, by designing a ’Z-lens’, a 
special type of contact lens which blocked light to the left-half
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retinae. Given more time to scan the words, the right hemisphere 
displayed what Zaidel estimated to be the level of linguistic compre­
hension of a 10 year old - vast improvement on previous (kfv&ings. This 
led theorists to consider whether the question of the lateralisation 
of linguistic functions was not more complex than was previously 
realised, with the right hemisphere being capable of significant 
contributions to at least some of the aspects concerned. However, as 
before, there is a frustrating lack of unity in experimental results. 
Zaidel*s estimate was based on the performance of just two patients, 
with another four showing negligible right-hemispherical linguistic 
comprehension. Likewise, in Gazzaniga*s earlier experiments, only 
three out of twenty eight showed any significant level of linguistic 
ability. All this indicates that research still has a long way to go 
before definitive theories can be presented.
Larry DeWitt [1975] attempts a softer version of Eccles* theory, 
in that he allows that the right hemisphere is conscious, and even 
that it qualifies as a mind, but that it lacks that particular 
reflexive consciousness that is required for it to count as a self - 
In other words, it lacks self-consciousness, the ability to think of 
oneself as oneself. As he elucidates this tripartite distinction :
"at the lowest level* we have 'consciousness', the basic phenomenal 
awareness that accompanies acts of perceptions* emotions* sensations: 
in order to possess a 'mind', the organism must possess a hierarchical 
ordering of behavioural priorities which are consciously utilised in 
intentional actions;.... by 'consciousness of self'* I mean the 
ability to apprehend oneself as being distinct from other similar 
beings* to recognise one's actions and thoughts as belonging in some 
sense to oneself"(p42) .
DeWitt says that the right hemisphere lacks this self-conscious­
ness, which he links with the ability to use language. He cites 
Gallup’s experiments in presenting chimps with their mirror-images, 
whereupon they gradually cease to regard such images as being of 
other animals, but rather to be somehow associated with themselves, 
which would seem to require the application of a self-conception at 
a rudimentary level. DeWitt sees the significance of such a test:
’ '■ in l * i$ providim1^ a means for checking for the
existence of self-consciousness without the need for verbal communi­
cation, and he conjectures that a similar test would prove that the 
human right hemisphere lacks self-consciousness even to this paltry 
degree.
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Puccetti [1975] replies that DeWitt, in saying that the right 
hemisphere lacks all linguistic abilities, is making the same mistake 
as did Eccles, in running together firstly the ability to evoke 
verbal responses, with secondly the ability to understand language, 
and argues that the right hemisphere does not lack this second ability, 
as is shown by Zaidel's tests, just described. Puccetti also cites 
Sperry’s experiments whereby the right hemisphere responds to a 
verbal request, such as 'draw the figure you see with your left hand' 
where the image of a dollar sign is restricted to the right hemisphere 
and the image of a question mark is restricted to the left hemi­
sphere. The patient is asked to draw what he sees, with his left hand 
(which, alongside the paper, is hidden from his view) and, as he 
draws, he is asked to say what he is drawing. The patient said that 
he was drawing a question mark whereas he was drawing a dollar sign.
Puccetti takes up DeWitt's experimental challenge regarding the 
right hemisphere's linguistic abilities, saying that an experiment 
could be devised wherein tachistoscopic images could be flashed 
exclusively to the right hemisphere, and the patient is asked to 
press a button with his left hand upon seeing images of his own face. 
Puccetti conjectures that the right hemisphere would actually do 
better at this than would the left hemisphere, since the right is 
known to be superior in facial recognition, and since failure to 
recognise faces, including one's own, is always found to be due to a 
lesion in the right parietal lobe. In fact, such experiments were 
performed by Sperry and Zaidel, and, while the results vindicated 
Puccetti to some extent, they were inconclusive. Basically, when the 
patient's own image was flashed to the right hemisphere, there was no
immediate recognition - it only came gradually, i.e. 'I don't know....
yes... it might be me... it is me... yes, definately, it's me'. The 
rese^fChers put this down to the assistance of verbal signals from the 
left hemisphere, and so the results indicate that while the right 
hemisphere has some sense of self, the extent cannot be assessed, nor 
how it compares to that of the left hemisphere. A more crucial 
reservation is that such results show merely that the right hemisphere 
recognises ci self, and not that it recognises itself as itself as 
distinct from the left hemisphere.
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7.7 SPERRY'S 'TWO MIND' THEORY
I will now turn to what I regard as a more credible view, 
associated originally with Sperry, namely that split-brain patients 
always have two distinct centres of consciousness, both in everyday 
life and under experimental conditions, in a way that the rest of us 
having an intact cerebral cortex do not. The most obvious issue that 
this theory must deal with is the apparently high degree of integrated 
behaviour exhibited by such patients under normal circumstances. In 
fact, this can be accounted for with no great difficulty. Take the 
case of vision, the sensory modality that most controlled experiments 
have focussed on. Normal saccadic eye movement causes an image to be 
registered on both halves of the retina within around 250 millisecond^, 
thus enabling both cerebral hemispheres to gain direct access to the 
same stimuli. This, plus normal head and neck movement, can explain 
how both hemispheres will gather virtually identical information about 
relatively stable (i.e. all but the instantaneous) features of the 
environment. Thus, under normal circumstances, split-brain patients 
will exhibit nothing that would indicate a split or a plurality in 
consciousness.
But this does not refute the claim that such people have a 
continuously divided consciousness, as the conclusion that follows 
more naturally from the above-mentioned facts is not that such 
patients have one unified stream of conscious experiences, but rather 
that they have two parallel streams, due to the independent duplication 
of sensory stimuli, with, to quote Sperry [1968], "no direct causal 
connection between the corresponding neural representations - ratherf 
there are separate independent causal pathways from the sensory 
receptors to each hemisphere" (p297).
Sperry further points out that each hemisphere has indirect 
access to the other’s contents by means of 'cross-cuing' strategies 
(which are sometimes referred to, rather question-beggingly, as 'self- 
cuing'). Cross-cuing is a means whereby one hemisphere uses 
information deriving from behavioural responses originating from the 
other hemisphere. The phenomenon was illustrated in experiments by 
Gazzaniga [1970] designed to test whether the right hemisphere could 
verbally identify colour stimuli. Under controlled conditions where 
the image was restricted to the right hemisphere, the patient was asked 
to guess whether red or green had been flashed, and, since it was the 
left hemisphere thg£ was initiating the talking whilst being blind to
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the stimuli, the patient had, it was assumed, a 50% chance of guessiing 
correctly. However, the researchers noted that a significantly higher 
rate of success was achieved if the initial guess was allowed to be 
revised, without the patient being told whether it was correct or not, 
and a second guess permitted. Yet they were satisfied that they had 
set up the experimental conditions to eliminate the possibility of 
the left hemisphere gaining direct access to the stimuli. The clue to 
what was going on came when they noticed that the patient seemed to 
know that his initial guess was wrong. Thus, if red was flashed, and 
the first guess was correct, the patient would be content to stick 
with this answer, whereas if he guessed that it was green, he would 
immediately react, commonly with a frown or a shake of the head, 
saying ’No, I mean’t red'. What was happening was that since auditory 
impulses are transmitted to both hemispheres, and since both hemi­
spheres can activate movements of the head and neck, the right hemi­
sphere, having heard the left hemisphere answer 'green', and having 
recognised this as the wrong answer, would react with a disapproving 
gesture, which would be / - e c o c y M . and interpreted by the left 
hemisphere, which would infer that a mistake had been made, and 
suitably ' revise the answer, which would then be greeted with a smile.
Similarly, if an object is placed, out of sight, in a patient's 
left hand, and he is asked to identify it, he will more than likely 
guess wrongly, since there is only a small and primitive form of 
ipselateral recognition of tactile stimuli, and of course the 
dominant hemisphere has no direct access to the object. However, as 
in the previous case, the right hemisphere will hear the left's 
guess, and will make a frown, etc., which will act as a cue to the 
left hemisphere to revise the guess.
However, the implementation of information deriving from cross- 
cuing strategies does not constitute a proof of the existence of 
merely a single centre of consciousness, since the situation corres­
ponds to the way in which we come to know the contents of another 
person's mind. That is, we have no direct access, but we come to it 
inferentially, albeit unconsciously, just as in the case of cross- 
cuing. In the case of split-brain patients, one hemisphere does not 
have access to the other's mental contents in the same way that it 
does to its own. It knows its own contents, or at least its own 
conscious contents, directly and non-inferentially, whereas its 
knowledge of the other hemisphere's contents is of the same epistemo- 
logical status as is it's knowledge of the contents of other minds.
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7.8 THE SUBJECTIVE VIEW
I want now to turn briefly from my main line of argument, and 
examine the 'subjective' aspect of split-brain surgery - the 'how it 
feels like from the inside', the 'what it's like'. The left hemisphere 
does not disown actions initiated by the right. Rather, it acts from 
a unitary perspective, confabulating, and integrating such an action 
into a comprehensible schema by means of plausible explanations, as 
if the intention and motive were Jtfs own. This tendency to gloss over
paradox and the fundamental disruption of deep assumptions seems to
be irresistible - the integrative impulse persists even in cases of
patients who are relatively informed regarding the effects of
commissurotomy. For example, Gazzaniga and Ledoux [1978] flashed the 
image of a snowy scene to the right hemisphere and simultaneously 
flashed the image of a chicken claw to the left hemisphere, and then 
showed each a sequence of pictures, asking each to select, by pointing, 
the picture that 'matched' the observed image best. The left hand 
indicated a shovel as linked with the snowy scene, and the right hand 
indicated a chicken head to go with the claw, justifying the choices 
as 'the checken claw goes with the chicken and you need a shovel to 
clean out the chicken shed'. Thus, the left hemisphere justifies the 
left-hand choice by integrating it into its own explanatory schema.
Gillett [1986] emphasises this integrative impulse, which he 
extends to circumstances in which the patient is conscious of a 
conflict which he then tries to overcome by various means (although 
I reckon that he is wrong in saying that such processes as cross-cuing 
and confabulation are conscious)... "Because they do try to reintegrate 
their information, or make best use of their disrupted brain function 
in tackling the tasks they are set, they can properly be said to be 
struggling with certain confusions to which they find themselves 
subject rather than to have become two mutually independent streams 
of consciousness which are in a no more than contingent relation to 
each other" (p227).
I disagree with Gillett here, for reasons that I will state when 
I consider Charles Marks' criticisms of Sperry. But for the moment, 
it is worth asking why it should be assumed that the patient's own 
subjective view of his situation has any special validity. It may 
just be a fact about the commissurotomised brain that it cannot help 
struggling towards greater integration of experience and action, and 
regarding itself as a single centre of consciousness, but may be
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radically misled as to the real situation, like in the case of 
amputees who continue to suffer pains in 'phantom limbs'. Once we 
step outside the language of the neurosciences, we are at a loss to 
adequately describe what is going on, and there is no reason to assume 
that this confusion is less marked from the first-person perspective. 
Likewise, when Nagel points out th&t others meeting these patients 
find it natural to relate to them as single individuals, one is 
inclined to wonder just what the natural response would be if they 
regarded them as having two distinct minds. Anyhow, in place of 
'natural' here, perhaps we should read 'entrenched', and, as I've 
said, the mere fact of its practice is no necessary indication of its 
correctness or appropriateness.
7.9 SPERRY CHALLENGED
Returning to Sperry's theory, I will now discuss his use of the 
central concept of 'unity of consciousness'. To Sperry, the criterion 
of a single unified consciousness is that the set of neural states 
coonstituting the physical realisation of this centre of conscious­
ness be directly causally connected and integrated. This might be 
better expressed by saying that the physical basis must be such that 
it enables members of this set of neural events (which will, from the 
inside, realise token sensations and propositional attitudes) to be 
directly - that is, without some external intermediary - causally 
connected, so that one can effect the other, or so that they can be 
co-experienced. By this criterion, he argues, in cases of split-brain 
surgery, the left and right hemispheres cannot together constitute 
the physical basis of one unified consciousness, because the cutting 
of the corpus callosum removes the physical basis of the direct 
connecting system between them, and thus no direct causal relations 
can exist between two neural events where one is located in one hemi­
sphere and one in the other - they can only be connected indirectly 
via inference from external cues.
This position is a strong one, but it is not conclusive. A few 
facts are worth considering :
Firstly, the nature of the communication between the hemispheres is 
still to some extent a matter of conjecture, as indeed is the very 
nature of information storage and retrieval in the brain. It is very 
tempting to think of the corpus callosum in terms of crude analogies 
such as with a form of telegraph network, relaying messages from 
place to place - but such models will more than likely be highly
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misleading, and it may well be that at present we lack the appropriate 
concepts with which to give a more accurate picture.
Secondly, it is well-established that in infancy there is no traffic 
of information between the two hemispheres, as the corpus callosum 
only becomes functional at around two years of age, and is only fully 
operative at around ten years. It is assumed that this slowly evolving 
process allows the two hemispheres to develop their different modes 
of cognition with a fair degree of independence.
Thirdly, and even more strikingly, consider people born with 
asymptomatic agenesis of the corpus callosum - that is, who are born 
without a corpus callosum and never develop one, yet in whom no 
unusual behavioural nor cognitive responses are discovered, neither 
in normal circumstances nor, crucially, when exposed to the same tests 
that revealed the tell-tale responses in split-brain patients. They 
responded to such experiments exactly like someone with an intact and 
functional corpus callosum, and therefore we have absolutely no 
grounds for the view that such persons possess a 'divided conscious­
ness' or 'two minds'.
But how can this be so if there is no physical basis for one 
unified consciousness? The answer is that it cannot be so - in other 
words, given that such people show every indication of having one 
unified consciousness, there must be some physical means whereby this 
is achieved - but obviously a different one. Neurologists reckon that 
the only viable explanation is that certain minor commissures have 
taken on the functions normally carried out by the corpus callosum.
This is not considered to be peculiar, since, from the point of view 
of evolutionary fitness, it is to be expected that the structure of 
the brain should allow both for some degree of adaptability, and have 
a certain degree of redundancy, and we have already seen strong 
evidence for redundancy in brain structure with the independent 
bipolar duplication of sensory information, and, as I've just mentioned, 
the fairly late development of a fully-functioning corpus callosum.
In fact it is now believed that the transfer of information 
across the corpus callosum is highly redundant in the everyday 
functioning of normal brains, and that such information is largely 
filtered out by some information-integrating system within the cortex, 
and thus it plays little direct role in the integration of mental 
life. If this is the case, it appears that the integration of 
behaviour in normal brain functioning is, to a very large degree, 
carried out by the same integrating mechanisms as in the case of
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split-brain patients, namely bipolar independent duplication of 
information. Marks [1986] takes this fact and argues that by Sperry's 
criterion of the unity of consciousness, we all, virtually all the 
time, fail to satisfy this condition, and therefore all of us have a 
disunified consciousness, a conclusion that Sperry would not want to 
accept.
This is a strong attack, but not conclusive. To remind ourselves, 
Sperry's criterion states that a 'mind' or centre of consciousness 
counts as single and unified the neural processes constituting the 
physical basis for that consciousness can be directly causally related. 
The usual way that the hemispheres are connected is by the corpus 
callosum, which enables direct causal connections to hold between the 
contents of the cerebral cortex. The fact that this function is 
neither as crucial nor as extensive as was once thought does not 
negate the existence of the function itself. Even if most integration 
of behaviour is achieved via the independent bipolar duplication of 
sensory stimuli, it-remains the case that some integration of 
behaviour is achieved by means of the corpus callosum. The crucial 
point of Sperry's criterion is that it is necessary that there be 
some physical basis that allows direct causal connections between 
processes constituting the 'centre of consciousness' in question. It 
is beside the point that the integration of behaviour and experience 
can also be achieved by other means.
It would also be wrong to suggest that the phenomenon of 
asymptomatic agenesis of the corpus callosum can provide a refutation o\ 
Sperry's theory. This would only be the case if possession of an 
intact and well-functioning corpus callosum was a necessary condition 
of having a unified consciousness , but it is not, given that people 
with agenesis of the corpus callosum display no indication of having 
a split in consciousness even under the most rigorous of tests, 
indeed under the paradigmatic tests used to reveal such a split. 
Sperry's criterion merely demands that there be some physical basis 
for the unity of consciousness - it doesn't matter what form this 
takes, as it is a functional requirement, and as such it cannot be 
reduced to any one physical specification.
Charles Marks uses the fact of the redundancy of much of the 
information transferred between the hemispheres via the corpus 
callosum to suggest that perhaps the independent duplication of 
sensory information can suffice to unite consciousness, and that
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bilateral neural representation is a sufficient physical basis for 
such a unity. To back up his case, he suggests a weakening of Sperry’s 
criterion, to the effect that it is not necessary that neural 
processes which together combine to realise a mental state be directly 
causally connected, but rather that it is sufficient that causally 
unrelated neural processes jointly, but separately, produce effects 
that realise a mental state.
My objections to this argument are firstly that it makes the 
fact of whether a consciousness is unified or divided, singular or 
plural, depend on factors outside itself and its physical basis, 
because it remains the case that experimental conditions can be set 
up whereby the independent duplication of sensory stimuli is prevented, 
thereby creating responses that are indicative of a major split in 
consciousness, where, in Nagel’s words, "there appear to be things 
happening simultaneously which cannot fit into a single mind : 
simultaneous attention to two incompatible tasks" (pl60). Nagel 
himself suggests a criterion for the unity of consciousness that is 
similar to, and compatible with Sperry's : "Roughly, we assume that a 
single mind has sufficiently immediate access to its conscious states 
that, for elements of experience or other mental events occurring 
simultaneously or in close temporal proximity, the mind which is 
their subject can also experience the simpler relations between them 
if it attends to them. Thus we assume that when a single person has 
two visual impressions, he can usually also experience the sameness 
or difference of their coloration...(etc)"(pl60). Clearly a criterion 
for the unity of mind cannot be so vulnerable, so contingent on 
external circumstances, as I have shown Marks' to be.
My second objection to Marks' criterion is that it runs 
together two totally different concepts which need to be distinguished, 
namely (i) a unified single consciousness, and (ii) two qualitatively 
identical but numerically distinct centres of consciousness which, 
as it happens (given certain conditions, albeit almost always 
present) are running along parallel lines.
I will now return to the main body of experimental findings, 
and use it to construct an ideal experiment which goes to the heart 
of the matter regarding the issue of mental unity in split-brain 
patients, and which I regard as forming the strongest argument 
against the view that split-brain patients possess a single centre of 
consciousness. Contrary to Nagel, I do not believe that we have hard
140
and fast criteria to tell us when certain mental activities are
mutually exclusive and which thus cannot be simultaneously entertained
in a single mind.... but the following argument is designed to display 
a very strong contender for such a pair of activities. The experiment 
takes the usual form of a test to establish that^under thg previously- 
described experimental conditions as devised by Sperry, Gazzaniga & 
Co., when patches of red and green are flashed simultaneously to
opposite sides of the patient's visual field, then each hemisphere
will be aware of one each of the colours, but not of the other. I
will spell it out :
1. Take a situation as described above, where both hemispheres 
perceive and correctly identify their respective colour patches.
2. Red and green are logical contraries, so that nothing can be both 
all-red and all-green at the same time.
3. From this, we can say that one subject of experience cannot 
perceive only red and only green at the same time.
4. However, it is logically possible for a subject A to see only red
at time t, and for a subject B to see only green at t, if A ^ B.
5. Given that red and green were perceived simultaneously, it follows 
that A f B. In other words, the left and right hemispheres must be 
separate and distinct subjects of experience at t.
7.10 DEGREES OF MENTAL UNITY
It may well appear from the past few pages as if I am advocating
a position similar to that of Sperry in this debate, namely that 
split-brain patients always have a 'disunified consciousness' or 
'two minds', whereas those of us with an intact cerebral cortex have 
a single unified consciousness. I do not hold this position. Rather,
I maintain that all of the major positions that I have discussed, 
including those of Puccetti, Eccles, Sperry, and Marks, each share 
the common fundamental error of regarding the question of the 'unity 
of mind' and other equivalent expressions as being a determinate,
'all or nothing' matter, [t is this mistake that allows them to
regard 'minds' themselves as coming in discrete units or quanta.
As opposed to this, my view is that unity of mind is in all cases 
a matter of degree, and that firstly, our everyday concept of a
'single mind' can allow a substantial degree of disunity, and secondly
that there is no all-or-nothing difference regarding mental unity
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between ourselves and split-brain patients - our mental unity or 
disunity just holds to different degrees.
On this first point, I am in substantial agreement with Margolis 
[1975] when he says that "the so-called unity of minds and persons is 
designed to accommodate all sorts of anomalies - for instance self- 
deception, contradictory beliefs, aphasias, loss of memory, compulsions, 
ignorance about one's motives and intentions, dreaming and sleep­
walking, the subconscious, schizophrenia and dissociative personality" 
(p279). I will discuss some of these conditions in the following 
chapter, where I will argue that Multiple Personality Disorder is 
the exception to the rule.
On my second point, let us go back to my description of the 
various forms of commissurotomy - complete, central and frontal (see 
ch.7.2) - and remember that the extent of the operation required is 
gradually becoming less and less due to our ability to locate the 
source of epileptic seizures. The important point here is that the 
degree of psychological disunity displayed by such patients is 
proportionate to the amount of surgery performed - so we do not have 
an all-or-nothing distinction between ’normal’ and 'split1 brains, 
but rather, in Moor's words, a 'split-brain spectrum', with varying 
degrees of mental disunity.
However, even in a 'far-end' case in this spectrum, involving 
complete commissurotomy, it would be a mistake to characterise the 
cerebral hemispheres as constituting two completely distinct and 
independently-functioning minds. To see why, let us return to the 
'two-mind' theorists' account of why, if both hemispheres are 
conscious, and capable of independent thought and volition, there 
are not frequent and visible conflicts between them. Puccetti [1973] 
gives a clear answer to this question, and one with which Sperry 
would be in full agreement : not only do the two divided hemispheres 
have a history of almost identical experience and access to sensory 
stimuli, but also "common sub-routines of learned behaviour stored in 
the still-intact cerebellum, and a common internal milieu (blood 
sugar, hormones, etc)... same autonomic, humoral and muscular reactions 
are shared, either by peripheral sensory feedback or via the intact 
brain stem, the shared vascular system, cerebrospinal fluid, and so 
on. Since primary drives are mediated at subcortical levels, it is no 
surprise that both hemispheres feel hungry, thirsty, lustful, or what 
have you, at the same time. Even in test conditions an emotional
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reaction gets into both hemispheres"(p343).
Quite right, but surely all of this can be used against a 'two- 
minds' theory. As Ritgerink [1980] says, "Surely motivational drives 
and emotive responses are an integral part of any human mind. If these 
experiences cannot occur without the operations of the sub-cortical 
areas of the brain, then these regions should be included as parts of
the same mind"(pAh2). So, since the brain stem and other sub-
cortical structures are not sectioned, then both alleged 'minds' 
share common parts, and therefore are not distinct and separate. Thus 
we see the strength of Moor's analogy of the tree which forked into 
two main branches.
It was forgotten by the 'two-mind' theorists that despite the 
fact that the cerebral cortex can, with a fair degree of accuracy, be 
called the 'seat' of conscious experience, the brain stem constitutes 
a necessary requirement for such experience to take place. To quote 
Pallis [1983], "The reticular formation forms the central core of the 
brain stem and projects to wide areas of the limbic system and neo­
cortex. Projections from the upper part of the brain stem are
responsible for alerting mechanisms. These can be thought of as the
capacity for generating consciousness. The content of consciousness 
(what a person knows, thinks, feels) is a function of activated 
cerebral hemispheres. But unless there is a functioning brain stem 
'switching on' the hemispheres, one cannot speak of such a content"
(p7). Penfield [in Eccles 1970] is equally explicit : "Consciousness 
continues, regardless of what area of cerebral cortex is removed. On 
the other hand, consciousness is inevitably lost when the function of 
the higher brain stem (diencephalon) is interrupted by injury, pressure, 
disease, or local epileptic discharge"(p234).
Let us now return to my 'side-issues' of ch.7.4, which now turn 
out to be more relevant than at first they appeared. You will recall 
that I described my state of simultaneously both knowing and not 
knowing a phone number. This was acknowledged as a form of mental 
disunity that does not prompt us to ascribe a plurality of minds. 
However, the issue that I want to take up now derives from my remark 
then, almost in passing, that an account of this state of affairs 
could possibly be given in the language of neurology in such a way as 
to avoid the contradiction and incomprehensibility resulting from 
the mentalistic, intentional description. My point is that this can 
also be done regarding descriptions of the results of split-brain
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research.
When these results were described in mentalistic terms (i.e. the 
person both knew and didn’t know that p, both saw and didn’t see q; 
saw both q and r simultaneously when q and r form a mutually exclusive 
pair, etc.,), it seemed that we could only avoid paradox at the 
expense of giving up the notion of a single unified subject of 
experience, and this, of course, was the source of all the philosoph­
ical perplexity. However, when we restrict our description to the 
language of the neurosciences, the paradox disappears, along with the 
philosophical problems. Problems only re-emerge when we attempt to 
translate this description into the commonsense vocabulary of folk 
psychology. But (as I discuss in the following chapter), like cases 
of self-deception and Multiple Personality Disorder, such phenomena 
associated with split-brain patients are unintelligible within this 
framework, as, to quote Wilkes [ 1988] or**,-KbptUssl^ , Fnj»^ ' fo tavo
irrational or non-rational behaviour is, after all, rational. This is 
all we can do with the commonsense vocabulary of psychological terms, 
since that is what it is for" (pl59). In other words, the folk- 
psychological framework presupposes a form of unity of mind that is 
absent in these cases.
Wilkes compares split-brain cases with those involving pure 
alexia where, for example, someone who can write clearly and fluently 
cannot then read what he has written. Such a situation is not 
intelligible within the folk-psychological framework, which takes it 
for granted that the two abilities are always correlated. However, 
again the situation is explicable at the neurological level. (Very 
roughly, there is damage to the left visual cortex and its associated 
area of the corpus callosum, so that there is no direct communication 
between the language centres in the left hemisphere and the intact 
right visual cortex). As Gardner [1975] says, Here the study of brain 
damage has helped us dissect a skill into its component partst a 
capacity thought to be unitary - the reading of symbols - is shown to 
be divisible into separate functions"(pl6). It follows that, to quote 
Wilkes again, "pure alexia is no longer philosophically puzzling, as 
the 'rational1 explanation has been superceded.... we cannot and 
should not expect an explanatory apparatus, developed precisely to 
explain what is tational and sensible about human purposive action, 
to cope with the non-rational, the irrational, the not-sensible. It 
must be supplemented or superceded"(pl61). Such brain disorders are 
legion. I refer the reader to Sacks [1986] for a selection.
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So what do we say in conclusion? We accept that some disunity of 
mind is inevitable, and that this holds to varying degrees, beyond 
which our folk-psychological framework leads to paradox. When the 
disunity takes place against a backdrop of general integration, such 
as in cases of split-brain surgery, we should maintain that there is 
°ne person present, with one mind, albeit a significantly disunited 
one. Since mental unity/disunity is not an all-or-nothing*matter, we 
cannot derive a plurality of minds from the existence of disunity.
James Moor again offers an excellent analogy : *I believe that the 
concept of a single person with a disunified consciousness will 
become less strange as science advances. There is a rough analogy 
with our notion of an atom. For a long time it was commonsense that 
atoms were indivisible. Now we regard them as complex systems.... In 
a similar way, I think we should understand persons as complex systems 
- even systems that can be somewhat disconnected"(plOA).
7.11 Appendix : 'MY PHYSICS EXAM'
I will end this chapter with some reflections on Parfit's [1984] 
thought-experiment entitled ’My Physics Exam', an imaginative 
application of having a divided consciousness like a split-brain 
patient. I will follow Parfit in telling the story in the first 
person :
I am one of the small percentage of the population whose 
linguistic functions are shared more or less equally by both hemi­
spheres. I am also in possession of a device whereby, by activating 
it, I can block all direct communication between my hemispheres by 
raising my eyebrows, and reunite them again by lowering each eyebrow.
I am sitting a physics exam, and realise that I only have fifteen 
minutes left with which to answer a question, but there are two 
possible strategies to adopt in answering it, and I don’t know which 
one is the more appropriate, and I don't have time to attempt both.
So instead I 'divide my mind', assigning one strategy to each hemi­
sphere, reuniting them in time to write up the best answer.
Parfit reckons that I would not experience any sensation of 
division, as each stream of consciousness would seem to be straight­
forwardly continuous with the pre-division single stream, the only 
difference for each ’subject’ being the disappearence of half the 
visual field, and of the sensation and control of half the body. As
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one subject works on one strategy, he can see the hand controlled by 
the other subject working on the other strategy, but he is unaware of 
the corresponding mental processes underlying the writing - in looking 
at it, it is just as if he is ’peeking' at a neighbour’s work (without 
the risk of being disqualified for cheating!). Once both sets of 
calculations are done, there comes a time where 'I am now about to 
unite my mind’. Once this reunion is achieved, Parfit expects that I 
will remember having worked on both strategies, and that both will be 
genuine memories.
The first point I have to make here is that Parfit’s thought- 
experiment is invalid because he has made errors concerning the facts 
on which it is based. If some such device could cut off all direct 
communication between my hemispheres, each half-brain would not 
therefore lose half their visual field in such a situation, as head 
and eye movements would compensate perfectly. Parfit might reply that 
this is a minor error which doesn’t affect his major point. Perhaps
  but he faces other difficulties. One concerns the above-
mentioned quote 'I am now about to unite my mind’. This is unfortun­
ately expressed, as it implies the existence of some ’I ’, some 
conscious subject of experience, over and above the two disconnected 
hemispheres. Certainly Parfit would not want to admit such a subject, 
and neither would I. Still, this action of reuniting the mind would 
seem to require a high degree of cooperation between the two 
disconnected hemispheres, thus posing a problem as to how this is 
achieved. Perhaps one could signal to the other ’I ’ve finished’ and 
the other could reply ’so have I ’ by a pre-arranged code. If not, the 
difficulty can be overcome by recasting the story while retaining it’s 
central point, for example by dropping Parfit’s eyebrow device, and 
replacing it with some pre-set timing device, so that one could set 
it to divide the mind and to reunite it after a given time, thus 
relieving the hemispheres of the task of having to arrange it by 
themselves.
In fact, if we revise the thought-experiment as I suggest, it 
has the added advantage of improving its credibility by bringing it a 
little closer to what is practically possible at present. Wada (see 
Patricia Churchland [1986]) has shown that it is possible to 
anaesthetise a single cerebral hemisphere by injecting sodium amytal 
into the ipselateral carotid artery, thus putting it out of action 
for as long as the drug is operative. Let us imagine that a drug has 
been invented that can similarly block the activity of the corpus
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callosum, while leaving the hemispheres themselves unaffected, apart 
from their functional separation. Let us also imagine that the process 
has been refined to such an extent that one can be so specific as to 
put the corpus callosum out of action for ten minutes, give or take 
a few seconds. We now have the means for reconstrucing Parfitfs story 
in such a way that the problem of re-uniting is avoided.
However, my second problem isn't so easy. It goes back to the 
question of whether the hemispheres themselves have the self-conscious­
ness necessary to earn the status of 'selves' (see the debate between 
DeWitt and Puccetti, ch.7.6). I have already noted that the experi­
mental results have proved inconclusive on this question. I propose 
a means whereby this matter can be settled. Quite simply, the 
experimental set-up remains that as devised by Sperry and Zaidel, 
incorporating a Z-lens, whereby an image of a printed sentence is 
flashed to each hemisphere separately, namely 'which are you, the 
left hemisphere or the right?' Patients would be told to reply by 
means of previously arranged hand signals.
Let us imagine for the moment that the hemispheres fail the test, 
and return to Parfit's thought-experiment. If such a self-conscious­
ness was beyond them, then a self-identification would be equally 
impossible, and the thought-experiment could not get started. The 
plan that 'the left hemisphere will attempt strategy A' is only 
possible if the subject knows that he ijs the left hemisphere. It will 
clearly not do to peek at what the other subject is doing - i.e. to 
see that he's doing strategy B, and that therefore he must be the 
right hemisphere, and therefore I must be the left. This will not 
work, because obviously the problem of self-identificatoin will affect 
this other subject as well, so it will only succeed if the other's 
identity could be established independently of his attempting strategy 
B. So if neither he nor I know which one he is, then I cannot know 
whether the strategy he is working on is his originally allocated one, 
and therefore I cannot deduce my_ correct strategy, nor my identity, 
from it.
Now the obvious solution to this problem is to suggest that each 
subject could identify himself by reference to his relationship to 
the body - i.e. given the established facts regarding contralateral 
control of limbs, etc. for example, a subject could attempt to write 
with both hands, and if he could only do so with the right, then he 
can deduce that he is the left hemisphere. Now I accept this, but
u n
strange consequences arise from it. It means that for 'subjects1 in 
a split-brain situation, correct self-identification is contingent 
on knowing certain neurological facts which, while they are common 
knowledge within the appropriate scientific circles, are still 
unknown to most people. This state of affairs is fundamentally 
different from the position of subjects embodied by undivided brains 
- I do not deduce my identity by recourse to any tests. It is also 
worth noting that such a test is not applicable to all situations - 
for example in an isolation tank, where one is deprived of all 
external sensory stimuli by being within a light-proof, sound-proof 
tank, floating in a saline solution at body temperature. If a split- 
brain patient, as depicted by Parfit, was placed in such an environment, 
his means of self-identification would be removed.
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CHAPTER 8 DEGREES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL UNITY
8.1 MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Having cleared up some misconceptions regarding the most-discussed 
'problem case' regarding personal identity and the concept of the 
unity of mind, I wish to turn now to another prima facie paradoxical 
condition, namely Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), which seems to 
call into question the fundamental notion of mental unity that we take 
for granted.
MPD was originally categorised as an extreme form of dissociative 
disorder, and, after numerous changes in status, this is how it is 
regarded at present. As Fahy [1988] says, "The nosological status of 
MPD was altered when it was listed as a diagnosis among the dissociative 
stated in DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association 1980) having been 
included as a symptom in the hysteria section in DSM-II (APA 1968).
MPD will also be accorded special recognition in ICD-10t where it will 
become a special diagnosis classified under the dissociative disorders 
of memory* awareness and identity (World Health Organisation 1987)"
(p598).
The concept of dissociation originally derives from the theory of 
'association', that memories were brought to conscious awareness by the 
mechanism of 'association of ideas', so that memories that are not 
available by connection to such a network are 'dissociated'. More 
recently, Taylor and Martin [1944] define MPD as a generic term 
specifying psychological conditions wherein "two or more personalities, 
each of which is so well-developed and integrated as to have a 
relatively coordinated» rich* unified and stable life of its own (p2.82.) 
appear to occupy one and the same physical body. Each personality is 
equipped with a complex integrated structure of memories, behaviour 
patterns, opinions, values, etc., with each such structure having 
autonomy and independence from its other cohabitees , often to the 
extent of complete ignortince as to the others existence, except 
through indirect, external channels.
It must be noted that MPD is a very rare condition. It seems to 
have reached a peak between 1840 and 1910. For the next few decades 
there was scarcely a book or article to be found on the subject (one 
notable exception, to be discussed in the following pages, was the case
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of Eve White/Eve Black) and the few that did appear tended to rely on 
historical cases from the Victorian heyday. As Nemiah [1981] remarks, 
on the subject of dissociative disorders in general, by the early 20th 
century, for reasons that are not entirely clear, there was a sudden 
loss of interest in these clinical syndromes.,, (but)... such clinical 
apathy cannot be blamed on a disappearence of patients suffering from 
the disorders, for there is no evidence to suggest that the incidence 
of psychogenic amnesia and most of its related clinical states has in 
any way diminished since that time" (pl545). However, it should be 
admitted that Nemiah regards MPD as the exception, having all but 
disappeared. On the other hand, at a recent symposium on MPD by the 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America, the considered opinion was that 
there are around one thousand cases at present in the USA alone.
In the light of Nemiah’s observations, it seems most likely that, 
given that the conditions described as ’dissociative’ have been with 
us throughout this century, their low profile was a consequence of 
major shifts taking place in psychological and psychiatric theory, 
firstly under the impact of Freud (around the time that the syndrome 
’disappeared’), and later as a result of the shift of attention from 
’mind1 and ’consciousness’ by the behaviourists. As Kuhn made very 
clear, such a change in perspective is accompanied by a change in 
interests and priorities, so that what was once a central research 
project or field of inquiry suddenly becomes an unfashionable, marginal 
issue, and is subsequently ignored.
It has been argued that the present relative scarcity of cases 
of MPD, and its virtual confinement to one socio-historical period, is 
a strong indication that the condition may have been an artefact of 
one particular social environment, and, more particularly, the self- 
fulfilling creation of a specific psychiatric theory - in other words, 
the suggestion is that MPD was what we would now call an iatrogenic 
illness. For instance, in a supposedly authoritative article, Charles 
Rycroft [1987] argued that two necessary conditions for the development 
of the condition are "(1) Prevailing views on the nature of person­
ality make it conceivable that two personalities can occupy the same 
bodily frame, and (2) The potential case of multiple or split person­
ality encounters a psychiatrist who believes in, or is already 
interested in, dissociation of the personality" (pl97).
This first alleged condition looks confused. It is certainly the
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case that such a psychiatric condition would not, nay could not be 
characterised, nor even recognised, except within a theoretical frame­
work that regarded it as conceivable. But this is a general point about 
the conditions of perception and of understanding, and as such cannot 
carry the critical weight that Rycroft intends for it. Also, it seems 
to be the wrong way round - if there had not been cases presented to 
psychiatrists that exhibited the symptomatology that could possibly 
be schematized as falling under the category of MPD, it is hard to see 
how any theories put forward to account for such phenomena could ever 
have been developed (or indeed why they would ever have been formulated). 
Furthermore, many case histories clearly state that the symptoms were 
well-developed before the patient was presented to any psychiatrist. So 
it seems to be a very strong bet that the symptoms that had previously 
been put down to demonic possession and suchlike, and were later put 
down to repression and the unconscious, had at least very strong 
similarities to those which were diagnosed as MPD.
Rycroft's second condition can be interpreted in two ways : 
firstly, as with his first condition, it can point to the fact that a 
theory is a lens through which we come to interpret experience, or, 
more significantly, he can be interpreted as pointing to the phenomenon 
of transference, wherein patients will unconsciously produce the 
symptoms that the doctor wants, in order to please him, for praise, 
etc. This process was not recognised in the last century. It is 
certainly a factor that must be seriously considered, but, since 
Freud, it is recognised as a hazard that can affect all forms of 
psychotherapy, and be present in any psychiatric condition, not just 
MPD, and thus it cannot be employed to dismiss the condition.
It has also been suggested, in conjunction with Rycroft1s first 
condition, that, given that the vast majority of documented cases of 
MPD exhibited a pronounced split between, on the one hand, the original 
reserved, straight-laced personality, and a second emergent outgoing, 
fun-loving personality, the dissociation of the two was explained as 
a result of the repression of life-affirming impulses under the 
weight of convention and 'Victorian values', which, in tandem with 
the second condition, would be reflected in the formality and 
reticence of the doctor/patient relationship, so that the 'new' 
personality would only be allowed to come out into the open under the 
aegis of specially-designed contrivances such as hypnosis.
However, we can accept that these abovementioned social restraints
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were responsible for the typical form that the split took, while 
maintaining that thfcCe is a general underlying tendency in the psyche 
to fragment under pressure, wifuiis common to all social settings.
There are also counterexamples to this typical form of split, for
instance(Rev. Thomas Hanna, who, after sustaining a head injury, began
■ ■a
to alternate between two personae.):! while being mutually amnesic,
h<AA,«' ,
were very similar in character* ' : his general character - likes/
dislikes, opinions, tastes, values - seems not to have been affected 
at all.
Anyhow, Rycroft’s arguments are totally beside the point. Even 
if he is correct in saying that MPD was a purely iatrogenic condition 
and restricted to certain social environments, this does not remove 
the fact that the phenomenon existed (or exists) - it merely offers 
an account of how it came to exist, and whatever the cause, the effect 
is real enough. Furthermore, there now exist various independent 
techniques with which to detect splits in personality, based on the 
recognition that such psychological conditions have certain physical 
correlates or accompaniments. For example, as Wilkes [1988] reports, 
it has been demonstrated that different ’personalities’ display 
different responses to EEG tests; in galvanic skin response to 
emotionally loaded words and phrases, and in visually evoked responses 
to light flashes. THere are also cases in which one personality is 
subject to specific allergies that the others do not share.
8.2 MINDS, PERSONS & PERSONALITIES
But what are we to say about cases of MPD? That there are two (or 
however many) persons coexisting in one body? That there is one person 
with two minds? One person with one divided mind? Note that the range 
of possibilities is similar to that characterising the debate 
concerning split-brain patients. Incidentally, it should be noted 
that in non-philosophical discussion of these issues, the terms ’mind’ 
and ’self’ (and others, such as 'centre of consciousness’) are used 
fairly interchangeably, with, perhaps, in the case of ’mind’, the 
more generally cognitive aspects stressed, and in the case of ’self', 
the more reflexive aspects emphasised. I hope that my sometimes informal 
usage will not lead to confusion. I will also try and show why some 
degree of looseness is inevitable in using such basic psychological 
terms.
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But to return to the question raised in the previous paragraph, 
it is certainly the case that due to fundamental, deeply entrenched 
assumptions regarding persons - namely that the mind is unitary and 
indivisible, with one to each body, embodied in the brain, and with 
the person essentially identified with this mind-brain - then any of 
the above speculative suggestions will be perceived as having a 
substantial degree of oddity, since they diverge so strongly from 
common usage. But, as is so often the case, such a conflict can be an 
indication of an inadequate theory being stretched out of shape by the 
pressure of unwieldy phenomena.
My conclusion will be that to demand a decision between the above 
formulations, to ask which one is correct, is to ask an empty question, 
as they are merely equivalent descriptions of the same condition, all 
struggling to deal with the fact that MPD poses an immense challenge 
for the commonsense view that a person necessarily possesses a single 
indivisible conscious mind. I will also argue that all of the above 
formulations are equally inadequate to account for what is going on 
in cases of MPD, due to their being couched in folk-psychological 
terms. I reckon that we are fooled into thinking that there is a real 
disagreement between saying that it involves 'one person with two 
minds' or 'one person with a single divided mind' due to our deeply- 
rooted tendency to reify the mind (and the self) - to think that minds 
are things that come in discrete pristine units. In other words, we 
are still plagued by the ghost of the Cartesian Ego. Hopefully, 
elucidation will lead to exorcism.
I will also claim that there is no clear-cut black and white 
difference between someone with MPD and the rest of us, but merely
different shades of grey. The integrity of the mind is a matter of
degree, with each individual being placed at some point on a continuum, 
with, at one end, the (unattainable) ideal of a perfectly integrated 
psyche that fully exemplifies the Socratic maxim of 'Man, know thyself', 
and, at the other extreme, a state of complete fragmentation that is 
exemplified not by cases of MPD, but by someone like the Korsakoff's 
Syndrome victim William Thompson, discusses in Chapter 6, and who, as 
I have already suggested, cannot in any substantial sense be said to
have a self at all.
At this point, I should perhaps be a little more specific regarding 
the central notion of 'unity of mind', and what constitutes a single
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mind (although, as I have already hinted, we can only be precise up 
to a point). A single mind, and our network of folk-psychological 
concepts, primarily belief and desire, form the basis of a deeply 
entrenched though rarely explicit theory of human behaviour. Forgetting 
for the moment any question of mind/brain identity or any physical 
criterion for the individuation of minds, one highly plausible sugge­
stion is that the mind is put forward not as a theoretical entity 
proposed in order to explain behaviour, but as a descriptive term to 
mark the coherence of one’s behaviour through time. Such accounts will 
inevitably be holistic, invoking a network of propositional attitudes 
spreading out to account for a piece of behaviour. A simple model 
would be along the lines of 'Why did you do x?' - ’Because I wanted 
y, and thought that doing x would lead to y'. Underlying this basic 
explanation will be a complex system of beliefs, desires, values and 
interests, and the whole memory system underlying knowledge. So when 
any piece of behaviour can be viewed as rational in the light of this 
network, the subject can be said to have a mind.
We only feel drawn to make this theory explicit when we are 
presented with anomalous cases such as MPD that seem to be outwith 
its range. Due to the inherent vagueness of folk-psychological terms, 
it is not possible to give a clear demarcation line (except in a 
purely stipulative way) that would allow us to decide up to exactly 
what degree of disunity or fragmentation we can regard a mind as 
single - but clearly there are some cases that look to be definately 
beyond the pale. It is to these that I shall now turn.
8.3 THE CASE OF MARY REYNOLDS
Let us consider the famous case of Mary Reynolds (1793-1854) (see 
McDougal [1926]). At 18 years of age, this young woman 'of dull and 
melancholy temperament' awoke from a long sleep with a severe and 
wide-ranging amnesia regarding episodic, semantic and procedural 
memory - for example she remembered nothing of her past life, she was 
unable to recognise her family, and no longer knew how to read or 
write. Apart from this, the most noticeable feature of her condition 
was that she displayed a strikingly different personality, now being 
'friendly, merry and adventurous, with a new interest in the outdoors'. 
I will call her original personality MR1 and her newly acquired one 
MR2, and when I want to refer to her without implying any split, I 
will simply call her Mary. After five weeks, and following another
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prolonged sleep, she awoke as MR1, with all her pre-MR2 memories now 
restored, but with total amnesia regarding the previous five weeks as 
MR2. She alternated between these two mutually amnesic modes for 
another sixteen years before stabilising as a 'modified' MR2, where 
she remained for the rest of her life.
The argument that MR1 and MR2 should be regarded as being or 
as having two distinct minds focusses on the self-containment and 
internal integrity of structure of each personality. In order to 
account for any piece of behaviour of Mary as MR1, we would attempt 
to rationalise it in terms of the beliefs and desires of MR1 alone. 
Those of MR2 would be irrelevant, since they are as causally 
separated from those of MR1 as are those of any other person.
Another closely related reason for regarding MR1 and MR2 as 
being two separate minds is that any attempt to combine their two 
respective networks of propositional attitudes leads to paradox.
Take some piece of information, 'p', that is discovered (and is 
both known and believed) by MR1, but not by MR2. If we want to 
deny the distinctness of the minds of MR1 and MR2, we are forced to 
say that Mary, at time t, both knows and doesn't know (and both 
believes and doesn't believe) that p.
However, as we have seen from my account of my experience of 
both knowing and not knowing a telephone number (in chapter 7), such 
a prima facie paradoxical result does not force us into positing a 
plurality of minds. However, unlike this case, in which it seemed 
that there was a lack of integration between different modes of 
information acquisition or recall, in such a case of MPD we are 
presented with the appearence of two fully formed subjects manifesting 
(or not) the same form of knowing (This is even more clearly 
illustrated in cases of intraconsciousness, to be discussed shortly). 
There is no correlated structural breakdown, such as between speech 
centres and the visual cortex in the case of pure alexia, or lack of 
integration of sensory stimuli as in the case of split-brain patients. 
And regarding this latter condition, any attempt to account for MPD 
on the basis of a split-brain model (by Fingarette [1969], for 
example) is completely unwarrojited by the facts, as well as being 
clearly inappropriate to cases involving several co-existing 
personalities, such as with Christine Beauchamp, where such a model 
breaks down as there just aren't enough cerebral hemispheres to go 
round!
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Returning to Mary’s state of knowing-and-not-knowing that p, we 
can, following Haight [1980] construct an argument to show that the 
peculiarly selective and recurring qualities of the mutual amnesia 
and the non-cooperation between the two personae is strongly counter­
indicative of regarding them as different aspects of one single mind. 
Imagine that MR1 discovers some fact, p again, that she reckons that 
MR2 could not be trusted to keep secret, so she destroys or alters 
any material evidence suggestive of p, making it look, if anything, 
that not p is the true state of affairs. This external rearrangement 
would be sufficient to prevent MR2 from acquiring the knowledge or 
belief that p. MR1 acted in the knowledge that mutual amnesia between 
MR2 and herself would bar MR2 from having direct access to MRl's k 
knowledge that p. She wouldn't need to success, or to perform mental 
manipulations on any of her mental contents in order for the 
deception to go through.
Now it is certain that there is a paradox in the idea of a 
complete and conscious self-deception - roughly, If I know enough to 
devise such a deception, and to carry it off, then I'll know too much 
to be taken in by it. So, given that the deception by MR1 on MR2 
succeeds, and is complete and consciously adopted, it cannot be a case 
of self-deception, and thus is incompatible with any attempt to 
combine MR1 and MR2 into one single mind, and thus we are forced to 
regard then as distinct and separate minds,
8.4 ALL ABOUT EVE
I will now turn to a second, equally renowned case of MPD, 
namely Ms. Chris Sizemore, who achieved fame (or notoriety) via the 
Hollywoodesque treatment of her case by Drs. Thigpen and Cleckley 
[1957],wherein Ms. Sizemore's extreme dissociative split was character­
ised as being between two highly distinct personalities, the outgoing, 
direct 'Eve Black' and the timid, constrained 'Eve White' (These two 
surnames were devised by Ms. Sizemore herself). Unlike the previous 
case of Mary Reynolds, this is not a case of two personae alternating 
in a relationship of complete mutual amnesia. Rather, their relation­
ship exhibited one-sided 'intraconsciousness', where one personality 
is aware of the other and of her thoughts throughout, even when this 
other is dominant or 'manifested'. Eve Black (EB) was intraconscious 
of Eve White (EW) while EW was totally ignorant of the existence of
EB. As EB said, j ^nQW ^er thoughts H k e  she knows them herself. I
don't think 'em, of course. But I can nearly always tell what's on 
her mind". It follows from this testimony that EB could somehow 
clearly distinguish EW's thoughts from her own. So we have the 
peculiar situation that EW was 'transparent* to EB, like with one's 
own self-awareness (or perhaps more like a case of complete telepathy), 
yet EB was a complete stranger to EW - she had no direct access to 
EB's thoughts, any more than to those of any other person, and had no 
direct evidence of the existence of her omniscient shadow.
EB's dominance over EW had a further striking aspect - by some 
peculiar form of intense concentration, EB could 'erase' certain of 
EW's memories, should she decide that EW should not be allowed to have 
them; yet she herself, EB, would still have access to these memories.
Alternatively, on a Freudian model, we could say that these memories
were buried to the EW mode, trapped in the unconscious, whilst 
remaining available to EB. But, looking back at the analysis of 
deception in the case of Mary Reynolds, again, on either way of 
looking at it, it is hard to accommodate it into any theory claiming
that EB and EW constitute a single mind.
Wilkes [1988] examines the famous Beauchamp case in terms of 
Dennett’s [1976] six 'Conditions of Personhood' to see if these
encourage a singular or plural view of the patient. I will do the same
for Chris Sizemore/Eve Black/Eve White. Now none of these conditions 
are unproblematic - but for my purposes, all I need to demonstrate in 
order to show that the plural view is the more appropriate is that 
there are no extra problems in the application of these conditions to 
a 'personality' to those that arise in their application to the rest 
of us.
Firstly then, both EW and EB are clearly capable of rational 
thought to the degree required of persons. Secondly, states of 
consciousness can be ascribed to them, as can mental/intentional 
predicates. Thirdly, both are capable of verbal communication.
Fourthly, both can be ascribed £elf-consciousness, as can be seen 
from EB's ability to distinguish 'her' thoughts from those of EW. As
Wilkes notes, the next condition of personhood is slightly more
problematic in its application to personalities : Regarding the 
condition that whether x counts as a person depends in part on 
whether we treat her as an object of moral concern, then, as Wilkes 
admits, »^t is just a plain fact that the doctors in charge treat 
these patients as single individuals to be cured" (pl21)....yet she
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admits the paradoxical corollary that at this point in treatment, 
involving distinct dissociated personalities, the doctor may not have 
a single person x there to treat, as the creation, or the recovery of 
such an integrated individual is the whole point of the therapy - i.e. 
one is presented with either EW or E B * > o  who, or where is Chris 
Sizemore? But to this it can be added that the treatment also 
involves the doctor taking the intentional stance towards individual 
personalities, for example in his attitude towards one personality 
regarding her attitudes and actions towards another personality.
This last point shows that the sixth condition, regarding the ability 
to reciprocate the intentional stance, to see others as persons, is 
also satisfied by such personalities, again pointing to a plural 
view of the dissociated patient. These are clearly capable of what 
Frankfurt [1971] calls ^second-order' beliefs and desires, as is 
shown by their strategies towards other 'cohabitees’.
8.5 DISSOCIATION AND HYPNOSIS
Such cases of MPD exhibiting intraconsciousness have distinct 
parallels with certain states of mind that can be induced in at least 
the majority of us by means of hypnosis. Such parallels focus on the 
much-documented but little-understood phenomenon of post-hypnotic 
suggestion, wherein commands that are given while the person is in 
the hypnotic state will be acted upon later, once the person is 
brought out of the hypnotic trance, by means of some pre-planted cue, 
without the person remembering having received these instructions, and 
thus being blind to the true cause of his having performed the action 
relating to the command. Afterwards, if the action is innocuous or 
unremarkable (e.g. lighting a cigarette after the hypnotist scratches 
his head), he will rationalise his action, for example by claiming 
that he just felt a sudden urge for a cigarette. And, of course, he
will not be lying - this is what it will feel like from the inside.
However, if the programmed action is bizarre - for example, one 
incident that I witnessed where an unfortunate victim of a stage 
hypnotist suddenly jumped bolt upright in the middle of the audience, 
screaming 'The Russians are coming!! ’ - such an action, totally 
incongruous in terms of his ordinary beliefs and desires, would soon 
be seen for what it was.
We can see the similarities to the case of EW/EB, in terms of a
split in consciousness with one-way amnesia, and also in 
inaccessible information surfacr to directly affect behaviour. But
the strongest parallel with hypnotic phenomena is with intraconscious­
ness. If we take a person 'A’, and call him ’A H ’ when he is under­
going hypnosis, and ’AW' when he has awoken from the hypnotic trance, 
but still vulnerable to post-hypnotic suggestion, we can say that AW 
performs an action which has roots that are completely unknown to him, 
and since observation of the cue is a necessary condition of such an 
action (and since such cues can be subtle and undemonstrative, which 
implies that anyone acting upon it must, on some level, be on the 
lookout for it), and given that AW is unaware of the cue’s significance, 
all this suggests that some residue of AH remains while AW is dominant. 
This suggests that A's condition is not like having two alternating 
personalities, but more clearly resembles a one-way intraconscious 
pair like EW and EB. Of course, any split in A is much more limited, 
as there is no way that AH is complex or developed or autonomous 
enough to be regarded as a personality, as his sphere of operation is 
'. that of acting upon a single cue, So AH is better described as an 
intraconscious dissociated response mechanism.
While acknowledging the similarities between hypnotic states and 
MPD, the actual relationship between them is not clear, as I mentioned 
in ch.6.9. As Fahy [1988] says, "Since hypnosis has been used to treat 
MPD it has been important to clarify the extent to which it is 
responsible for the disorder. Under hypnosis, alternate personalities 
may reveal themselves when required by the therapist. That there is a 
relationship between hypnosis and MPD is suggested by the high 
hypnotisability scores of mostMPD patients". Subjects under hypnosis 
have some features in common with MPD patients, i.e. production of 
alternates with different behaviour patterns and amnesia, the appear- 
ence of such phenomena as automatic writing and post-hypnotic suggestion, 
and also "7% of normal individuals were able to respond to suggestions
to create a secondary personality using an age regression test......
However, the age regression model, like the automatic writing model, 
does not provide an entirely satisfactory comparison with MPD, lacking 
the complexity and chronicity of the clinical syndrome• There is 
scanty evidence that short-term exposure to hypnosis can induce well- 
developed alternates through the use of hypnosis alone.... That 
patients are excellent hypnotic subjects and prone to self-hypnosis 
does not prove that the relationship between hypnosis and MPD is 
causal" (p601).
Hypnosis gives us clear examples of seemingly paradoxical states 
of ’knowing and not knowing’, ’seeing and not seeing’ that resemble
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results of experiments on split-brain patients that I have already 
discussed. For example, as Wilkes tells us, one good way of finding 
out if someone is really hypnotised or is just faking it is to place 
an object, e.g. a chair, in his path, whereupon the faker will walk 
into it whereas the genuinely hypnotised person will walk round it. The 
peculiarity of this response lies in the fact that the person clearly 
sees the chair (as is shown by his ability to avoid collision with it), 
yet it is also as if he never saw it, as is suggested by the fact that 
he will not mention the chair if he is asked to give an inventory of 
the contents of the room, and also if he is asked why he diverted 
from his straight path, he will rationalise his action without 
reference to the chair.
Another split that is strikingly parallel to those shown in 
split-brain patients is hypnotic anaesthesia. Hilgard [1977] describes 
tests wherein a person is hypnotised and is told that he will feel no 
pain. His hand and arm are placed in a container filled with icy water, 
whereupon he continues to appear to be without distress, and, if asked, 
will confirm that he feels nothing. However, if he is given a pen in 
his other hand, and asked to write down on paper (positioned out of 
his sight) how he is feeling, he will complain bitterly about the pain. 
(The 'writer1 is an example of a phenomenon that is commonly referred 
to as the 'hidden observer'). So here we seem to have a case of someone 
who both feels and does not feel pain, or, who both is and is not in 
pain.
8.6 THE SELF
Discussion of 'the self' in contemporary clinical psychotherapy 
does not presuppose the existence of the self as some separately- 
existing entity of that name, over and above the facts of physical 
and psychological continuity. As Toulmin [1977] says, we must 
distinguish this project from that of speculative philosophical 
psychology, where a major focus of attention was the purported 
existence of such an entity, which was postulated as a theoretical 
entity to explain the order and regularity among mental contents - an 
enterprise doomed to failure, as Hume recognised. To quote Toulmin :
"In clinical contexts, the point of invoking the self is not to specu­
late about concealed mechanisms... Theories of the self 'cash in for' 
a special class of empirical relations within the whole spectrum of 
'self-' phenomena : self-esteem, self-control, self-understanding,
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etc." (p308). So to talk of a self has no hypothetical or explanotory 
overtones, but is rather descriptive and diagnostic, and rests within 
a context that provides both a grounding and an extension of everyday 
talk on reflexive conduct.
Rather than dwelling on the question of the existence of the self, 
the central issues tackled by a clinical theory of the self concern 
the dual concepts of integration and fragmentation of mental contents 
- beliefs, desires, etc. Toulmin again ; "To be mature (or free from 
psychological troubles) is to have a 'cohesive, well-integrated self't 
to suffer from psychological immaturities (or difficulties in the area 
of self-knowledge) is to have a 'fragile, fragmented, and/or incomple- 
tely-cohesive self1" (p309). Such a schema is reflected in such common 
expressions as 'cracking up', 'falling apart' or, conversely of 'being 
together'.
Toulmin's position fits well with my depiction of what is involved 
in the 'unity of mind' as I have been building up over the last three 
chapters : "The integration of the cohesive self is the compendious 
label for the coherence of feelings and motives, intentions and 
actions, typical of a psychologically free agent....(consisting in)., 
a rational coherence between the different components of his self- 
knowledge... . Conversely, fragmentation of the self (consists in).... 
the absence of intelligible coherence between these different reflexive 
characteristics of the agent's conduct" (p309).
8.7 A MATTER OF DEGREE
Perhaps one day, once a fully satisfactory.\tun3physiology or neuro­
psychology has been established, MPD will be given an explanation that 
dissolves its apparently paradoxical nature, where, instead of positing
two or more 'minds', we could describe the physical processes and sub-
Puv\ Vo be. .
systems that/*. ' “  ^ : with each other. Perhaps we will be able
to specify the brain processes underlying such a condition, and be 
able to cure or to pre-empt it - perhaps by chemical means, perhaps 
by electrical means, or by something completely different
. ‘ ‘ ‘ , acupuncture). However, for the
moment, we must accept that, in Nemiahfs words, "the information 
currently available concerning neurophysiological processes is not 
sufficiently detailed to provide clinically useful concepts and 
explanations" (pl545).
So, for the moment, explanations are confined to the psychological 
domain, and these tend to consist of hypotheses regarding the social 
conditions that could contribute to the development of MPD. Any 
'philosophical' problems regarding the condition are left virtually 
untouched. I want now to , develop/ my position that we 'normal'
people and those with MPD are not distinguished by having any different
numbers of entities called 'minds' or 'selves', but that we occupy 
different positions on the integration-fragmentation continuum with 
regard to the relations between our beliefs, desires, etc. I will do 
so by examining a range of mental phenomena experienced by people in 
general (i.e. not clinical cases) to gain more insight into the issue 
of unity of mind, and to emphasise just how theoretically loose a
concept it is. As an entry to this survey, I want to turn to a
causative account of MPD as suggested by Glover [1988]. He notes that, 
as far as contemporary documented cases indicate, MPD is often linked 
with a history of child abuse. He argues plausibly that "it may be very 
hard to form a single picture of yourself that includes both normal
relationships and your role as the victim of these assaults. One
way of coping with this would be to compartmentalise your lifef behaving 
as different people in different contexts". (p23).
By comparison, Glover draws our attention to well-documented 
cases of those who worked in Nazi concentration camps, as doctors, 
guards, etc., who participated in, or turned a blind eye to the most 
hideously evil deeds, yet returned home each night to resume life as, 
say, a loving husband and father. Here, one would not want to say that 
there were two minds or selves present, since, unlike in cases of MPD, 
there is no mutual amnesia, in any literal sense, between the two 
roles. However, even against a background of some integration, there 
is clearly a high degree of dissociation involved, and indeed this 
should not surprise us - how else would one cope with the contradictions 
of such a life? And let us not be complacent or superior - no-one who 
has studied the work of Stanley Milgram [1974] can assume that they
(JiS k  f a i lu r e  cm ( c w a v u a / ,
would be any different,] _ were not essentially different or evil
people, but ordinary people like you or I, responding to extraordinary 
conditions.
Glover quotes Robert Jay Lifton [1987], who describes the 
condition of the concentration camp worker as involving 'doubling' - 
a term he uses to describe a condition involving a psychological 
'barrier', which is set up in order that the two highly conflicting 
modes of being, as the sadistic torturer and as the family man, are
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felt as having nothing to do with each o t h e r , a r e  turned into two 
mutually exclusive modes of living, where such a person leaves his 
humane persona at the gates as he 'clocks in' to the guard mode, and 
collects it again, intact, as he 'clocks out' at the end of the shift.
■lifton uses this term 'doubling' rather than mere 'splitting' to 
draw attention to the fact that such a process involves 'the creation 
of two autonomous selves* - In other words, there is a high degree of 
internal integration between the thoughts, feelings, etc., within each 
persona, but little interaction between them.- the hermetic
hit1
- _' . ' —  _ of non-intraconscious M P D , s t r o n g
enough similarities to warrant the suggestion that MPD is basically a 
more extreme development of a general tendency of the psyche to 
fragment under pressure, whether internal or external.
Moving along the continuum towards the ideal of integration, we 
come to ourselves. We all know the man who is a subservient doormat at 
the office and a tyrant at home. Isn't this just a less extreme 
version of what Lifton is talking about? It is always easier to see 
such compartmentalisation in others! But it is now a commonplace that 
people adopt different roles and behaviour patterns in different 
situations and conditions, with little self-awareness or appreciation 
of doing so. We all express fragmentation of this nature to some 
degree. One of the most penetrating observations of this everyday 
condition comes not from the world of professional philosophy, 
psychology or psychotherapy, but from the Armenian mystic G.I.Gurdjieff 
(see Ouspensky [1950]). This is how he describes the average person's 
state of psychological integration. I include it as it makes an 
interesting comparison with Lifton, not least because of the simil­
arity between their metaphors, of 'barriers' and 'buffers'......
"'Buffer' is a term which requires special explanation. We know what 
buffers on railway carriages are, They are contrivances which lessen 
the shock when carriages or trucks strike one another. If there were 
no buffers the shock of one carriage against another would be very 
unpleasant and dangerous. Buffers soften the results of these shocks 
and render them unnoticeable and imperceptible. Exactly the same
appliances are to be found in man  The cause of their appearence
is the existence in man of many contradictions.... of opinions, 
feelings, sympathies, words and actions. If a man throughout the whole 
of his life were to feel all the contradictions that are within him hB 
could not live and act as calmly as he lives and acts now. He would 
have constant friction, constant unrest.... but if buffers are created
in him he can cease to feel them, and he will not feel the impact from 
the clash of contradictory views, contradictory emotions* contra­
dictory words” (pi 54).
These groups of thoughts and feelings separated by ’buffers' are 
not substantial enough to count as 'selves' or 'minds', and are best 
described as roles or sub-personae, and represent the far less drastic 
degree and form of fragmentation found in people in everyday life, 
without the greater pressures of the concentration camp worker. Such 
'buffers' are not depicted as static, but are dynamic, adapting to new 
experiences. Nor are they indestructable, although their 'dismantling' 
is a tricky business. However, a correct dismantling of buffers will 
allow one to achieve a greater integrity of function, free from the 
internal coercive agencies that such a departmentalisation of 
experience brings, and leads us up the continuum towards what Toulmin 
calls 'maturity'. This is, of course, the aim of psychoanalysis and of 
all forms of psychotherapy. (Of course, 'buffers' do not exist any 
more than do 'selves', over and above the beliefs, desires etc. 
themselves. The utility of such a concept is to mark a form of 
fragmentation between these).
Returning now to the issue of self-deception, this offers us 
another view into the relative fragmentation of the psyche in everyday 
life, fts we have seen, there is a paradox in the idea that one mind 
can consciously and completely achieve a self-deception, and it was 
the factors of a consciously applied strategy and the complete success 
of the deception that made it impossible to characterise the hypothet­
ical deception of MR1 on MR2 as self-deception, and, therefore, why 
we had to regard MR1 and MR2 as separate minds. Howver, despite the 
air of paradox, it remains true that we regard self-deception as a very 
common occurrence. I agree with this belief that self-deception does 
take place, and maintain that it is another indication of the 
relative fragmentation of the psyche, albeit to a significantly lesser 
extent than in the case of MR1 and MR2. I agree with Glover that the 
plausibility of the idea of a complete, conscious self-deception 
derives from an unconscious amalgamation of two different, lesser 
forms of self-deception.
Firstly, we have a self-deception that is conscious but incomplete, 
where one suspects that something is the case, but deliberately don't 
investigate the matter thoroughly or spell out to oneself the 
consequences of its being so. For example, take a self-deception I
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played on myself not long ago : I noticed that I had developed a small 
but painful lump on my body. After an immediate panic of ’Oh no, I ’ve 
got cancer!’, I found myself deliberately ignoring it, not going to 
the doctor, immediately blocking the thought should I remember about 
it. This situation went on for weeks until I finally plucked up the 
courage to find out what the lump was (to my relief).
Secondly, we have a self-deception that is complete, but is 
unconsciously performed, where we unconsciously ignore evidence which, 
with hindsight, was staring us in the face, but which, if it was 
suggested to you at the time, you would deny it. For example, after a 
relationship has ended, you can often recognise certain events as 
signifying the beginning of the end, or as having an import that 
wasn’t admitted at the time, through unconsciously choosing to go 
against an unpleasant truth.
8.8 IN CONCLUSION
I will finish this chapter by relating its conclusions to those 
of chapter 7 regarding split-brain patients, and thus expand on my 
theory of unity of mind. Shoemaker [1984] is in some agreement with my 
general position, in that he accepts that ’unity of mind’ and the 
’integration of mental states’ is one and the same thing, and 
not in an all-or-nothing way, but to varying degrees. He accepts that 
a mind can be ’compartmentalised’, having various subsystems of beliefs, 
desires, values, etc.,/that, while internally coherent,jhave "little 
or less coherence with other subsystems, \\-z u\x' contrasts this state 
with that of an ’integrated’ mind in which all its' mental states 
form a coherent consistent set, so that one's actions can be seen as 
rational in the light of all one's mental states (although it is not 
clear whether he regards such a condition as practically possible, or, 
as I do, as an unattainable ideal or limit). But he accepts that most 
of us, having a modest level of fragmentation, count as having a single 
mind. In this context, he discusses the 'unity relation’, this being 
the relation holding between mental states just in case there is the 
possibility of their being integrated into a single set.
But how are we to understand this cited 'possibility'? Clearly it 
cannot be'logical possibility', as there is no formal contradiction 
involved in the claim that your mental state a, and my mental state b, 
can directly combine to produce an action »}n another body. So such a
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type of'possibility' is far too lax for our purposes. In contrast, far 
too strict is something like 'practically or technically possible1.
It may well be impossible, given the present state of play in medical 
science, to enable the unity relation to hold between certain mental 
states embodied in a single brain - for example in a particularly 
intransigent case of psychogenic amnesia, yet scientific research 
continues am the assumption that many things ' u'- '; are not
realisable at prerent will be so in the future. So a case where the 
unity relation would not hold in 1900 may well do in 2001, by this 
reading of 'possibility'.
Instead, we need what I have called 'theoretical possibility1, 
which is determined by locating the phenomenon under scrutiny within 
a theory that locates the limits of what is possible for an entity of 
the kind concerned. However, this cannot be done for mental states per 
se, and thus the unity relation cannot be given precise conditions 
of applicability. Folk-psychological concepts such as 'Mental ststes1, 
'consciousness', 'will1, etc., are not natural kind terms. Crucially, 
they are inherently too theoretically vague to allow any clear set of 
entailments and implications that are required to be able to locate 
such items within a framework of natural laws.
So we can see now why MPD is still regarded as a source of 
philosophical perplexity. Like split-brain phenomena, pure alexia, 
visual agnosia, it is inexplicable in terms of folk psychology with 
its assumption of a single conscious agent, but, unlike these cases, 
the commonsense model has not been supplanted by another, more 
scientific, systematic model of explanation. So far, the neurosciences 
have shed little light on this condition, as there seems to be no 
associated physical/structural damage of OjA obvious form T 
.T 1. ‘ . 1 as I have said, we now
have the diagnostic tools, in the form of various scanning devices, 
that could easily locate such a lesion). It seems more likely that the 
underlying disorder (of which there obviously 123 one) is located on 
the biochemical level, i.e. a mutant gene, but, at the moment, there 
is no substantial theory of such a kind that can provide a scientific 
account of MPD.
FINAL OVERVIEW
The crucial point, from which all my other conclusions ... , 
involves the dismantling of the very 'Problem of Personal 
Identity', by showing how the traditionally problematic issues stem 
from ft)CuSS(A^ on 'puzzle cases', created by placing certain 
important aspects of human life, namely bodily and mental continuity, 
in conflict with each other, and thereby creating opposing 'criteria 
of personal identity', only one of which could be correct. SUch an 
error was associated with the employment of far too lax a conception 
of 'possibility', as regards whether these counterfactual states of 
affairs could really occur, which in turn led to a false estimation 
of the relevance of these hypothetical cases to the enquiries.
Once these criteria cease to be placed in opposition to each 
other, then, firstly, regarding the Physical Criterion, we can 
accept the commonsense view that we are essentially embodied beings, 
where there is typically continuity over time of a singly body.
Within this, we acknowledge the unique significance of the brain. I 
remain agnostic over the possibility of brain transplants. Should 
they occur, then I accept the judgement that I go where my brain 
goes. Pushing my liberalism regarding thought-experiments to the 
limit, I would say that should 'brain division' and hemisphere 
transplants ever occur, so that two surviving persons have portions 
of my brain, then Parfit's analysis is vindicated.
Regarding the Psychological Criterion, as we have seen, the 
issues that remain centre around the concepts of psychological unity 
and psychological continuity, concerning, respectively, the co­
personality of mental events at-a-time, and over time. These issues 
are firmly located within the fields of the sciences, for instance 
the neurosciences in the cases of memory and split-brain research, 
and psychiatry as regards Multiple Personality Disorder. In order to 
make a useful contribution to the clarification of these issues, 
philosophers will have to become far more familiar with the relevant 
areas of scientific research than they have (with notable exceptions) 
shown themselves to be.
This contribution will involve an investigation of the relation­
ships between firstly our commonsense theories and concepts; 
secondly our inherited philosophical theories; and thirdly the
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results of scientific research, and their interpretation within 
scientific theories and concepts. Within this, the role of the 
philosopher is akin to that of the industrial service ACAS, i.e. 
advice, conciliation, arbitration : determining errors, agreements, 
misunderstandings, and, in cases of irreconcilable differences, 
delimiting the domain of application of each party. This will be 
done with the crucial acknowledgement that the philosopher is not 
thereby making judgements from 'on high', from some perspective 
above, or prior to that of the empirical sciences, but from the 
ground floor level, working with the scientists within the given 
field of enquiry, with each being engaged in different, but 
complementary aspects of the same enterprise.
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